The Design of the MiG  17                                                 

     Prof. Prodyut Das

11 May 2026

 

The MiG 17 was so close in design to the MiG 15 that it was initially designated MiG 15 Bis/ 45, the 45 referring to the ten degrees increase in wing sweep over its predecessor. Though near identical to its predecessor, its engineering Historiography is a case study in frugal engineering combined with careful improvement of a good base. The superb MiG 15- really a one and a half generation aircraft- was morphed into an effective match to the 3^rd generation Western fighter despite technological constraints in the engine which enforced a larger fuselage cross section, was slow to throttle responses and reportedly could not be re started in flight. The MiG 17 designers did not wait for the improved AM-5 axial flow engine then under development. The MiG Bureau “mended and made do”. They got Klimov to “clean up” the engine gas flows and add an afterburner.

 The MiG 17 served in nearly forty air arms and was something of an enfant terrible; a very basic but well-designed aircraft that repeatedly proved that even the third generation Western Combat Equipment could be tackled at a fraction of their cost.

The MiG 17 was not invincible but an example of the Designer’s art. It checked all the vital boxes; simple, robust, of adequate but good performance, upgradable, easy to produce- the Chinese were producing at the rate of twenty per month in the sixties - it was potent enough to be ranged against NATO yet simple enough to be acquired and operated by small newly fledged African Air Forces which could not afford elaborate facilities. This could be only achieved partly because the aircraft’s robust engineering and partly because its specifications viewed it as an object for a task. The results? In repeated actual combat world across the world, less trained air Forces, flying under conditions of numerical inferiority, this first and half generation fighter could match the later 3^rd generation Fighters of highly trained “Western” Air Forces and earn their opponents’ caution and respect and do that at lowest cost. You can’t get much better than that.

Engineering the MiG 17

In creating the MiG 17 the design team tackled two sets of problems. The first was to address the lack of equipment and secondly to eradicate lacunae in transonic handling both, of which handicapped the MiG 15’s combat potential over Korea.

The MiG 15 had suffered from buffet and snaking at speeds above M 0.92 reportedly so bad that the airbrakes deployed automatically to prevent things going out of hand. The lack of radar ranging for the guns, pilot anti – G facility, a GGS prone to toppling and lack of powered ailerons had prevented the MiG 15 from scoring better in Korea. The 37 mm NR cannon, whilst devastating against B 29, B 47 and B 50s, was less suitable for general combat as the slow rate of fire and differences in ballistic drops did not permit brisk concentrated fire on the smaller fighter size targets and was replaced by a smaller 23 mm, resulting in a battery of three 23 mms. In discussing the 14: 1 kill ratio of the Sabre over Korea mention is made of the score ratio but not so often of the lacunae in simple critical equipment level partly responsible for the poor results. Naturally The MiG Bureau focused on rectifying these deficiencies.

For the equipment upgrades the entire forward fuselage was revised internally (the external contours were unchanged) to accommodate the new equipment and the smaller cannon. The improvement for transonic handling required more changes and can be summarized as:

i)                  Increase in wing sweep from 35⁰ to a “banana” or “sickle” wing with 47⁰ inboard, and 43⁰ midspan whilst retaining the earlier TsAGI-S12A laminar aerofoil of 12% thickness reducing to 11% at the tip which was rounded instead of the sawn - off tip of the MiG 15.

ii)                If you visualize the air flow past the fuselage as a set of co-axial tubes you will see the aerodynamic logic of the “banana” wing for maximizing lift and reducing drag. The charm of the MiG 17 is in the attention to these small details. An additional pair of fences was added to check the increased spanwise flow caused by the greater wing sweep. Somehow the Sabre and the Super Sabre do not seem to go much for fences and so the use of fences was perhaps  preferred in the spirit of “make do” with Soviet manufacturing constraints or because it was lighter and less complex a solution at the expense of more drag, Today, higher RCS of fences would be a point to ponder.

iii)              The MiG 15’s rather short fuselage was a culprit in its Mach number limitations both in terms of flow separations and the drag coefficient. Fuselage length, aft of the fuselage joint was increased, to improve the coefficient of finesse, by 0.9 mts and reshaped to reduce the “after body” drag. The air brake area was increased. As the same engine was used there was no change in the intake system nor was the intake diameter of 0.747 mts changed.

iv)              Since transonic flight means a rear ward shift in AC the tail volume has to be increased. The 17’s stabilizer was increased in span by 20%. The aerodynamics department was awake but someone in the stress department must have been asleep because during flights at Mach 1 the stabilizer lost its elevators and the aircraft suffered a fatal crash. With hindsight the reason was obvious. It was a case of a cantilever (the stabilizer) on a cantilever (the fin) which is a very big invitation for flutter. What worked well enough on the MiG 15 didn’t work at the higher “q” of the MiG 17 and you will remember that MiG bureau increase the stabilizer span by 20% (to have sufficient tail volume despite the rearward shift of AC) which increased the deflections at flutter amplitudes by almost 100%.

It will be noted that all these many changes were made tested and cleared within a 18 month period of 1951 -53.

The quest for higher Mach nos.

The quest for higher Mach no in the MiG I7 provides engineers an approximate numerical indication of the steep rise in drag in asking for “supersonics”. The MiG 15 could do M 0.92 on 23 kN thrust. Mach 1 required 33 kN that came from an afterburning version of the same Klimov VK-1F. i.e. a 43 % increase over the thrust required for M 0,92. To reach M 1.3 (in an experimental version with two small dia. axials) a thrust of 64.7kN was needed i.e. an increase of 260 % increase of thrust to go from high subsonic to supersonic. Our gentlemen asking for “super cruise” for the AMCA are de facto supporting a foreign collaboration in engine design. It is not a critical need. That money could be better spent in facilities here.

  

The MiG 17 and the Convair F 102 Delta Dart

The MiG 17 vs F 102 comparison reveals the more profound purposeful thinking of the Russian approach. Brochure wise the MiG 17 was obsolescent, compared to the Convair F 102 Delta Dagger, If we cut through the chaff however, the two aircraft were designed for the identical Jet bomber intercept role jet bombers of very similar performance e.g. the B 47 and the Tu 16 and it was the simpler cheaper MiG 17 that could do the job superbly. The Convair F 102 was never tested in that role  but even if it had done well does it even matter when a simpler approach does the task adequately? The comparison underscores the responsibility of frugal and focused specifications in having equipment on time, numbers, least cost and effort. Below is a summary:

The MiG 17 was the simpler aeroplane, at 4300 kgs empty weight less than half of the F 102 Convair Delta Dart’s empty at 8777 kgs. The empty weight is of course an approximation of acquisition costs. The US aircraft had a better longer MG 10 radar with a range 30 n.m. 5 times more than the MiG 17s.Toriye radar of range 6 miles. The MiG 17 could barely do M.1 in service and the F 102 was M.1.3. The MiG 17 relied on guns supplemented by early IR and Radar Homing missiles whereas the F 102 relied on radar guided missiles and rockets but had no provisions for guns. In service the better equipped more expensive US was a disappointment.

The MiG 15/17 routinely intercepted and destroyed USAF B 47s and other intruders. In Vietnam and in the Middle East, the Vietnamese and Arab MiG 17s were serious opponents not to be taken lightly by seasoned pilots flying Mirage III and Phantoms. Many Syrians pilots gained multiple kills against the Israeli A.F and the same was repeated in Vietnam. With some basic electronics upgrades , the MiG 17 would have returned even better results against the Western types because the MiG 17 platform was near optimal for actual combat.

In contrast the F102 displayed all the limitations of the delta overburdened by equipment weight. It was never used against Jet Bombers and when used is ground attack it proved unsuitable and vulnerable to ground fire, its pilot visibility was poor in interception. Deployed in Vietnam against possible NVAF IL -28s its only attempt to intercept led it into a trap set up by two Vietnamese MiG 21s and one of the two F 102s involved was shot down. Its use by the Turk and Greek air forces in clashes was equally undistinguished.

There should be no surprise in the outcomes. It can be explained by the approach of Big Pharma and Ayurveda to diabetes. One advocates the use of Metaformin the other Methi (Fenugreek). Which is more effective, cheaper and actually cures?  IYKYK!

The same Investment banks that finance Big Pharma also funds Big Aviation and with the same aim: making money. If the US Industry survives it is because of the absence of global competition for alternative thinking which has been largely eliminated, perhaps by plan, over time. The Palestine War has shown the F 35 class of aircraft is not for winning wars. It is a bank token to get the Government money back to the banks.

 

Looking back at the future

If you have heard of the phrase “You don’t have to be mad to be in Aviation but it helps” you will understand what I put down below. Having collected material for this blog I had material left over. I spent some time thinking what would happen if one were to apply a modicum of modern technology to this 80-year-old airframe to see what we could get, below is what I found.

The MiG 17 propulsion system (engine plus fuel) weighed about 2200 kilos and occupied 4000 litres of airframe volume. By comparison, a modern propulsion system based, say, on a HTFE 2500 engine, will save the designer a potential 1000 kgs of weight and 2500 lits of space . This allows the Designer to play with:

i)                  More equipment and range keeping size of the aircraft and performance same

ii)                Use the savings to reduce the size of the aircraft and improve performance, reduce RCS,

Or any combination therein.

 I treat the MiG 17 airframe as generic there being at least half a dozen classic fighters which can be similarly studied and would indicate similar possibilities.

One possibility would be studying the design as a F 35 sniper. Utilize the released space for the internal carriage of two IR missiles along with associated equipment for passive IR detection equipment based on Nag ATGM technology and supplemented by ground based LF radar/infrared chains.

The aircraft will not be a point-to-point match of a F 35 or a J 20 but would be a cheaper and much quicker more certain solution to the threat posed by J 20s and F35s

. How much quicker ?  A small private venture team, should be able to give a100% aatmanirbhar “sniper” for flight testing in about 30 months within about 1800 crores. The moral question is should we try for a perfect solution knowing it is likely to be available or an imperfect solution which will work and cost a fraction and be ready on time.

In conclusion

The MiG 17 excellence is often muted because it is an embarrassment to the West’s way of thinking. Here was a versatile aeroplane that cost perhaps between a fourth and a tenth of its “better” opponents but it still made its impact. After all it was the US not Viet Nam that went for a re-look at it pilot training.

There was absolutely no magic in the MiG 17. The MiG was a more profoundly thought design which accepted and respected the axiom that every capability advantage in an area resulted in a disadvantage elsewhere, marring the overall design. In keeping the MiG 17 design upgrades and advantages to the minimum they equally kept it’s bundle of disadvantages to a minimum. It was in this balance that respected technology constraints, operational realities, and customer imperatives that the MiG 17 emerges as a very interesting example of mature design.