The alternate AMCA Part 1.   Prof. Prodyut Das

Introduction

The Americans fought the air war over Vietnam with two technically superb warhorses the F4 Phantom and the F105 Thunderchief. These aircraft represented what the most powerful and innovative Aircraft Industry in the world could develop. 761 of the former and 382 of the latter were lost over a seven-year period in their attempts to “bomb North Vietnam back to the stone age” falling to a low-cost Air Defence system.

 The Americans appear to have one of the most data-based process of aircraft specification fixing that we know of and yet had the Americans had included a good Astrologer in their processes they may have got the prediction to ignore the above to focus and expedite the aeronautically mundane Grumman A6 Intruder, the North American OV 10 and the Republic A 10. These aircraft were more suited to the scenario. For example, the Americans, engaged as they were in destroying low value targets defended by low value defences- dense AAA, obsolete SAMs and obsolescent interceptors in cloudy Vietnam weather supersonic capability was actually a penalty; the nocturnal A6 Intruder, subsonic but with advanced night attack/ bad weather capability, would have nullified much of the formidable Vietnamese AAA or the daylight only MiGs which were the main killers. Similarly for the other two types. The Americans would not have won the war but they would have caused much greater casualties at much lower costs and it is an unknown what that may have led to.

So why did the Americans end up with the wrong/ less appropriate war planes for the type of war they actually fought? There are complex reasons but briefly it can be put down to the following:

i)                 Weapons specifications must stem from long term political aims.  Clausewitz said War is an extension of national aims by other means then the corollary to Clausewitz is:  the nation’s war plans, strategic policy and aims must be clearly spelled out by the Political policy makers to the Military in “inter-pares” planning. The ability of the Soviet Union to get well-suited weapons at low prices came because its weapons development was tied to national political aims.  It is very probable that the present Chinese “challenge” today had its foundations to political ambitions elucidated decades ago. The American specifications which appears to be subject of much copying-are much too general or “all- rounder” which is always difficult to engineer.

 

ii)               The process of fixing specifications is something like the four blind men and the elephant. The person who sets up the specifications knows exactly what he wants- he has been working in that line for thirty years. However  he does not know how to engineer it what are the trade- offs and he does not pay for it; he also does not know when and what war he will be asked to fight and the political stand then will be. It is one of those unusual cases where the customer knows what he wants but does not pay for it; The Engineer is motivated to get the project “at all costs” and will put up with a fair amount of ordure/tell lies/sell dreams to land the order.

 

In the West this “unworkable” situation usually works because most stakeholders usually have knowledge-almost to the “hobbyist” or “fanatique” level about each other areas, they (usually!)  have a greater degree of respect for each other competences. The “owner” i.e., the financier, is keenly interested in quick outcomes and, of course, the industry moves very rapidly to hardware-three to four years being the norm.

 

iii)             Futurology. Fixing relevant specifications is one of futurology. The process begins to delve into the unknown as e.g., the USAF in Vietnam. Faced with the unknown the protagonists do what the schoolboys do when facing a question paper which they do not know- they cheat and copy from each other which is why many specifications look like a copy of the other.

 

iv)              Over specification. The customer, because of the reasons above set up unattainable specifications. The recent New Delhi story goes of a specification for an assault rifle which could mount all sorts of additional equipment but it was found that there was no space for the trigger. After much redesign space was found for the trigger but there was no space at all for the trigger guard which of course rendered the super rifle useless and specifications was scrapped after wasting much time.  Over specification is a pity because often very useful specifications can come from original thinking.

 

v)               The topic of the haphazard dynamics of the struggle between relevant versus glamourous specification, over conservatism and over enthusiasm is vast; I cite just two examples as an appetizer.

 

vi)              Marketing and Auto suggestion: Since weapons are designed to make a profit or generate influence the weapons wish to have the largest possible market and so many influencers are employed. The Mach 2 requirement was a particular Western cold war era requirement that was rendered obsolete in 1950s when nuclear weapons delivery was taken over by ICBMs. Today it continues to be specified despite horrific complications in terms of technology base required not to speak of costs. The rise and decline of 5.62 mm as the main infantry weapon are another illustration that what is generally accepted as necessary by the experts is often the result of auto suggestion and marketing without any serious gaming of various alternatives. 

 

Unwillingness to venture into new concepts The De Havilland Mosquito was a god send.  It used a two- man crew to deliver, so the story went, the same payload as eight man Flying Fortress but flew fifty m.p.h. over much the same range. Its versatility was legendary. It used non- strategic materials and skills for its production and yet the RAF never had as many as they wanted because when proposed it was the “experts” who tooth and nail opposed to the idea of a “gun less” bomber which was central to the concept. This opposition to “Freeman’s Folly”- Air Marshal Freeman was the lone RAF supporter -delayed the service introduction of the aircraft by over two years i.e., until 1942. The “experts” were not wrong; they were frightened/worried that it was a “risky” concept-why take the blame/consequences if it fails; better safe than sorry. Incidentally Original solutions ,as the Mosquito showed, can be remarkably more economical.

 

Insisting that the general specification is the best bet: Closer home, by 1956, it should have been clear- that a 4x30mm Aden armament and a Mach 2.2 top speed was a pure Western Air Forces need to intercept the TU-16. For India it was unnecessary, “thoughtless” and counterproductive. Tank could have developed a smaller, longer range, more maneuverable and trouble-free i.e., a “better” HF 24 if the specification had asked for 2X 30mm and a top speed of say Mach 1.3 or so but the IAF specifications itself whilst “fashionable”, actually played a role in the ultimate failure of the project e.g., the insistence on Mach 2.2 scuttled the adoption of the Russian engine in 1964.

To sum the specifications of the weapon must stem from scenarios evolving from identified political objectives and the tendency to over specify have to checked against the scenario laid down by the war aims. Specifying requirements without specific political war aims is wasteful and we are missing out on other alternatives. This proclivity for “standard specifications” is in part due to the crippled structure of our weapons development Industry. Imported weapons will for a short time be better but we don’t need arms to win spectacular victories. It is sufficient to undermine the adversary’s confidence about the final outcome.

The concept of the alternate AMCA

The AMCA as displayed has gradually matured into a fairly acceptable configuration but its specifications, down to super cruise abilities appears to be a “cut and paste” of comparable fifth generation fighters. In the process it has laid the seeds of its own delays and non fulfilment. Is the AMCA specification as it stands today the best way to achieve our political war aims? Reportedly we will need a 120kN engine and we will not get it- even by the proposed collaboration/s- a vendor’s reported reluctance to fulfil “buy back” agreements regarding hypersonic tunnel and high-altitude test chambers should be an indication of the “seller’s market” we are in. Should self-reliance in powerplant be sacrificed to get super cruise? Super cruise is a deployment rather than a combat need. Sacrifice it and see how much the development burden reduces.  Thel question to answer is will a formidable state of the art warplane mired in uncontrollable development delays deter aggression?  There must be options to explore something simpler and more achievable aircraft to hold the fort? We don’t need to slash specifications drastically-only just those which yield dividends.

We have to get back to fundamentals. Some of the more important markers are:

1.              Artificial Intelligence and Smart weapons are changing the paradigm of weapons platform             design. The fundamental equation for combat success in mobile warfare was Platform                         performance plus weapon plus intelligence equals results. Increased “intelligence” of weapons         i.e., smart weapons should revolutionize and make flexible the design requirements of the platform.     The platform is no longer needed to bring the weapon to the enemy’s six o’ clock. This flexibility is         waiting to be exploited. Whilst manned aircraft will continue into the foreseeable future their role         will change from being an aiming platform to more of a “carrier” or “transporter”. In case of             technology constraints as in India’s case, platforms of relatively modest energy or “specific excess         power” related performances coupled with intelligent weapons can yield effective results specially         as in our case when engines of the thrust needed is not on the industry’s horizon.

 

2.          Stealth is specified without appreciation of its potentials. Stealth is a substitute for speed. Given         our weakness reference to engine technology this does not appear to be sufficiently appreciated.             There are also contradictions. Stealth is specified with super cruise but stealth and super cruise is:

 

i)                 Contradictory because of kinetic heating but also the technology required is heavy, expensive and not available to India. Super cruising is a logistical rather than combat requirement. Can the specifications authorities re-examine this as it would mean significant simplifications in engine and airframe technologies?

 

ii)               The application of stealth will vary with the intelligence of the weapon. The influence of stealth on platform design has changed because of increasing intelligence” of the “weapon”. The F 119 went in for total or Extreme Stealth-Radar, IR aural and visual because its weapons - LGB s were “smart” but not “stand-off”. The aircraft had to overfly the target. The F 35 is ignoring IR/Aural and Visual and it is probable that its radar signature is not of the “one steel ball” kind of size of the F 117. In fact, since Sokolnikoff’ s radar equation works both ways, the use of stand- off weapons will reduce the level of stealth required in attacking a target. This can again lead to major technical and cost reductions.

 

iii)             Stealth is most suitable for intruder/missile launcher type of aircraft rather than on fighters.  A fighter requiring M2.2 will need approximately four times the maximum power and yet at low levels the effect of afterburner on speed is marginal. To ask for a M 2.2 capability and stealth- when the country has yet to be developed is thus doubly illogical specially for a critical weapon. We have to renegotiate / or explore alternative designs as insurance keeping in mind the risks.

 

iv)              The engineering penalty of supersonic speeds not kept in mind at the time of specifying. The only but excellent example is between the North American F 86 Sabre and the F 100 Super Sabre which used the same technology genre- axial flow engines, gun armaments, electronics etc. The results are tabulated in Table 1 below

            The table highlights the penalties even a marginally supersonic aircraft imposes.

            Table 1

Sl. No	Parameter	F 86F Sabre	F 100A	Ratio: F100/F 86F
1	Max. Speed	M 0.93@S.L	M1@S.L. /M1.4 at 10k mts. alt	1.41
2	Disposable Load / Thrust kg	151	81.5	0.539
3	Disposable Load/Aircraft Empty Weight Kg/kg	0.844	0.6585	0.78
4	Internal Fuel / Max. Thrust kg ./ kg	0.46	0.34	0.74
5	Wing Loading kg/ sq. Mts	330	450	1.364
6	Target Volume	562	943	1.67
7	Aspect Ratio	4.8	3.92	1.22
8	Engine Thrust kN	27.69	71	2.54
9	Wing section thickness %	9.5	6.5	0.7

 

The table suggests that an alternate AMCA designed as a Transonic (M 0.90-0.95 at S/L) Intruder platform will carry 3500 kg i.e. almost double the AMCA weapons load in “stealth” mode and the same total weapons load 7000 weapons load but with 20% greater range for an empty weight of around 9800 kgs, using a total engine thrust around 3x40 kN or less. It would have lower acquisition and life cycle costs. It would be significantly smaller, cheaper, more versatile with lower detection signatures and yet do at least as well in combat as the “standard specification” AMCA aircraft. In transit to target -because of its internal stowage of the Brahmos – it should be as fast as the SU 30MKI.

 

Military specifications do not come from logical scenarios. They often come from what is technological possible and greed for earliest profits. The M 16 rifle is a case to the point. At one time it was not possible to produce a reliable 5.56 mm automatic rifle-possibly because the metallurgy and the tolerances were not up to the required mark. When these challenges wee overcome the Americans rushed in the 5.56 mm rifle prematurely into Vietnam. It suffered a fate much much worse than the much-derided INSAS 5.56. Many Americans died because of their faulty rifles jammed in combat. Their bodies were found trying to re-assemble their jammed weapons. Everyone knew that the 0.22/5.56 was not a killer weapon. Even teenagers had to be cautioned that the 0.22 could kill. Yet the 5.56 mm became the standard calibre of all armies.

 

We have technology deficiency made worse by lack of political ownership. For us reasoned debate over specifications will yield solutions.          To be continued…