The 6^th generation crisis”                                               Prof. Prodyut Das

24 July 2026

 

When the planets line up, as they sometime do, astrologers get their knickers into a twist, for they try to argue “how can THAT happen” rather than merely reporting “range and bearing”.

Aeronautically we seem to have arrived somewhere there with the 6^th, gen. Big changes in the role of aircraft in battle are needed but the idea is being resisted. The 4^th. Generation requires replacement, the 5^th generation that were fielded have not been dazzling successes being literally “more trouble than they are worth” – frankly I now await, solely as an aviation fanatique- the economics of cheap Chinese “Stinger” equivalents vs. F 35s over Iran and Lebanon. The question confronting the West’s Industry now is how to sell a 6^th.generation whose prime proponents are the Financiers. The logical thing- to make a “sensible” warplane -gets in the way of maximum profits.

From Fighter to commodity

The last “common sense” fighter the West produced was the Sabre. Ed Schumed used every drop of his wartime North American Mustang experience to design the Sabre- good visibility, strong, reliable, handling faultlessly at combat air speeds and affordable. Its sensibility was reflected in that it was frontline equipment for NATO and very small air forces in the same era.

The Next generation i.e. 3 rd. gen. was pure S. Jaishankar, India’s External Affairs Minister; “The West’s problem is the world’s problem but the world’s problem is not the West’s problem”. Replace “problem” with “specifications” and you get the nub of the situation. In the 1960s bar NATO and Warpac no Air force had any need for an all-weather atom bomber intercept capability. Yet, in the 60s if any Asian or African AF wanted to re-equip it had to buy some fairly dodgy all weather, Mach 2 capability. You could not even commission your own aircraft like the IAF, to an extent, did with the Gnat. By the 1960s the independent design capabilities were being destroyed in finance led mergers and acquisitions.

A seller’s monopoly had been created. The “better” 3^rd generation with its many marginal utility or irrelevant features was roughly five to ten times more expensive than the best 2^nd. Gen fighter, The Gnat was 11 lakhs, when even the comparatively cheap MiGs were about 96 lakhs. The Western ones were twice the MiG’s price.  The more tuned to the world’s needs, e.g. Gnat Mks 2 to 7, were killed on the drawing boards or in the Bank boardrooms. If you did not buy the stuff, “they” sold your neighbour a few squadrons of 3^rd gen. stuff “to hurry you up” and kill the competition. The F 104 came in March 1961 a few months before the HF 24s first flight.There are never coincidences in this game.

The 4^th.generation was pure loot. They cost $ 16,000 per Kg, when a hand-built Rolls was peddling at $ 300 kg. To sell the “4^th.gen.” there was a media blitz- e,g, pictures of a F 16 handsomely out turning a F 4 both conveniently emitting smoke so that even the dumbest dummies could see how much tighter the F 16 turned. It was fraud; the F 4, great airplane, was hardly the best dogfighter. Actually, the Sabre or the MiG 17 as was would have given the F 16 a run for its money; with frugal re-engineering would out turn the F 16 and spoiled that photoshoot and may have closed and shot down the F 16 in WVR or BVR - at a fraction of the cost. When discussing Western design a certain sardonic cynicism is advised. The 1:1 T/W, FBW, Hi- alpha “requirements” pushed at industrial scale as “essential” was a de facto an US only correction of their wrongly specified US 3^rd generation.

“Top Gun” did its bit in deflecting the attention on deficiencies onto pilot training whereas the problem was rooted in “wrong” equipment. They should have fought the war with the OV 10, the A6 and the A 10 and perhaps the F 8U. The US Vietnam experience was globally irrelevant but the Vietnam based 4^th gen. specifications was projected as the gold standard -and the only one you could buy. The great alternative design capabilities e,g, Folland, VFW or Hawkers had been merged out of existence

The philosophy that won in Vietnam –the Soviet system of inter meshed ground and airborne capabilities – which allowed a numerically inferior, newly emerging , inexperienced Air Force to remain in the fight and inflict deterring loses – at a fraction of the cost was never given publicity in forums. The US should have built their equivalent of the MiGs - but the idea was to maximize profits through exorbitant prices. The cynical will observe that the “must have” features have been forgotten once the goods were sold. When did you last hear of 22⁰ alphas or a T/W >1 as a must have feature? To question them then (1980s) was heresy

The 5th generation is even worse.  A multi- role super cruise stealth fighter is conceptually a fraud. How much of its hi cost performance- say-super cruise- help to avoid overall losses?   You will never get to hear of it because it is embarrassing. It is a “US specific” design rammed down the throat of its allies.  

Times have changed. The F 35 fifth generation has not given the kind of shock and awe my generation had for the 3^rd gen. F 104. Many countries have avoided the 5^th generation all together and sat on the fence and are now dithering on the 6^thgen, not because it is beyond technical capability but because it doesn’t make sense. People are talking about it only because the 4^th, gen will be need replacement and after 5 comes 6. The F 35 (read 5^th.Gen) as sold) is a very troublesome and expensive way to fight a war.

i)                  How many countries have enemies necessitating stealth for penetrating enemy airspace? Look at the map.

ii)                Given LRASMs do we need aircraft with stealth for penetration?

iii)              At a distance far enough, all aircraft are stealth and near enough NO aircraft is stealthy. So “Stealth” to what level?

iv)              How many F 35s have been lost to low-cost weapons when their expensive capabilities did not save them? How many were lost to hypersonic missiles whilst sitting in their HAS.

These embarrassing questions have to be debated before we buy a readymade Brooklyn bridge.

The F 35’s lack of “impact” -compared, say, to the stunning use of Mirage III in 1967- is because it grossly violates a fundamental design truth. Aircraft design being a compromise; every ability brings along at least one disability. The very able F 35 just has too many consequential disabilities. 

This brings us to the starting question: What adjectives and features are needed to sell the 6^th.generation as a viable proposition. The collapse of NATO, a general public exhaustion with constant “threat” environment and ruinous wars are also factors. The 6^th, gen. as envisioned by the USA is really an aircraft in search of a market. We need replacements for the squadrons mounted on 4^th.gen but it should not be a foreign influenced specification. The brilliant success of Sindoor shows we will do much better if we think for ourselves.

The lessons of the US- Iran / Sindoor wars

1.      Sovereignty can be defended and it need not cost the sky nor does it require us to match equipment for equipment.

2.      The days of the long-range multi- role strike fighter is over. The IIRAF has very few aircraft but its missiles did the work much better than a dozen squadrons of F 35s.

3.      Don’t overlook that the little F 5 based Iranian design got through the toughest Air Defence systems of the US Gulf bases and the “more capable” Su 24s were detected and destroyed.

4.      OP. Sindoor showed the value of accuracy. Small war loads 50-100kgs did more destruction than “carpet bombing by 500 and 1000 pounders of earlier wars.

5.      War loads can be drastically reduced thanks to weapons being “smart and more accurate”. Both numbers and weight of warhead will/can come down. This will mean smaller warplanes, smaller engines. The large engine inherent in the US 5^th,gen idea is a clever entry barrier. The new Indian fighter can be happy with sub- Kaveri technology.

6.      There is no priority need to develop a new, uncertain, engine to carry large loads for long tactical distances at super cruise speeds. The ALCM (Air launched cruise missile) will do most of that part.

7.      Aircraft, irrespective of their sophistication, spend most of their time on the ground. The US and Israeli losses of aircraft within the HAS (Hardened Aircraft Shelter) is not known but will be as high as was the PAF’s in Sindoor. Given our scenario and the uncertainties about ADA, the AMCA, as concepted has no future. The IAF needs numbers but must balance the urgency of needs against the probability of success of the AMCA. It will be delayed, cannot tackle hostile 5^th. gen. and its strike functions can be done by Brahmos kill the Pakistan /Chinese 5^th gen. in their nests. Iran did just that.

8.      For enemy airborne 5^th, gen, a ground based “stealth” radar system vectoring a stealth sniper will kill the hostiles.  

9.      End of manned aircraft? Not in the foreseeable future and not for air superiority. There is thing called “instinct” in air combat. I don’t think that can be replaced by AI.  UAVs/ Missiles can be jammed or “virus-ed: and the attacker doesn’t know it until the shooting starts. So, we will also need manned aircraft in larger numbers.

The superior technology myth:

Salesmen always discuss their wares as if aircraft fight in knightly single combat. That is not true.

The outcome of combat can be given as the product of 1, relevant combat characteristics x 2. The square of numbers of units engaged. Relevant characteristics means that in a daytime dog fight at low altitude, any capability not being used e.g. supersonic capability, and swing role abilities reduce the chance of victory. A case would be the Vietnam air combats. The NVAF was able to consistently meet and disrupt US air attacks using simple equipment having a fraction of the capability of their US counterpart. The US was using aircraft which used only a fraction of their capability, the VNAF was using every bit of theirs -and getting commendable results.

Operation Flashlight

A very significant experiment not given the publicity it deserves is Operation Flashlight. In this the F 86 H Sabre was then flown against the then top line Century series fighters of the US- F 100, F 101, F 102, F104, F 105 and F 106. Translate to today. A F 86H would cost about $ 1,2 million against a F 35s $ 75 million. There would be more situations where the F 86 in numbers would be a more cost-effective solution and few where only the F 35 could do. However if we were to use frugal re-engineering of the F 86 which may push unit cost to perhaps $3 million the F 86H would become smaller, more appropriate less demanding of maintenance and being available in greater numbers represent more and sustainable air power than a comparable budget on F 35s, For many air forces this would be a case to examine afresh. Thanks to a deliberately created monopoly the AFs look only at available equipment rather than exploring, like the Navy, what it could best do.

The above is a sample of the various, far-ranging thoughts that are relevant and that is why a professional debate is important so that information can be exchanged. As I said in the beginning, a debate is not to win arguments but to pool ideas and information and “brain storm”. India has both ideas and skills. We are no longer under Socialist Pattern of Society. It should be possible to have a larger “Panchayat” beyond the usual suspects. Currently the debate is between  “Import wallahs who argue for the latest and best and DRDO who pitch for local development will pitch for large complex projects that will require years of development If the problem can be quantified it can be tackled at low cost, time and effort.

What is to be done?

Take a deep breath. There is no need to panic or rush. India’s priority threat is not military action but subversion, regime change and insurgency. Military capability is of tertiary importance. So don’t rush to sign up for foreign collaboration, purchase of existing stuff. That is what they want you to do.

2. Think. Listen to this; Would the Air Chief sleep more soundly if his Fairy God mother gifted him a baker’s dozen of brand-new MiG Bison squadrons with all spares and upgrades? He would. Now suppose those MiG 21s Mach 2 capability was exchanged to give more safety, better ergonomics and a lower landing speed. what would be his reactions? He would be overjoyed. The Tejas Mk1 (only after thorough re- engineering, gutting the airframe for weight) , making it more aatmanirvar) could just be that aircraft. Ideally ADA should be the agency to do it but 87 “concessions” long neglected, is a lack of spirit and ability, a  surrender 26 years after First flight and this state of affairs is a project joke.

The Tejas project should be handed over to a consortium for a really professional effort to get the Tejas Mk1 /1A/1X absolutely right. Not a single of the 87 “take it or leave it “concessions.

3. Thriving industries have been destroyed throughout the world. It is a continuing process. Investigations are needed as to why critical projects like the Tejas took 43 years or the Tapas BH took 20 plus years to find that it would not meet specifications or why the Kaveri was shut down on the threshold of success in 2008. The possible potential of improvement we can have by better policies alone can be gauged from the 30-fold increase in Defence exports, Rs.36000 crores – and we are just starting on exports. The DcPP will show better results than the past but given their dynamism they should become independent programme leaders. Govt. established bodies have failed which may have been due to foreign influence

5. It is an example of the inexpert contradictory ways we run projects that we allowed our HDW submarine technology and manpower to wither away because of a “single tender” situation. Yet the same system have allowed a severely defaulting organization to function on the same “single tender” situation. Multiple tender bidding, even for the present AMCA, even now, may be the wiser choice because the probability of the MK2 or AMCA emerging successfully is very low.

6, In any case we will need greater design capacity, we will need not one but two new Combat aircraft and it would be a good time to invite funded project bids from the private sector.

i)                  a small, naturally stealthy, air superiority type costing a fraction of the US concept to hunt the 5^th/6^th.generation. It will not need large engines.

ii)                ii) A large hi- stealth subsonic long-range weapons carrier on the lines of the Chinese H 35.

Premature though it may sound, Iran has defeated the combined capability of the mightiest war machine and the most ferocious Intelligence capability on this planet. They did not clone the US led philosophy equipment. Using a combination of technology, careful planning and innovative thinking the Iranians have re- written the book about defensive warfare.