Lessons from the Bekaa Valley

Lessons from the Bekaa Valley - an Indian's assesment    Prof. Prodyut Das

Introduction

The tale of the air war over the Bekaa Valley has only improved with time and telling. It was definitely a spectacular operation but various slanted lessons have been read off the operation. though the Israelis themselves have often said that its lessons cannot be generalized.

This assessment is based on a selection of typical analyses done by various agencies.  I have based as my source official analyses by Col. Dubrov writing in the Aviytsiya and Kosmonautica on the lessons of the war and a commentary on the same by Dr. Benjamin Lambeth writing for RAND. Both these journals are “Government” and being “Government” has the merit of being true though by no means is it the whole truth. Governments cannot afford to work that way.  A factor none of the reports mention was the contribution of the terrain of the Bekaa Valley. It appears to me that the terrain of the Bekaa Valley was significant to the final results and makes the operation” unique” rather than “general”. This I have discussed.

Military reports often have a strong “marketing” angle to them. I have filtered out what I thought were obvious biases. It then appears that at Bekaa Valley rather than “the latest technology” (i.e. unaffordable) warplanes winning the war it was the traditional qualities- diligence, carefulness, training and planning which the Israelis displayed over a sustained period- a decade to be precise-paid rich dividends whilst dogged courage –which the Syrians displayed in abundance- did not get the Syrians anywhere. It should not be taken to mean that if the Syrians had the same qualities of careful planning as the Israelis the loss ratio would have been reversed but certainly with even with the “hand” the Syrians had they could have given the Israelis – who are poorly placed to take casualties- quite a bad fright.  In fact with equally careful planning and some supplementary upgrades on the part of the Syrians the Israelis could have been dissuaded from undertaking the operation at all which is the ultimate achievement of any Armed Force. As an aspirant but pacific major power we should look at the more economical alternatives available to us, thanks to our national policies and considering the current state of our defence research.

Various claims and predictions have been made about the conflict from the Israelis having invented a secret weapon to the fact that the Bekaa Valley triggered the collapse of the Soviet Union to even that  Bekaa Valley is a proof that third ( read x ) generation  fighters cannot survive against fourth ( read x+1)  generation aircraft. This view needs reasoned debate because the assumption is less true than is generally supposed to be. We need to look at the more economic options.

For India the tactical lessons of the Bekaa Valley are not important. The IAF is more than up to that job. The focus is on thephilosophy. Ignoring numbers to concentrate on quality would be as sure a way to defeat as to rely solely on numbers. Adequate numbers of adequate warplanes is the need. How to achieve this balance between sophistication and numbers should occupy our experts because the specifications will be India specific and somewhat different from “world standards”. No one- certainly not the vendors- will tell you what they really  should be. If you enjoyed the first Kung Fu Panda movie you will remember that the secret of the Magic Scroll was that there was no secret and no one will teach you any which way– you have to “figger” out the secret of the Wu Xi hold yourself!

The Yom Kippur War

In the Yom Kippur War of 1973 the Isr.A.F. suffered horrendous losses to the new and then largely unknown SA 6. (Note 1) The flat Sinai terrain allowed the tracked launchers room for maneuver as well as presenting the aircraft as a clear high contrast target. The flat launch trajectory of the SA6 was also of no problem.  Under ideal conditions for the SA 6 system it was devastatingly  effective and the total Isr. AF losses in the critical first 72 hours was 50 aircraft      ( Israeli figures) and  the total losses over the 18 days air war was 109 aircraft. How many fell to what system will not be known because amongst other things the Isr.A.F. mentions all losses as “operational loss” or, if they are feeling particularly talkative that day, “due to ground fire”. As with the PAF, Air to Air losses are almost never acknowledged. Another noteworthy fact was that despite all the legends of Israeli prowess in Intel, lack of up to the minute information had repeatedly caught the Israelis flat footed in 1973.

Surviving the near mortal losses the Israelis prioritized three lessons.

i)                    They focused on the development of tactics to neutralize the threat posed by the tracked SAMs. In this they were aided by the Americans who had a direct interest as NATO forces would encounter the same missile systems were they to engage in hostilities with the USSR. By 1978 i.e. after about five years the Israelis cautiously declared that they had the measure of the SA 6 threat (Note 2). By May 1980 the Israelis were able to “field test” their solution under actual conditions when they destroyed two SA 9 launchers but waited patiently for another two years for a suitable opportunity both tactical and political.

ii)                   They also built up their number of combat squadrons from 14 squadrons to 21 squadrons which included helicopters for the CAS role. It took the Israelis about 5 to 7 years because of the time to train new aircrews and reach an acceptable level of proficiency. The time required to build up of air Strength is noteworthy for India because it is a period of vulnerability.

iii)                Learning from their unpreparedness from Yom Kippur they reorganized their information gathering and dissemination system thoroughly so that information, even at the squadron level was real time. It is interesting to note in the reports  how much stress the Israeli put on the “freshness” of the information. Without the latest information the Bekaa Valley operations would have unravelled badly!

  

The Bekaa Valley shootout

The details of the operations are widely available; what is given here is a summary. Syria had involved itself in Lebanon in support of the PLO and in the early ‘eighties. It had moved its SA 6 batteries into the Bekaa Valley to protect its forces in Lebanon following the shooting down of two of its helicopters by Israeli F 15s. In June 1982 Israeli forces invaded the Lebanon after informing Syria that they had no intentions against the Syrian forces and were after the PLO and would penetrate 40 kms into Lebanon. Apparently Syria accepted the conditions and moved its forces out of the way. When they exceeded that 40 kms limit the Israeli advance was halted by a Syrian armoured division at the River Jazzine on the night of 8-9 June 1982. Israel then saw that as a long awaited opportunity for its plan to take out the SA 6 Batteries. The Israeli Armed Forces, which had been inexact about the excessive advance- 40 kms- from where had not been precisely defined-, emphasized to the Israeli Cabinet  that taking out the SA 6 batteries was crucial to the safety of the Israeli armoured division under Syrian attack. They also assured the Israeli Politicians that given its preparations, careful planning and homework its losses would be minimal. Political Sanction was given by 1000 hrs of 9 th June 1982 but the strike was postponed due weather conditions over Bekaa and the need to update information. The strike was finally unleashed on the SAM sites at around 1400hrs. It will be noted by our planners that despite the overwhelming superiority of the F 15/ F16s over the MiG 21SMT the Israelis waited patiently for another three-four years i.e. until all the other elements in their game were ready, before engaging in combat. The platform's superiority is not everything as is sometimes propunded.

The strike consisted of aircraft at three levels.  It will be of note to India that Second/ Third generation airframes with upgraded avionics e.g. Kfirs/Nesher and upgraded Skyhawks provided CAS at sea levels. Further third generation aircraft, F4s, were stacked in “cab ranks” at 3000 mts and at 9000 mts were the Boeing “jamming” aircraft and the E2A’s AWACS used to direct the strikes.  The Syrians apparently withdrew their combat air patrols but by 1420 hrs the Israelis attacked the EW Radar at Jebel Barick .The Syrians reacted with fighters about an hour later but were shot down flight by flight as they blundered blindly against the Israelis who could not only monitor, thanks to the use of IAI Scout UAVs, each flight almost as soon as they took off but also had jammed their communications.  At around 1550 the Israelis went in for the SA 6 sites using HARM, Shrike and similar standoff missiles mounted on F 4s. The F 16s and F 15s were not tied to close escorts but were employed in the “free hunt” mode with the F 15s also being used as mini AWACs to cover the gaps in coverage. As can be seen from the topographical map the Lebanon side of the Valley was blanked off from the Israeli AWACS by the Lebanon ridge  as the E2s  were operating out over the sea to avoid being shot down by Lebanon based SA6s.

 At its peak there were up to 90 Israeli and 60 Syrian aircraft (note the numerical superiority) in the conflict zone of about 40kms and 40 kms. Having first “blinded” the guidance radars with ARMs the SA 6s were destroyed all by cluster bombs in a very short time- reputedly about 20 minutes because of the up to the minute knowledge of the SA 6 positions. No LGBS were used because the Israelis deemed them to be too slow. It is also noteworthy that the Israelis used long ranged artillery, the Zeev, as an economical way of knocking out the Syrians SA 6s that were within its range. The use of “smart shells” has also been mentioned.

The Losses

The figures usually quoted for the Bekaa Valley shootout are about 85 to 87 Syrian aircraft shot down for no losses for the Israelis. These figures, as with the Soviet official figure of 60 Israeli losses, must be taken as untrue and for respective domestic consumptions. The history of estimation of air combat losses shows that the enemy’s losses are always difficult to estimate even given the best of intentions and intentions are not always the best. In the Battle of Britain the RAF claimed destroying 178 Luftwaffe aircraft on an occasion when the actual German losses were 45. So what were the actual losses?

 The claim of 87 losses means that there were 87 situations when the Israelis thought they had shot down or destroyed a Syrian aircraft. Since the fighting was taking place over territory that was Syrian held it would be difficult to verify the claims.  The Syrian admission of 50 losses and 18 pilots (Note 3) are likely to be nearer to the truth.

The Israeli losses are – and I am going only by my readings on the subject - would have been around ten to twelve. Of these three, two A4s and a Phantom F4 have been confirmed by photographs of the wreckages and the rest must have been caused by the formidable AAA at Bekaa Valley. Whatever their lacunae in terms of planning, the Syrians “stuck to their guns” (literally!) and it would be incredible that the “dumber” weapons 2X23 and 4X23 mm AAA did not “damage beyond economical repair” (delightful PAF phrase; note 4) This is not to belittle the Isr.A.F achievement because 50 kills for wastage of 12 aircraft i.e. 4:1 is enviable.

An analysis of the results

The Bekaa Valley shootout has been used to sell everything from the “latest and best” fighters to, I am fairly sure, some variety of malted milk drinks! There is a view that Bekaa Valley confirms that  “quality” will triumph over “quantity”. My conclusions are somewhat different. Bekaa Valley confirmed more than anything else the traditional qualities of Military Planning- a mastery of one’s own weapons and a thorough knowledge of the enemies’, careful planning, patience, and numerical superiority( to be noted, please!), training all played apart. As always the element of surprise and the first mover’s advantage-which is always significant but in this case inexcusable on the part of the Syrians- is also to be noted. The Bekaa Valley shoot out was an aerial Commando raid brilliantly choreographed. Thanks to diligent planning when it came to the actual fighting, the Israelis were shooting fish in a barrel. Below are some salient points we should note:

The terrain

None of the analysis mentions anything about the terrain. One can conclude it played no part but this goes against common sense if you look at the contours of the Bekaa. A Topographic Map of the Bekaa Valley by the geologist A.S.A. Lateef (presumably no relation of “Late” Lateef  of Indian Folklore!) is included and shows the contours with the usual practice of the heights being shown to a different scale as compared to the distances. The Bekaa is a rift valley with two ridges rising to peaks of 2800 mts and a gap of around 16 kilometers between the ridges. The map being a geological map showing rock compositions does not show the ridges to full height. The Bekaa ridges were fairly narrow at the top.  The North - South orientation of the ridges meant that the theatre was isolated into three sectors- Lebanon, Bekaa and Syria. Any radar located in any of the sectors were isolated by the ridges from looking into or networking with the other two areas and those located on the ridges were sacrificing their mobility and siting options for the sake coverage whereas the Isr.AF EW stations could look up and into the valley. The fighting was confined to a very small “bowl”. What advantages it gave to the jamming which was a big contribution to the success or how the opposite ridge wall may have disadvantaged the SA 6s tracking radars clutter suppression abilities –something that was never a problem in the Yom Kippur War- cannot be quantified here. It must have been a factor.

The Distances

A second feature was the relatively short distances of the airbases of both the combatants from the Bekaa Valley. Typically they would be within 80 to a 100n.m. of the Bekaa the greater ranges of the US warplanes meant that they could loiter over the battle area and were able to give instant support where ever needed.

AWACS

The Israelis were using at least two of their four E2 Hawkeyes and these were operating well above the battle at around 9000 mts and 20 kms away from the Lebanon coastline to stay out of SAM on the seaward side looking right down into the arena. This was supplemented by the powerful radars of the F 15 which supplemented any “blind spots”- a strip about 6 kms wide caused by the shadow of the Lebanon ridge to the E2’s radar. The Israeli set up and maintained an imaginary threat line on the Syrian side and any Syrian flight that crossed that line was destroyed, the Israelis sending in their forces so that there was no friendly fire.

The missiles

The Israelis used the AIM7F Sparrow, the AIM 9L Sidewinder. Some sources mention the homegrown Shafrir but this could be a marketing effort. All the IR missiles were capable of “head on” attacks. The Syrians were using the Atoll which had very restricted launch parameters. The differences in the missiles were at least as important, possibly more a factor as the differences in the platforms.

The Syrian mistakes

The SA 6s mobility was a part of its repertoire for survival even if it was only frantic searching by the attacking pilot around its last known position. Using it on the ridges of the Lebanon (Jabil al Liban) and Anti Lebanon (Jabil al ash Shariki)  mountains meant that mobility was severely compromised . The SA 6s were literally “sitting ducks”. The Israelis knew exactly which holes to ferret and accounts for the swift destruction (allegedly 20 minutes for the 19 batteries) of the SA 6 batteries. Indeed, having suffered from the SA 6 in the Yom Kippur war the Israelis treated the SA 6 with informed respect, delaying at the last minute their strike until two batteries which had moved around a village were located.

 When “baited” by flights of IAI drones the Syrians reportedly switched on all their radars thus revealing their position and confirming them to the ELINT aircraft. This sounds something out of  Leon Uris “Exodus” but if true the Syrians deserved what they got.

MiG 21 SMT avionics

It is fair to describe the MiG 21 SMT as a third generation (Mach 2) airframe with a second generation avionics suite. The MiG 21’s had only front and tail warning from its Sirena RWR and the Israelis who were dominating the agenda fed in its fighter streams to make beam attacks so the Syrians had no inkling that they were being painted even just prior to a VFR attack.

Jamming

The jamming of communications completely disrupted and demoralized the Syrian efforts. It was possibly the key force multiplier in blunting the Syrian response as the pilots were cut off from their GCI. In desperation they were seen to fly around in figure of eights trying to obtain visual contact until they were shot down. “It would not have mattered what aircraft they were flying because the way they were flying they would have been shot down anyway” said one Isr.A.F. Senior planner. This statement is noteworthy. It is possible the confined spaces in which the battle was going on would mean that the jamming would have been particularly effective- the valley acting as a bowl antenna and also the short distances between the arena and the jammer was a factor- as a thumb rules the jamming declines as the square of the distance. It is interesting that the Israelis also used helicopter borne and ground based jammers to ensure complete jamming.The ground based jammers must have been particulalry cost effective.

Jamming of attacks is nothing new. The RAF used “Headache” which was simply a microphone in the engine nacelle of the bomber and broadcasting on the frequency of the Luftwaffe’s fighter control frequency. Very soon the Luftwaffe rigged up a simple device which would home onto the jamming i.e. they would fly to where the jamming was the strongest. Homing on the jamming Boeing 707s does not require high technology. It could have been rigged up by the Syrians themselves for their MiG21s and would have passed the initiative of the battle over to the Syrians because the Israelis would have to move to protect the foundation of its attack strategy, the Boeing 707 jammer. Indeed the Israelis used two F 15s as close escorts to protect it “Jammer” at all times. The Syrians should have anticipated heavy jamming once the Hey Avir got the Boeings and the E2s but obviously they did not. They paid the price.

Politics

In 1981 the COAS Maj.General Mamdouh Hamdi Abazi was assassinated by the Moslem Brotherhood. The Syrian Air Force had to be purged in early 1982. As with Stalin’s purges of the Soviet Armed Forces it must have crippled the Sy.A.F. yet the reports do not mention this significant part.

It is clear that with more “thinking” on the part of the Syrians and with small upgrades to their equipment, as it existed, the Syrians could have got much better results.

 Lessons for India

The Lessons for India are somewhat different than the tactical lessons discussed above. The lesson for us is the need for numbers.

The Russo Japanese War of 1903-4 threw up all the lessons that mechanization of slaughter made possible by the Maxim Machine gun. These were ignored and so had to be grimly re-learnt at greater cost in the First World War. The Yom Kippur and Bekaa Valley certainly and even Kargil and the recent Balakot episode are microcosms of the losses that modern technology can cause.

Our lesson to absorb will be the horrendous losses we will suffer in the opening phases of any serious/sustained conflict. The need is to stay in the fight after the initial shock so that we can “give it back”. Our ability to “Give it back” after the shock and not the initial losses will be the decider. The estimates could be anything between 80 to a 100 aircraft lost due to all causes and another 100 -200 damaged to various degrees in the first 96 hours before we could come up with the counter tactics. It will be noted that the Bekaa Valley ended on the third days by a US/USSR sponsored cease fire before Syrian counter strategies, if any, could be brought into play. We must have sufficient political strength to resist such an enforced ceasefire so that the enemy can at least learn for the future.

This loss rate means that of the ten to twelve squadrons on a particular front will have been worse than decimated. They will need replenishment and, possibly, rotation. We need a larger air Force with the 50 squadrons.  Fifty squadrons is not just a round “Parkinson”-ian figure but the vital second strike capability and therefore the position at the negotiating table. Even the archaic figure of 42 squadrons will not be sufficient because of the increased “mechanization of the killing” since the 42 squadron figure was accepted. The inevitable sacrifice of the aircrew will have gone in vain if just as the attacker’s advantage will have been evened out we cannot hit back because of depleted strike strength. Ideally we should have the latest and the best equipment for these fifty squadrons but the economy cannot sustain that. We would “Pakistan” ourselves very easily.

We are therefore facing a choice about how we are going to be inadequately prepared. Either we have a small excellently equipped and trained air force that will be very sensitive to losses or we will have a larger well equipped Air Force but whose training and serviceability may suffer. The lifetime cost of equipment is usually three to four times the procurement cost. What we are trying to make at home is “not quite international standards” and delayed and what we import is unaffordable in the quantities we shall need and more important, unreliable politically. The problem appears insoluble.

However within the convolutions of the Bekaa Valley lies our answer. It will be noted that:

i)                    None of the platforms used their “limits of the aerodynamic performance” limits. No one pulled 9G and more importantly none of the two hundred aeroplanes went supersonic let alone Mach 2. The Balakot fight reconfirmed this aspect as did Kargil.

ii)                  Equipment did not perform according to the brochure. The “all weather” equipment did not perform under all weather conditions. Strikes had to be postponed according to the weather. If this was the case in the Mediterranean how much worse they will behave under Indian Monsoon/Aandhi. More generally every line of the marketing brochure is followed by several lines of fine print. We either read every line carefully or live in a fool’s paradise.

iii)                Very little additional equipment was needed by the Syrians to avoid the one sided drubbing.

iv)                The platforms by themselves were not important to the result as the Israelis themselves acknowledged. It will be also noted that the Israelis did not rushin as soon as they had the F 15s/F16s.

We have to game the problem differently and so asymetrize the war. We have to ask ourselves what minimum the Syrians really needed to have evened out the losses substantially. They did not have to win or shoot down more etc. The key analysis is to find What did they need so that the Israelis would look at their potential losses and perhaps be dissuaded from attacking?

The Syrians did not need too much. Let me expand the idea:

i)                     I am putting a deliberately provocative proposal. Suppose “the Syrians” had a platform with the performance capabilities of the MiG 17/ Mig 19 in terms of top speed, high AoA, etc i.e something between a second and a third generation airframe.  There would be zero improvement i.e. the losses would the same as the “better” MiG 21 “the Syrians” used but the force would have been cheaper to buy and maintain!

ii)                   To that add jam proof communications. Would the kill ratio have improved? By how much?

iii)                Suppose the Syrians then had added an all aspect RWR system. This could have saved them from being blind in the cases of gun/CCM attacks. The scores would have been altered. By how much?

iv)                Then add to that all aspect CCMs the R 73/R60 or equivalent -what then? Ther would have been considerable change?

v)                   Now put in a HMDS- not the latest thing with this year’s almanac incorporated in it -but something simple that can be locally produced and got into service and what will enable the missile to be pointed correctly. What would have been the kill ratio picture?

We see that fairly simple upgrades could have made the MiG 17/ MiG 19 / hypothetical simple platform quite a deterrent. We also see that at a certain point the Israeli losses may have reached an “unacceptable” level. The question is at what point of this build up would “the Israelis” think carefully and twice before they would attack? They may still have shot down more Syrians but only with “unacceptable” losses.

The basic gaming is what better minimum equipment and tactics should “the Syrians” have used so that the kill/loss ratio became unacceptable to “the Israelis”. I emphasize the minimum because that is what “the Syrians” are capable/can afford as of the moment. I have put “the Syrians” and “the Israelis” within inverted commas because “the Syrians” could be us in a future conflict. We are still relying on imported supplies and specifying what is available “off the shelf”. Soon we will get a picture of a relatively simple “minimum” aircraft tailor made for a clear well defined threat scenario –like ours- which is within the reach of our Industry and costing a fraction of a Mach 2 all singing all dancing type. We start with what we can do for sure- and it is a fair lot- and then build up rather than match the sales brochure of thevendors line for line. This is a ”zero based” specification for a fighter general combat (ZBF-GC) type which will form the core of our air power. The alternative is to import with the consequent options of a small- casualty sensitive air force or inadequately trained one. You are referred to the items 7 to 10 in the references list. We have chosen a very wise mix of MKI/ MMRCA/LWF aircraft to meet our air defence needs. We must maximize the flexibility and the economies this mix gives us to get the large air force that we need but cannot afford if we rely on import. Indeed given the dependencies on spares imports cannot be an option.

In Sum

The Bekaa Valley Air Operations was a commando operation: violent, effective but unlikely to be repeated. The real lesson is not that “Technology” is everything. Bekaa could have been ”won” by the Syrians even with the same “hand”.  It was possible for the Syrians to have done much better and foiled the Israelis with greater losses which would have been good enough.  The reasons for not doing so will never be known because it would have been relatively easy. Perhaps for the highly politicized Arab Armed forces and the purges the small (6-8 squadrons?) Syrian Air Force underwent just prior to Bekaa this was not possible.

The real lesson for us is the likelihood of severe losses for the “defence” and how to absorb them and still remain in the ring. We need a large and sensibly equipped Air Force rather than one to international standards. For us we have to consider whether, with all due respects, is our thinking being “jammed” by Western concepts?  For us following their doctrines is sure recipe for being underprepared

Appendix 1

The changing game

Guided weapons and AI are putting the onus of performance on the missiles and the aircraft is continuing to be more of a platform than ever before. The West, having developed the Mach 2 platforms some sixty years ago, are continuing to use them as the basis for their future aircraft but there is no need for Mach 2 or even Mach 1.4. It is a half truth that transonic performance is “better” in a Mach2 airframe. It need not be so.

We have to evolve a comprehensive doctrine to see how we can cobble a credible deterrence to any threat using whatever technologies that we have developed e.g. the LCA with more range and better transonic handling rather than overpowering it with an engine technology that we still do not have to reach the Mach 1.6 speed and super cruise which is nice to have but not absolutely necessary.

 I insist on the transonic regime i.e. around and less than Mach 1.3 because aircraft in that regime can be significantly smaller, longer ranging and cheaper than something even at Mach 1.4- Mach 1.5 and what is more completely within our present technological capability including the required engine technology.

 I do not believe that we will get any engine technology by any collaboration. Even if we did we would not know what to do with it because the “know why” cannot be taught. “Know why” is situation specific. Our needs and situations will not match theirs.

 Having selected the correct “three class” fighter formula the whole will unravel unless we make the LCA type the cornerstone of our numbers the 30 or 35 squadrons of Fighter –General Purpose to work with the MKIs and theMMRCAs. This would be a transonic airframe with reduced radar (not full stealth- because it is beyond us, the performance penalty is too much and stealth is probably a May laurel- it won’t outlast May!) and IR signatures but with fifth or sixth generation information and display systems and using homegrown VFR missile systems and operating under AWACS and ADGES an area in which we seem to have made hopeful progress.

Note 1

These included actual firing tests in the Negev Desert on captured SA 6 systems.

Note 2

Each Syrian SA 6 battery consisted of one “Straight Flush” fire control radar , four SA 6 launchers based on the PT 76/ZSU 23-4 chassis each with three missiles and two ZiL 131-6  six wheel re- supply trucks. The batteries are controlled by “Long Track” surveillance radar and a thin Skin height fining radar.

Note 3

Of the 87 Syrian losses claimed by the Isr.A.F., 40 were claimed by the F 15s and 44 were claimed by the F 16s and one fell to a F 4. Interestingly the ratio of gun fire /CCMs kills are contradicted by the Israeli sources themselves possibly as a matter of policy. One source said only about 7% of the Syrians fell to the guns i.e. about 6-7 aircraft whereas another sources rather equivocally talked of “surprisingly large number of gun kills.” Take your pick. Amongst the 17 Syrian pilots lost was their Ace of Aces Major Bassam Hamshu ( 8 kills including one on the ground in 1973 ) and Col. Fayaz Mansour ( 4 kills) who was shot down in a ”friendly fire “ incident by a Syrian tank using its 12.7 mm AAA.

Note 4

In his epic fight over Kalaikunda on 6^th September 1965 Flt.Lt Alfred Tyrone Cooke, IAF shot down one F 86 F and severely damaged “beyond economical repair” another F 86 F. He also hole-d two other Sabres but unfortunately was using “ball” ammunition rather than the more correct H.E. (“Minen”) shell possibly due to supply and stock problems. Had Cooke been given the correct ammunition the 14 Squadron PAF would have another two Sabres missing or “beyond economical repairs”. I mention this to emphasise that success will only come from planning and strategy at all levels and every detail.

References

1.      Lambeth. Benjamin S “Moscow’s lessons from the 1982 Lebanon Air War” r 3000AI ISBN 0-8330-0587-1 September 1984

2.      Duvrov V Colnel. Aviatsion in the Lebanon Conflict ( Translated by Benjamin S Lambeth) Aviatsiya I Kosmonautica  No 9 and No 10.

3.      Grant. Rebecca “The Bekaa Valley Air War” Air Force Magazine 06/28/2008

4.      Voronov. Vladimir The Syrian Nemesis. January 2017 ( Translated Arch. Tait) Russia Studies Centre The henry Jackson Society

5.      Flight International no 3832 16/10/1982 “The Bekaa Valley Combat.

6.      Operation Mole Cricket 19 Wikepedia

7.      Das. Prof. Prodyut Kumar “ A cat amongst  the pigeons” blogspot .com profprodyutdas and blogspot profprodyutdas2. Also in Vayu II/2016 “Flying against the wind” pp 86-93

8.      Das Prof. Prodyut “The case for simpler Fighters” Vayu  V/2009 pp 90-96

9.      Das Prof. Prodyut “The Lessons from the Kaveri” Vayu/pp also above blogspot.

10.  Das Prof. Prodyut Kumar” Falcon Griffon Tejas  Vayu”  1/2017

11.  Nicolls David, Cooper Thomas Arab MiG 19 and MiG 21 units in combat Osprey Publishing 2004