The Indian
Aeronautical Industry- Birth, decline and the future – Prof. Prodyut Das
08 June 2026
The Indian
Aeronautical Industry is now in its 86th year. In terms of
continuous existence, it is older than the German Aeronautical Industry though comparisons
must end there,
When Lala
Hirachand Walchand, was refused permission to build the Hindustan Aircraft
Limited in Calcutta in 1939 he chose to go to the Wodeyar Maharaja of Mysore
State who donated land and invested in the new Company.
The original plan
for aircraft manufacture was disrupted by the Second World War and HAL became a
giant MRO for the SE Asia theatre of war. It was an enormous blessing in
disguise.
The Indians were
exposed not only to a vast range of the very latest designs but also the direct
exposure to American Management methods including taking decisions “on the
feet”- the “Gung ho” but methodical approach of Americans to meeting challenges
that war time MRO brought.
The later recovery
of deliberately wrecked Liberators for IAF service, the fact that in the 1970s
HAL was one of the few places which was certified to carry out overhaul
the Curtiss C 46s shows how deeply the training had been absorbed and ingrained.
This spirit was no flash in the pan. When some idiots at the Air HQ (yes,
they also have their quota of that) prematurely scrapped the Canberra somewhere
in the ‘80s it was the HAL workmen who rewrote the overhaul manuals from
memory and got the old girls back into the air for a long second innings.
The spirit and elan was always there though it looked “easy going” to the out
sider.
Given that
fortuitous exposure, HAL activity, in the period 1947 to 1977 was deceptive;
it moved quietly but surprisingly sure-footed. The HT 2, the Pushpak, the
Marut, the Marut 1T, the HJT 16, the HAOP Krishak, the Basant, the HPT 32 and
the Ajeet Trainer -that is nine new types with about a thousand aircraft of
Indian designs produced in a period of thirty years; throw in HT 10,
HSS, HF 73, ASA and HAC 40 project studies and that is about as good as it
gets. Even established Western companies would be pleased with such a track, I
am not including the excellent Dhruv which came later, a contemporary of the
Tejas of which about 400 plus have been built with Prachand and Rudra
derivatives waiting in the wings, not to mention the HJT 36 and the HTT 40. China
in this period was nowhere near and today we have to grudgingly respect them. I
say the setting up of ADA has brought about this change and its failure opened
up the gates to upgrades and imports.,
Post ADA we have
had NO aircraft in 43 years; those lead(pb) sleds at Sulur with a fleet flight
hour total of perhaps 6000 hours in 10 years doesn’t count.
Why results are so
different between pre-ADA and post ADA is simple to answer. Prior to setting up
of ADA the stakeholders directly affected e,g, IAF and HAL were in charge. If
HAL Design Bureau failed HAL Divisions would be out of work and the IAF would
suffer the consequences. As we have seen above it worked remarkably well, though
its achievements are glossed over possibly to justify setting up of ADA. By
contrast
ADA has failed
comprehensively and sustainedly. It continues to get funds, salaries, blames
everyone and pontificates on the difficulties of aircraft design and claims,
just by insertion in 1984, Leadership position for future projects. Why the ADA
was set up at all when HAL/IAF was doing so well even by international
standards is a more difficult question the Government must find out. I have no answer.
A question of
“balls”
Funds and
facilities were always short, even more so in fifty years ago. The difference
in attitude and spirit are noteworthy:
The HT 2 had a spinning problem, quite common in
aircraft design with an inexperienced design team. Ghatge didn’t ask for a
foreign consultancy and then after such consultancy, as with the HJT 36, delay
matters, by another eight years in solving the problem, Ghatge
tried a few alternatives such as strakes, re-designed the shape of the rudder. The
solution based on the rudder worked and within six months that problem was
cleared.
The Basant Mk1 tried a very unique fuselage
configuration (seeing it in the HAL scrap yard I was incredulous that such a
configuration had even been tried) – the aircraft allegedly would not go
out of ground effect. SC Das (no relative; I get asked!), the designer, took
the “hopeless” case’s aggregates, redesigned the fuselage with one of the
largest hoppers in its class and the aircraft went into production at service-
all in a period of two years from start, prototype, failure, redesign, rectification,
ultimate production and service. You may say Das messed it first time; the
question is how quickly he corrected it instead of making excuses and blaming others
but not taking action to correct the mess fastest, That sense of
responsibility and identity with a project and the speed is absent.
The Pushpak was designed and built in 1959 over a
period six weeks. Do we still retain the capability: to design. Build
and fly a production worthy Pushpak in six weeks which the clubs can use?
In six months? In six years? A larger version of the Pushpak, the Krishak was
built for AOP roles and served with the Indian Army in numbers.
So when in 1978 SC Das proposed the HF 25 it was a
sound design by an experienced engineer aware of realities - the engine was
common with the MiG, the design basis was proved and risk free, and it should
have been ready for trials, going by the track record, around 1981. The funds
asked was Rs 65 crores in 1978. This was denied,
Instead, Drs, Raja Ramanna, Scientific Advisor to RM (1976-1980)
and VS Arunachalam (1980-1990) successive SAs with no relevant experience
blindly championed, in the teeth of objections of the other stakeholders and
independent observers, a “DRDO” led effort to set up of green field ADA outside
of DRDO with a budget of Rs, 650 crores to produce an urgently needed fighter.
It does not sound like sense and it wasn’t. It has turned out to be a technical
quagmire we are not going to come out soon. What little chance there may have
been of success was eliminated by replacing SR Valluri and Raj Mahindra with an
“insider”. The Indian ability to design and produce fighters as of the present
has been wrecked. The wrecking happened, as with the British Industry, from
within.
The implosion of the British Industry
Despite the ravages of the Second World War British
Aeronautical expertise was formidable – brilliant designers, reputed firms,
world class products. One could almost approach the British Industry and get
products tailor made and within a few years- mixed propulsion fighters, Mach 2
research Aircraft , STOL Transport- it seemed all you had to was to ask. This
was because to use a native Bengali expression, where the US Aerospace “cut by
weight”, the British “cut by edge (sharpness)”. Small British firms, e.g.
Martin Baker, were innovative world leaders e.g. - the US Escapac and
Russian KM-1M had angled rocket thrust which reduced low level ejection margins
- the MB Mk8 (?) had a brilliant but simple “through the CG” rocket thrust
which increased safety margins.
The Americans recognized
British abilities; The US bought British Airliners – the Viscount and the BAC
111 and even license built British aircraft and engines in preference to existing
US offerings. In some areas, e.g. the Hawker Harrier and the Fairey Rotodyne the
US had nothing comparable - Hawker Siddeley was designing VSTOL tactical
transports and Folland was working on the Gnat Mk7 (yes! You got that right!
We had the MK1. Mk7!) under Maurice Brennan,
Yet from such an unassailable position the British Industry, within fifteen
years. lost the ability to design and build combat aircraft independently
How it happened cannot be discussed with justice here
but I will cite one action. Duncan Sandys was an important leader. He was on
the Committee that identified the V weapons threat in 1943 and tackled it
successfully. Yet in 1957, the same Duncan Sandys, wrote the death knell of
British Aviation Industry by stating that the Lightning was to be the last
manned fighter and cancelling all British Combat aircraft projects including
prototypes then under design or construction. This killing of “infants” was
going on earlier. The Hawker P 1083, a super Hunter, was cancelled when the
prototype was just three months from completion! The Hunter was a big
export earner, the Super Hunter was near ready- was that a sound decision or a planned
destruction of British competition ?
Today, seventy years later, we are not sure if the
manned fighter is dead. In 1957 Duncan Sandys could have had absolutely no facts
then. How could an apparently sane Sandys take this awful stupid anti
Industry decision? Was it Deep State/Bankers pressure? It seems many US
senators can be pressured,
Whatever the forces behind such a decision the result
was that within the decade Britain ceased to be a competition to US Industry. One
directive fascinates. When the TSR 2 project was cancelled in 1965 the tools,
dies and the prototypes including the flying prototypes were destroyed ensuring
the project could not be restarted. This appears to be - like the Romans
ploughing salt into the soil of Carthage- a cold hate- filled destruction
of a feared competitor’s future. Was the setting up of ADA something like the
Sandys Committee report or merely some Scientist- Bureaucrats letting their
personal rivalries get the better of them? Or was it one of the Socialist
schemes that benefitted the Political Leaders more than the Public. We from the
outside cannot know. The Government can..
The setting up of ADA was also counter common sense.
It removed the two stakeholders most affected by the outcome of any programme
e.g. HAL and the IAF from project Leadership and replace it by ADA, a special
detached body out of DRDO and reporting to itself and which remains unaffected
by sustained non- performance. As if this was not enough there was another
flaw. Engineering projects have to be headed by “Engineer”. I talk of
“Engineers” as an attitude and experience, not in terms of weight of
qualifications e.g. V. K Krishnamurthy who set up Maruti or the superceded
(by VS Arunachalam) APJ Abdul Kalam of rocket fame. Unfortunately, ADA was
set up and led by “Babus” I talk again in terms or attitude. Result of this
double fault? We have had no usable fighter since ADA was set up and unlikely
to have any soon. Reassurances and dates to be unkept: beyond numbers.
As happened with the Global Industry the design roots
have been probably damaged. There were, worldwide, in the fifties, many firms-
about 50 - that could develop combat aircraft competing or out matching
US Industry products. Post 1950s there was a steep decline in the numbers of
such competitors, and today there may be perhaps four companies which can, if
they set their mind to it because the technical requirements are unclear beyond
the fact that the current generations need a replacement -, produce a
matching competitor to US products. Beyond these four, the rest still survive,
like HAL, as companies capable of license producing US designed
airframes. Conspiracy theory? No. Pure business! Keep the “source code” and
use the cheap labour.
Summing up
Chaos is very effective in obscuring simple truths.
The Tejas chaos covers a very simple truth.
1.
Prior
to ADA India had a very effective Development structure led by the Customer
(IAF) and the vendor Industry (HAL) which worked excellently despite various
constraints because both parties were affected by the outcome.
2.
The
setting up of ADA resulted in a structure such that ADA is unaffected by
consequences for its failure: its funding continues and it is not held
responsible for the “downstream” of its output- production, testing service
introduction. The structure lacks common sense. It quite unnecessarily introduced
a “Leader” (ADA) which has been unaffected by its performance. At the moment, with
87 concessions, the Tejas is not worth producing, Various “delays” ascribed to
HAL is possibly to cover up the much work that remains to be done to get a
worthwhile warplane and yet we repeat folly. ADA is being allowed to lead AMCA
a task which by past performance, it seems unfit for.
The result has been that by using entirely Ahimsa methods
our Air strength has been decimated. The IAF is dwindling to a point when re
-building air strength may become a problem of decades. HAL is lacking a
product to build. ADA continue to get thousands of crores and its Directors retires
with pomp and pensions.
Correction of this simple anomaly is essential if we
are to expect results. ADA can no longer lead projects until it has delivered
on the past and pending. Its work is cut out in getting the Tejas MK1 to
specifications instead of gathering more funds with Mk1A, Mk2 etc. With a
thorough revision the Mk1 may just be equal to a MK2 in capability, It
is a possibility that possibly has not been explored,
Let the old arrangement of IAF and HAL be revived,
supplemented by Pvt. Sector as project leadership and let ADA be a “vendor”
supporting whatever stealth Technology “expertise” it may have gathered,
Some odd notes collected during the preparation of the
above and not used but may be of interest in further reading,
1.
It
is the US Aerospace that needs the 5th generation and the 6th
generation to keep their core competence intact. They are not particular of
building in the US. Just keep the knowledge within themselves.
2.
The 5th and 6th gen specifications
are marketing based: How do we sell a 4th gen replacement unless it
can somehow be branded better?
3.
Like US Israeli Interceptor missiles, the 5th
and 6th generations are not cost effective because they too are
designed with profit motive uppermost.
4.
Even
to the US, the US products and proposals are bank tokens- a means of getting US
defence spending back to the Financiers.
5.
US
specifications, studied impartially do not stand scrutiny or make common sense.
6.
The
F 35/J 20s are a threat to India. The Urgency is unknown to outside of IAF and Government.
To tackle we do not need much. Their specifications do not need to be met point
by point which AMCA seems to be attempting to do- pushing costs, time and
technology beyond reach. It will be sufficient if we can deter F
35/J20 pilots from entering Indian Airspace in the “carefree” mode.
7.
The only apparent reason for pushing AMCA and
the associated engine-ry and not a “Sniper” ignoring the near certainty of
the AMCA being delayed and irrelevant is fund hunting. The AMCA requires a
budget 10 times bigger than a simple Sniper.
8.
Lack
of Funds and facilities are not a choke point for success. Since 2009 a
present-day value (PDV) a total of Rs.11,000 crores have been spent over the
past 17 years (Rs. 6000 crores in project funding, 5000 crores in Manpower
costs), If that time and treasure is not enough nothing will be enough. We
should have had the aircraft in FOC service by now with that kind of money.
9.
ADA
has shown none of the initiatives that would mark its position as a promising
project leader. ADA proposes new stealth technology: DSI, low RCS duct and
“anti-radar” coatings. calibration of the RCS equations against actual
measurements using various cheap TDs costing “pennies”. None have been tried
out. What is lacking is the Spirit, i.e. “Balls” and I am not aware of any
collaboration for developing “balls”. Excuse me but I believe that what is
being told about developed abilities is bull shit. I could go on but need to
pause.
10. What to do? Abandon AMCA, FCAS, Engine Collaboration
et all. Decree a Sniper has to be ready within four years using only desi aggregates
currently under promising development- engines, radar etc We need a F 35 Sniper
/Harasser. Like the era before ADA, let our experts from the Engineering and
the Forces take the lead and the Babus remain out or as facilitators and
supporters.
11. The experts can sit down and arrive at the numeric of
what is needed to detect the hostile 5th and 6th
generation and kill them using passive homing weapons. The detection system
does not have to be completely on board and the missiles do not have to
be “like X” or “like Y” types, A 2nd /3rd
generation-based airframe re- engineered to take some stealth with basic (and
minimum) equipment to launch passive homing missile when brought within range
of the target using a combination of ground and on-board detection system
should be the aim. Match the solution to our problem not to someone
else’s wares.
12. How much will a Sniper TD cost? ADA has used up Rs.11,000 crores and 17 years.
And expects another 15, 000 crores so that they can botch up the project again.
To me the money was wasted and cannot be any basis for estimating the
cost of the Sniper project. A starting estimate of about Rs. 3000 crores and
four years is probably all that is required to meet the challenge of the F
35/J20. Let at least a parallel effort be started out because without Industry
IAF Leadership as of before failure of the AMCA is certain,
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