The Tejas, Tejas Mk2 and AMCA situation-                                               A review of the crisis.     Prof. Prodyut Das

One has long given up having any faith in official briefings about these projects. The “facts” given in do not fit into the bigger picture and indeed, contradict it. If you try to force fit the new “fact” it dislodges another piece of earlier “official” information as happens in a bad jig saw puzzle.

 A new and disturbing phenomenon is noticed. Earlier the officials gave target dates knowing they could not be achieved e.g. a FF date of April 1990, month and year when at the time of making the announcement the concerned organization did not have its full team or even its own premises. Now the switch is from dates that were outright lies to dates that are trivial. I take the term trivial from mathematics. X=0 is called a trivial solution because whilst it solves the equation such a figure is of no use to anyone. Take the recent declaration of dates of the Tejas Mk2, and the AMCA by the DRDO Chief that the AMCA will be ready by 2035. This date is trivial. Of course, the AMCA can be ready by that date but who present and committing will be in any position to face the consequences should the project remain, as always is, “still just around the “corner”. This date also springs the question why it should take us another 12 years to develop a fighter when the work has been going on this project for the last 15 years! It should take no more than 3 years to roll out or ADA should be deemed an organization unfit for the job.

Since as an aviation “fanatique” I found available information to be useless I set up my own methods to assess the truth. I share here my methodology so that your own conclusions are in no way influenced by mine. I seek no “convert”. The method is quite simple and generally follows the “Laboratory Notes writing steps  of so long ago- Theory, Apparatus, Experiment and conclusions: Here below are the steps

1.      First- and this is from observations of over 43 years- drive from your mind that the problem is only what is being stated e.g. funds, facilities, time etc. It is almost always a smokescreen meant to hide some other sin committed. Look for other causes. You have a right to be paranoid. Remember this is a project running for half the history of aviation and we are not out of the woods by a long chalk.

2.      For every subject being investigated look around for associated incidents however loosely connected and arrange sequentially i.e. Follow Historiography.

3.      Add own’s own experience from various branches of Industry and the “cricket enthusiast”s knowledge of the game.

4.      Do not let your better judgement and conclusions be swayed by the “official” statements. Statistically they are not worth the paper they are printed on. The chances are you may be wrong but not by too much. The other is way out.

With that as a rather cynical ( but unfortunately true!) assessment and  introduction let us examine the current questions.

The Tejas Mk1A Deliveries in 2024-25

Currently the Tejas Mk1A production is held up by production difficulties and development issues.

1.      Production difficulties are mainly due to assembly problems stemming from bad design. Composites, liberally used, is proving to be an insuperable issue. Boeing had the same problems with the 787 but in the early 2000s Boeing was still an “Engineer’s” company and were able to fix those issues. ADA was never an “Engineer’s” company being infested with “politicians” and “the well- connected to Raisina” types. Naturally, even today, it lacks the kind of leaders who will wade in to fix the issue-in situ-getting their hands dirty. The production issues can be tackled but evidently ADA/HAL don’t have that kind of leaders. 

2.      Using Historiography: When did the hullabaloo about the non-delivery of F 404 start? It started after the first crash at Jaisalmer. Before that we were getting confident cock -a hoop promises about 16 -or was it 12 deliveries? - by March 2025 starting from the first delivery in July ‘24  etc. Then on 12 March 2024 a Tejas went in at Jaisalmer. The official report of that accident says it is an engine problem. The slender evidence I have seen does not support that. Even at the frame where the pilot ejects the engine is making a healthy full- throated roar. There is no smoke and the attitude of the aeroplane is normal. Now the pilot must have taken about 3 seconds to assess that the kite was going in and the seat may have taken another second or two to extract the pilot as seen i.e. 3-5 seconds to decide to eject and two seconds from the time the pilot starts to reach for the crotch handle to the time the seat begins to ride. That means that the frame where seat extraction initiates was “crisis + 4 to 7 seconds”. It is my submission that an engine situation serious enough to warrant ejection in the visible configuration of the aircraft – in “high drag” landing mode with the undercarriage down- on a narrow delta low AR wing the attitude of the aircraft seven seconds- say even four seconds- after engine malfunction is all wrong. It should have been in a steep sink, or nose down dive or even “kiting” to generate lift against the decaying airspeed but straight and level? I may be wrong but that’s what I conclude from what is seen. Sorry I cannot accept what is being said. It certainly is not the all.

3.      If sabotage has been ruled out-our prototype security is awful and the Sulur Tejii are all de facto prototypes, then probably this is a software problem. Software quality was a drum ADA has long tom- tom-ed and naturally ADA would like to cover the embarrassment of a software problem after so short an exposure to real life away from Sulur Nursery. The engine is being blamed but that is to cover the scramble to fix the software which would explain the delay and shift in delivery dates. Incidentally one has to point out that the F 35 had a more realistic, more intensive, more risk-taking development programme and yet it was totally crash free development. LM did not even bother to mention about being crash free because the critical requirement is timely and not crash free development.

4.      The Idea of America doing engine politics to stop the potential of the Tejas is the usual self-congratulations and smugness. GE knows that this fighter is still wet behind the ears and they can never sell more than a few engines per year so perhaps they think prioritizing the Koreans as it makes more sense to their bottom line. You need to be canny when you deal with them Yanks but look at the right areas. If one must have an excuse or cover up please make the effort and think of  a better cover up.   

5.      Did you notice that the recent exercise was held at Sulur? Why not anywhere else? Is that a symptom or clue? Why not Goa where at least, as the old Military song went “Come to where the beer is cheaper”?. It is possible the IAF wanted to be sure that there would be always a Tejas available out of a stock of 40 if one was suddenly required. It does not speak highly of the customer confidence. Air Marshal Rajkumar wrote that when the Russians came to salvage a AN-28 that had been “bent” in Assam, all the spare that the pilot of the Mil helicopter brought along to do heli-lifting was some spare tires. The Tejas reliability, in IAF planning, is nowhere near that.

6.      Engine supply issues are a smokescreen to hide problems ADA is incapable of handling.

So how many will we get this year? This is my estimate. The Burra Sahibs have said 12 or 8 whatever. Best to expect about 4 aircraft ready by March 2025- if we are lucky.

Tejas Mk2.

As written earlier in my blog the layout of the canard is extremely disturbing. There WILL be developmental problems with the canards. This possibility came up during a casual, literally “after dinner” discussion on canards with another enthusiast. I raise this small detail to show funds are not a constraint to think. You do not need funds to think about what are the possible problems and here we have ADA, funded in crores, could not in two decades identify this possible problem and having been cautioned insist on proceeding on the outside chance that they “may get away with it”. The perpetrators of this very doubtful decision will be well away from the scene of this “crime” when it is finally exposed. The egos of few officials rather than transparent honesty have always prevented actions. Name one canard fighter with the canard position similar to the Tejas Mk2? Did it make it to production? Let that be the starting point. Don’t show me ONERA analysis, show me common sense examples. One does not need money or facilities if one has common sense, You might read the link at teh end of this piece

The positive action would have been to admit a possible error and a serious risk, thank the people who pointed out and use the inter-regnum, now some three years since this problem was pointed out, to quietly re- design the aircraft forward fuselage to tackle the problem and use the opportunity to reduce RCS. You have been shown up anyway by the Tejas programme. . The expertise to correct the intake and reduce the RCS  is available within the country and would be almost for free but it would raise questions about the higher direction of the project and so, as long as the people get away scot-free they will not hesitate to put the air force at risk- as the steady decline of our Air Strength shows- and save their own hides by "we won't be there when there crunch come".

The AMCA

Having followed the insipid efforts of the AMCA since 2009 when 100 crores (=2.5 tons of Gold) was released for project studies it is a considerable personal fear that come 2035 we will be shocked to find we do NOT have a 5 th generation warplane but a large 4^th generation aircraft which is also “just around the corner”. I conclude this from the rate of development and the lack of attention to detail- fin angles, exhaust masking, intakes with diverters released from time to time since 2009. It is very disturbing. I felt as if the Project group was sleepwalking- and yet the ADA communication show a sense of smug self satisfaction. Given the symptoms the AMCA will fail.

My gloomy prognosis I sum up in the table below:

For brevity I have “digitized” or "binary"-ed the resources assessment. 0 means “inadequate for the task” and 1 means “resources were adequate to do the job”.

Sl.No	Resources	HF 24 Marut	Tejas	Tejas Mk2	AMCA
1	Soft Knowledge	1	0	0	0
2	Detail engineering	1	0	1	1
3	Proven technology	1	0	1	0
4	Funds	1	1	1	1
5	Production technology	1	0	1	1
6	Political Support	0	1	1	1
7	Monitoring for results	1	0	0*	0*
8	Facilities	1	1	1	1
9	Customer Collaboration	1	0	0*	0*

 

*indicates that there has been some improvements but it is still well below required.

The Marut failed because political support, after the advent of Menon, was gradually withdrawn.         The Tejas was funded repeatedly but not monitored.

Going by the weightages of the table The Tejas Mk2 will be ready more or less on time-there will be no ten-year delays about the first flight - but will still fail at the tests for the reasons discussed.

The AMCA will fail in “stealth” even if it is rolled out on time.

 If the Marut failed because ONE Resource was missing what chance does the others with 3-4 ssoft resource missing have. Common sense.

(soft) 

The importance of soft knowledge

The importance of soft knowledge in Engineering design is not given importance in our plans for aircraft development. Any good design begins as a set of vague dreams which swirl in the Chief Designer’s head and various constraints are thought off and tried out “in the head” even before a single line is drawn. Possible engine supply constraints, manufacturing requirements, service idiosyncrasies and other unquantifiable aspects are turned over in the mind. Possible existing platforms are then examined to see if those can be used to form a basis for the new design. Indeed almost 60% of the design takes shape in the Chief Designer’s brain and then the “Mathematics” begins to roll in as does the need for “focused research” to give dimensions to the proposal. Indeed, the plans for project specific research stems after the key problems have been identified. We should have gone in for composites on the Tejas- if at all- only after fairly detailed and repeated project studies showed that the weight target was impossible to meet. Even then supply chain constraints should have been kept in mind. If the US is causing problems, then if it is engines today it will be Carbon- Carbon composites tomorrow Chief Designership is a skilled job and not many can do it. Nor can a single person do all the thinking by himself and the customer is a valued collaborator but that requires deep knowledge. ADA’s reluctance to engage whole heartedly with the IAF in the Tejas could have been a defensive reaction because of this lack of knowledge. Even today I have doubts if that level of knowledge  has been reached though people may have got to know each other better- it is not quite the same thing. People are there and in sufficient numbers but as, the fate of the recent lateral entry scheme showed, there is vested interests to foil it.  

 The 5^th generation problem.

If we think our 5^th generation aircraft problem is going to be solved by developing the AMCA I would call that a smug attitude. The AMCA won’t happen and if it does then 2035 is too late. AI is changing the entire spectrum of warfare and equipment design as the development of transistorized equipment changed aircraft design in the 1960s. Our approach in these uncertain times would be to find methods by which the 5^th generations aircraft of the Others- the F 35s and J 20s and FC 31s are nullified and unable to enter India Air space with impunity. that is possible at a much faster and less cost.

Further reading:https://prodyut7.blogspot.com/2023/05/the-tejas-mk2-corrections-prof.html