The Betaal , specification and the alternate AMCA                 Prof. Prodyut Das

Introduction

The Betaal Panch Vingtsati, the five and twenty stories of King Vikramaditya and the Betaal have been popular across large parts of India for tens of centuries. The stories are set in that the valiant king, for reasons that have nothing to do with aircraft, carry the Zombie Betaal through the woods at night. Unlike the wheezing zombies of Hollywood, Betaal is wise, articulate and witty. As the King labours through the forest the Betaal presents case studies and in the end of the narration questions the King in a manner that tests the Kings sagacity of judgment in what today would be called multi- variate optimization. The catch is that should the King fail to answer correctly his neck would be immediately broken; if he answers correctly the Betaal flies back to hang up side down from that tree in the woods. Reading a good translation is recommended; default Sir Richard Burton’s. I have cited the Betaal here because I see a parallel between the predicament of King Vikram and those involved who in formulating specifications for weapons. Get the scenario wrong due to wrong reasons and Hubris sends Nemesis to break your neck.

The prospect of ADA AMCA maintaining any deadline is not good. ADA is attempting an aircraft for which ADA has not dug sufficiently deep the requisite foundations. In 2030 we will have only a specification that could have done the job had the aircraft been ready.  The present purpose is to brain storm and debate. The essence of the debate is succinct. Do “intelligent” weapons need high kinetic performance platforms?  As a start we must question the present process of raising a specification and its sanctity. These questions are of particular interest to India because ADA has made the same mistakes as it did earlier. The course run will be the same.

Getting the scenario right

The U.S. fought the air war over Vietnam with the superb McDonnell Phantom and the Republic Thunderchief. Technically the aircraft were the last word in contemporary capability. Their top end performance let nothing to be desired. However 761 of the former and 382 of the latter fell to a primitive Air Defence system whilst attacking low value targets in confined airspaces in daylight conditions. All these aircraft were lost when performing at the lower left hand corner of their full performance. Tasked to attack truck parks, power stations and bridges in daytime/cloudy/monsoon Vietnam weather, supersonic capability was actually a penalty; It made the F4 and F 105s much bigger and more “densely packed” than they needed be e.g. in the F 105 the primary and emergency hydraulic lines ran due to space constraints, side by side; a single hit took both systems out; even with low cost massed HMG fire; every hit was a “bull”. The aerodynamic inefficiencies of the unutilized Mach 2 capability required a huge effort in aerial refuelling quite apart from the much higher acquisition costs and avoidable losses.

 The U.S. have one of the most data-based process of setting up aircraft specifications which reputedly even take in the Dow Jones index for the week. That process led them to the F4 and the F 105 above. Had the U.S. included the services of a roadside Indian Astrologer they may have been advised to instead focus on the aeronautically mundane Grumman A6 Intruder, the North American OV 10 Bronco and the Republic A 10 Thunderbolt II. The Intruder, subsonic but with advanced night/ bad weather capability, would have completely nullified the North Vietnamese air defence system. The Intruder’s Digital Attack and Navigation Equipment (DIANE) would have achieved better accuracies thus lowering effort and losses. Similarly for the Thunderbolt along with the Bronco for spotter duties would have been ideal. The U.S. may not have won the war but they would have caused greater casualties at lower costs and who knows what that may have led to. With hindsight we know that Vietnam needed theatre appropriate aircraft. It is appropriate- not excellent- specifications that lead to excellent results. So why did the U.S., despite “science” end up with less appropriate war planes? The reason is “Sensible” specifications are often drowned at birth by non-military reasons- prejudice, politics and profits. That multi role aircraft is cheaper is an argument with weaknesses.

i)                Weapons specifications must stem from long term political aims.  The Chinese “challenge” today had its foundations to the Chinese ambitions of Overlord-ship of the Middle Kingdom. Galwan in 2022 is connected to the Chinese cartographic aggression in the 1950s by the identical constant political aim. The American Foreign policy is also long term. Being economically powerful and more technologically advanced US weapons specifications are overtly expansive- in short, “everything plus V/STOL” about sums up US approach to specifications. For the US this yields economic payoffs in the export markets but makes for expensive weapons which are a challenge even for the US to develop. India did not have an elucidated war aim so my suspicion is when required the military xerox and then re-noun US requirements. We have not mastered cunning (for want of a better word) low cost options e.g. the Vietnamese AA defence system to do a task though the recent use of time expired AAMs for ShRAD indicates that the talent is there and money to be saved to be used for better pay etc. 

ii)               The process of fixing specifications is siloed. The person who sets up the specifications knows exactly what he wants- he has been working in that line for thirty years. He does not know how to engineer it nor does what are the trade- off possible and- initially at least, he does not want to even think. The Engineer is motivated to get the project “at all costs” and will put up with /put out a fair amount of bovine ordure/tells lies/sell dreams to land the order and project money. The Government is an absentee landlord; it tip toes between one election and the next. In the West this “unworkable” situation works because most stakeholders are real stakeholders; it is their bread and butter –failure will make the leaders jobless/unpromotable-and the leaders usually have knowledge-almost to the “hobbyist” or “fanatique” level about one another’s areas,- the stories of the evolution of the F 16 by collaboration between the USAF and the Engineers are the stuff of legends : people sat up and around after the conference ended, migrated to the bar when shooed out of the venue and when the bar closed customer and vendors went to the Coffee shop; This was only possible because LM engineers, the engineers from competing firms ( some of whom soon switched jobs to LM to be in on the action) & the USAF nominees could understand one another- they respected each other competences and because of it were more mature about different viewpoints. They all also realized that success was counted when the project made a profit. Event managements- roll out, first flight, valiant effort etc i. e drama, did not count. The “owner” i.e., the financier, was keenly interested in quick outcomes and, of course, the industry moves very rapidly to hardware-three to four years being the norm.

 In India the vital collaboration between the IAF and the design Engineers is well below par because truth to tell the Engineers lack the expertise to take on and occasionally corner the Services in a enjoyed  debate; the essential common ground is not there- there is a dour fulfilling of orders rather than any mutual evolution of concepts . The real owner – the Government - who could have rectified this dismal state has largely absconded. Nevertheless the resounding success of the Helicopter programme shows the present systems can be made to work but this is dependent on too many chance factors to be relied on as a system. Industry is a full time full expert job, it is the metier of full time Industrialists.

iii)             Futurology. Fixing relevant specifications is one of futurology. Faced with the unknown the protagonists do what the schoolboys do when facing a question paper which they do not know- they cheat and copy from each other which is why many specifications look like a copy of the other.

iv)           Overspecification. The customer, because of the reasons above set up unattainable specifications. The recent story, only partially untrue, of course, goes for an assault rifle so over specified of additional equipment that it was found there was no space for the trigger. After much redesign space was found for the trigger but there was no space at all for the trigger guard which of course rendered the super rifle useless and specifications was scrapped after wasting much time.  

The haphazard struggle between relevant versus glamorous specification, over conservatism and over enthusiasm is vast; I cite just two handy examples – the better examples are lengthier. 

v)              Mass Hysteria: AC Benson in his “The Farm Yard” describes amusingly the nervous behaviour of roosting hens. One does not normally think of the GSQR/DCAS people as roosting hens but there is a great deal of similar nervous checking out what the other side is up to. If no logical reason is found the tendency is, as in The Farm Yard- to follow the roost. The rise and decline of 5.62 mm (“point two two”) as the main infantry weapon is an illustration. Everyone knew that the “point two- two” had low stopping power. We were warned whilst first handling 0.22s- a pump action Belgian FN made Remington repeater with orange yellow furniture belonging to the Language Master- to be careful that “the 0.22 could kill” so you get the idea. Once it was technically possible to mass produce the 0.22 - it needed finer machining and distortion free heat treatment- it was sold as God’s gift to the Infantry. Armies across the world were suckered into ordering en masse. In the field its inherent defects jamming, overheating (lower thermal mass!) in carbines and requiring more care in maintenance not to mention its considerably lower “stopping power” came under the glaring spotlight. I suspect that rather than admit that they had been “had” by slick marketing- the customers attacked the weapon’s shortcomings inherent with the calibre- as “poor product quality” and hurried back to the old 0,303 (7.62) calibre. In the meantime the Arisake’s 6.5 mm calibre with which Japan fought two world wars and the Texans without any complaints has been ignored. I do not know how much it costs to develop a new machine pistol/assault rifle but if out of sheer good Hindustani mischief the Indian private sector manufacturers got together and produced prototypes of a standard 6.5 mm and its ammunition who knows we may have another run in the Hennery. The “logic” of specifications- especially that over demanding last ten per cent, is really as bad as that.   

Experts are unionized. They are worried, insecure so they all say the same thing and support each other. The De Havilland Mosquito used a two- man crew to deliver, so the story went, the same payload as eight- man Flying Fortress but flew fifty m.p.h. faster over much the same range. Its versatility was legendary. It used non- strategic materials and skills for its production and yet the RAF never had as many as they wanted because when proposed,  it was the RAF “experts” who tooth and nail opposed to the stupid idea of a two seat bomber without any defensive armament (What! NO defensive armament- did anyone ever hear of such a thing?!). This opposition to “Freeman’s Folly”- Air Marshal Freeman was the lone RAF supporter -delayed the service introduction of the aircraft by over two years.

 Closer home, by 1956 that a 4x30mm Aden armament and a Mach 2.2 top speed were for India’s Marut- counterproductive. There is no way the IAF could have defended that specification had it been cross examined. Tank could have developed a smaller, longer range, more manoeuvrable and trouble-free i.e., a “better” HF 24 if the specification had asked for 2X 30mm and a top speed of say Mach 1.3. The IAF specifications actually played a role in the ultimate failure of the project e.g., the insistence on Mach 2.2 scuttled the adoption of the Russian engine in 1964 which had a compressor stress limit of M 1.3 though there are those who believe that the import lobby played a part in being adamant over this requirement.

The career of the B 52 is relevant. Flown in 1952 it was supposed to have retired by the 1960s replaced by the B 58 of advanced specifications. The B 52 is actually ”anti” every “necessity” of the 5^th Gen aircraft-stealth, speed, energy  yet the B 52 is a very valued USAF asset and is likely it will see off not only the B1, B2 but also the B3 should that ever hove over the horizon. The secret of its longevity –immense adaptability-is worth incorporating in future projects.

To sum up: There is little sacred about specification and portions can be worked out to simpler and better standards by fair mutual discussions. A Specification is finally piece of paper of little use if not realized on time. What is “essential” is of course the difficult “Betaal” question. A year spent on intelligent discussion can save ten in development. Unfortunately our engineer leaders lack or certainly in the past lacked the depth of information required to discuss constructively in minutiae with the IAF.

The concept of the Betaal AMCA

We are using the term Betaal because he would ask us the difficult question – What should we be making? Should we persist with a specification that experience indicates it will not be ready? Ideally what is the task the military will be required and permitted to do should precede the formulating the specifications- an extreme example being the carefully built up IAF not being permitted to go into action in 1962. Political aims are the foundation of a specification. The admired capability of the American regarding Aircraft Carriers is the embodiment of a long held political aims. Do our Services know what our war aims are? No. Then they will play safe and order only the best not the most suitable.

Specification wise the ADA AMCA appears to be a “cut and paste” of comparable fifth generation fighters. In that it has planted the seeds of its own non-fulfilment. The AMCA specification as it stands today is not the best way to achieve our political war aims which in short is peace at our borders. The specifications ask for an 5^th Generation “expeditionary” weapon yet our Foreign policy have no expeditionary plans. Why this waste? It certainly is not “playing safe” because the weapon will not be ready. We do need to stop the marauding F 35s and J 20s. The proposed AMCA is not the most economical way to deal with the F 35/J20 if only because given our present inefficient development structure it will not be ready and cost more than the US nd China.  Digressing, a possible solution may be a combination of radars, SAMs and a very small “undetectable” aircraft- a sort of HA 300 or a Northrop F 5 with just enough performance, equipment and stealth and BVRs to sniper the marauding F35/J20s.

The alternate approach

We could also examine the alternate approach of ignoring the F35/J20 altogether but make a flank attack. When the USSR developed the superb and reportedly much loved Sverdlovsk class cruisers in the 1950s the RN counter was not a matching cruiser- which then was well within British capability. Instead they went for the Blackburn Buccaneer strike aircraft. Suppose we acquire the capability to severely disrupt mercantile shipping between the Gulf and the Malacca Straits and by overflying the isthmus even the South China Sea and beyond Sri Lanka in the IOR. Would the possibility of Chinese shipping being brought to a halt dissuade the Chinese from serious misadventure in Ladakh or for that matter anywhere? Suppose we talk of an Indian updated B 52-but relatively smaller (about half to one third the size of a B52) stealthy highly versatile and adaptable aircraft with a large weapons bay and appropriate range to carry out interdiction tasks that the political establishment would be willing to sanction in case needed. “We already have the Su 30 MKI” argument is not the answer to this proposition. The MKI will age, it is not aatmanirvar and its remarkable upgradability is even now being stretched. The key to a successful weapon is take note of the shifting paradigm of platform design.

The changing paradigm

1.              Artificial Intelligence and Smart weapons are changing weapons platform design.

The fundamental equation for combat success in mobile warfare since the days of knightly warfare was Platform performance + weapon + intelligence (the horse’s if not the knight’s) equals results. Increased “intelligence” of weapons i.e., smart weapons will revolutionize further the design requirements of the platform. In aircraft most of the penalties in design-cost, complexity and serviceability comes from the “dash” or the combat portion of the profile. With AI incorporated in the weapon the platform is no longer needed to bring the weapon to the enemy’s not six o’ clock nor does a Brahmos need a platform that can dash.   

2.          Stealth is a substitute for speed. Stealth cuts down the time the enemy has for reaction an intercept; The B2/21 does sub sonically something the B70 Valkyrie tried to do by dashing about at M2-M3. Stealth is most suitable for intruder/missile launcher type of aircraft rather than on dogfighters because close up no stealth will work.

3.    The required degree of stealth will vary with the intelligence of the weapon. The F 119 required total or Extreme Stealth because its LGBs were “smart” but not “stand-off”. The aircraft, because of its weapon, had to overfly the target at a height. This required stealth to the level of “a ball bearing” plus IR, aural and visual i.e. “nocturnal ops.” only stealth. The F 35 ignores IR/Aural and Visual and its radar signature is unlikely to be of the “one steel ball” kind of size of the F 117. In fact, since Sokolnikoff’s radar equation works both ways, the use of stand- off weapons will reduce the level of stealth required in attacking a target. This leads to major simplifications and cost reductions. Stealth engineering may be difficult in terms of tolerances, robustness, maintenance etc but reports indicate that achieving “reasonable” stealth as would be required with stand- off weapons is not too difficult. Configuration and size helps. The ancient Horten IX/ Go 229, the Avro Vulcan, the B 58 Hustler and our own Gnat had small radar signatures even without being stealthy by design. The logical question is what if such an approach was incorporated judiciously?

4. The engineering penalty of supersonic speeds. Supersonic speed is specified thoughtlessly; e.g. when AF people actually want SEP (specific excess power) they ask for Mach 2. This inaccuracy causes penalties. A transonic aircraft i.e M< 0.95 at SL will be 25% lighter require 40% the engine power and yet have 25% more range compared to a comparable aircraft designed for M1.3. The final ignominy is that the “supersonic” can be for a few minutes yet the platform is “crippled” for life. The Table 1 compares a transonic and a supersonic fighter designed by the same competent team using the same technology. The comparison confirms the above. The three times greater installed power for the supersonic warplane meant more disposable load and as long as top speed was an issue the greater war load was an acceptable exchange for the other penalties of size ,cost and complexity. Given smarter weapons war load is a negotiable quantity.

 

 

 

        Table 1

Sl. No	Parameter	F 86F Sabre	F 100A	Ratio: F100/F 86F
1	Max. Speed	M 0.93@S.L	M1.0@S.L. /M1.4 at 10k mts. alt	1.41
2	Disposable Load / Thrust kg	151	81.5	0.539
3	Disposable Load/Aircraft Empty Weight Kg/kg	0.844	0.6585	0.78
4	Internal Fuel / Max. Thrust kg ./ kg	0.46	0.34	0.74
5	Wing Loading kg/ sq. Mts	330	450	1.364
6	Target Volume	562	943	1.67
7	Aspect Ratio	4.8	3.92	1.22
8	Engine Thrust kN	27.69	71	2.54
9	Wing section thickness %	9.5	6.5	0.7

 The table suggests that the AMCA if designed as a Transonic Intruder rather than M2 it will carry 3500 kg but in “stealth” mode and the same total weapons load with 20% greater range for an empty weight of around 9800 kgs using a total engine thrust around 80kN. In transit to target -because of its internal stowage of weapons- it should be as fast with much lower detectability than the SU 30MKI giving it higher probability of success to launch.  

The outlines of the Betaal AMCA

The Betaal AMCA can be summarized by the logic that if 16 missiles mounted on a 35 knot frigate is considered a viable platform then a 600kt aircraft with a ten ton war load of missiles is also viable. This aircraft outlines are discussed below.

1. The key feature that ensures along service life is a large uncluttered weapons bay that can carry internally i.e. stealthily/ or with reduced detection all current and expected long range cruise and hypersonic missiles up to a total of 10,000 kgs. Adaptability is a key feature of all long serving aircraft and a large weapons bay is one of them. The B 52’s weapon bay 7900mmx 2800mm x 1700mm is an ideal to strive for. Such a bomb bay will be a technical challenge as uncluttered space so essential for adaptability requires considerable acumen to engineer to the rigidity and finish essential for stealth.  

2. Given out security needs the radius of action along with the size of the bomb bay above should be decided by strategy and not by an arbitrary “round” figure. Every km and every kilogram counts but a radius of action of 2000 kms - 40% of a B 52s- will allow us command of the Malacca Straits, and by overflying a narrow 50 km strip of Thailand a presence in the South China Seas and to the borders of Mongolia- perhaps excessive to our purpose.

3. Stealth is a feature of the concept’s effectiveness. The Sokolnikoff ’s equation shows that for a given level of skill in designing for stealth, small size IS important. Various steps are to be taken to pack the smallest airframe around the largest weapons bay. To reduce the overall volume of the aircraft the fuel that needs be carried for the range needs to be minimized. Amongst solutions to be explored will be the old naval attempts to fly patrol aircraft using only some of the power plants because turbine engines flying at part throttle consume disproportionate amounts of fuel. Most attempts were not satisfactory but a new attempt where AI is combined with FADEC may finally give results. Experiments will have to be carried out. If successful a few tons of fuel and associated structure would be saved.

4. The flying wing is naturally stealthy but is misunderstood, most prejudices initiated by its bad accident record (De Havilland108, Chance Vought Cutlass or AW 52. Structurally weak prototypes were pushed beyond their aerodynamic limits. Also the tailless concept cannot handle without complications the rear ward shift of the AC at higher Mach numbers. They are generally more trouble than they are worth but the long range stealth intruder is a niche where this configuration shines. The Horten type “Nurflugel” series developed by two brothers mainly with their own funds is particularly well suited for this role as it is naturally stealthy, extremely efficient aerodynamically with a 20%-25 % increase range due to the absence of parasitic drag; the internally housed guided weapons can by design make for small CG shifts. The Horten Nurflugel is sufficiently well documented in unclassified papers. Tamed, as by Lippisch, with a fin,  it does not insist on FBW and therefore makes for an excellent starting point.  

5. The Betaal aircraft will need a very large number of sensors in the forward and the rear hemispheres which will require a large frontal area and this makes a side by side seating almost de rigeur; as a bonus it provides for the better crew coordination. All modern combat aircraft being envisaged must be able to process a large amounts of data hence the two man crew and more than average electric power generation is almost a must even from the start. Some specialist versions would have a four man crew rather like the A6E. This additional crew capability would be particularly useful in AEW, ECM, and for the future if the “Loyal Wingman” concept comes into its own.

6. Before commencing detail design hard experimental data has to be obtained between the robustness and merits of stealth in the field by the various application of RAM, faceting and Ufremitsky’s equation.

A discussion of the proposals

The intruder is conceived as a side by side seating high wing possibly tail less aircraft with three or four Kaveri size engines. The studies are centred on a high subsonic combat aircraft somewhat between the size of a F111 (but no VG, supersonic etc) and the Vulcan, as large an internal weapons carrying bay as will be arrived at keeping present and future Indian missile development and the intended targets. Present studies indicate for a total installed thrust of 160- 200 kN obtaining from relatively higher BPR (>2-3) turbofans and a MTO of 65 tons carrying an internal weapons load of 10,000kilos over a radius of action of around 2500kms. To ensure early development the prototypes are firmly based on “yesterday’s “rather than “tomorrow’s” technology but capable of being upgraded with new technology as and when developed. Some of these studies are technically “ideal” solutions in that some rely on engines that are not of Indian origin but the design aim is to use politically neutral sanctions proof off the shelf items and materials as far as is possible. There have been talks about a Bomber in our inventory the completely white elephant TU 160 being cited as the only one feasible. It is entirely possible to have our stealthy miniaturized B 52 to cost and time tailored to our needs at a fraction of the cost and within planned time.

Technology Demonstrators.

Development of this aircraft will require the intelligent use of technology demonstrators. The weapons bay design, Stealth design and its maintainability in the field, engine switching techniques to minimize fuel burn, the better RAM skinning will need more knowledge than we have at the moment. Innovatively used technology demonstrators (TD) can generate that confidence. TDs are often very simple –to the point of being crude- adaption of off the shelf item to prove a technology; the Rolls Royce “Flying bedstead” being a very good example. Two surplus RR Nene engines were lashed together  and yet this almost crude lash up revealed in about 200 hrs of testing many un-anticipated problems of jet thrust for VTOL and gave rise not just the “puff pipe” control system but also the problem of jet efflux recirculation- note the efflux dams / Aden Packs in the Harrier/AV8.  Similarly the tiny SE 210 which checked out the low speed handling characteristics and STOL of the double delta wing that Erik Bratt proposed to achieve in the Saab Draken. It was a little surfboard of an aircraft and it is amusing that the Technology Demonstrator for a M2 fighter was a wooden aircraft with a low power piston engine that could be knocked together by any well- equipped workshop. Genuine TDs have been avoided in India because with a “absentee Landlord” of an owner  “big fund, till retirement” sinecures were the preferred norm. The simpler TD programmes are not popular because they are demanding; they show up weaknesses in project management and job skills early and the money is marginal.

Cost is saved as TDs are simple and time is saved as the work proceeds in parallel to the main project and the progress is certain because it is based on facts and generated skills which improves the final design. Several technologies need to be studied ending up hard design data though not all technologies studied will be used an example being the Durchstromte flugel- a through flow wing- and flap blowing used by the Swiss in the ‘fifties to examine if TO run can be reduced which may be of later interest for ship borne trials. Any Indian design will be vulnerable to pressures from engine sources and the under-slung engine e.g. the MiG 29 is attractive in this respect, the required engineering change will be minor and  confined to the engine pod. However such an engine configuration has bad IR signature and will require design data on mesh type inlets as used in the F 117 to reduce of stealth signature and the system by which the design can be “stealth-ed up”- to use the B2 phrase- i.e. the meshes moving into place when within detection range. The same pre used biz tri-jet platform planned for the development of the computer controlled engine management system can be used for these trials. There are more ways of killing a cat, as they say, than drowning it in cream.

There are four basic aerodynamic configurations of TDs that need to be explored for the proposed aircraft- Horten Only Wing, Lippisch type, Lockheed Northrop F 40 finless canards and a conventional layout. Each configuration optimizes a subset of the various contradicting parameters- stealth, performance, timeliness, technology to be developed a priori, cost etc.  Whatever the selected configuration the structure of the TD is highly innovative and is extremely simple and permits considerable modification of the shape of the aircraft because the skin is attached separately so that the stealth can be optimised if required. The TD will be able to carry a number of Harpoon and Aakash missile and during the course of development the tactics to use the concept of simple platform and intelligent weapons can be developed thus cutting down on the trials time of the final Intruder.

A Typical TD  

One of the four possible final configurations for the TD mentioned above is shown in fig 1 as an example. It is a Lippisch type flying wing where a fin is used. The layout is a compromise between the excellent stealth and long range of a flying wing with generally pleasant flying characteristics associated with Lippisch designs without the need to develop a FBW which can come later. It is a tailless single/two seat high wing monoplane. If promising, in the future provisions will be kept so that it can be “folded” and navalized for carrier trials. It is of all metal structure of great simplicity with an unstressed carbon fibre aerodynamic shell having a core of honeycomb anechoic material which acts as an aerodynamic fairing. This feature will allow rapid changes to fine tune stealth and flying characteristics. This feature will also improve serviceability so that test aircraft being grounded is reduced. The inside of the metal central fuselage box forms the bay for missiles- Harpoons or Exocets for the TDs and the outer walls of the box is stressed to carry two long range AAMs. To cut down design and procurement times the proposed TD uses all the systems (electrical, avionics, hydraulics, ECs, power plant etc) of a popular light business jet currently in toto. A conscious design effort will be made to use stock aggregates – wheels, brakes, undercarriage, Instruments, electric hydraulics and navaid systems etc to speed up the development of the prototypes. The TDs will be used not just to de bug the new technologies related to the configuration, stealth, engine management systems but also the operational and tactical aspects of the new concept that “AI” weapons can make significant simplifications to the design of the platform. Missions can be flown include live firings to fine tune the specifications and tactics.  

The TDs should be ready within 3 years and the bulk of the trials would follow in the next two. The design of the actual AMCA would begin two years from the start of the TD  i.e. after the hump of the TD’s drawing releases is passed in the D.O. and the project would be ready for production in about ten years. The cost in total should be around 5000 crores. 

 The completely different outcomes of the two project the Tejas and the Dhruv indicates that lack of facilities and resources was not the cause of failure. Whilst the above shows the present structure can be made to work it is now a matter of ample precaution to restructure DRDO and induct the Private sector ab initio. Given skilled Design Leaders and competent dedicated management the project should go at least as fast as the Turkish programmes- they are no miracles but the norm for an efficient development structure. Our present structure’s fatal flaw is that the DRDO is both a regulator and through ADA, a competitor and with its control on CEMILAC the certification agency, it is a competitor with an unfair advantage. I refer to the issuance by CEMILAC of a FOC when a fighter has been cleared without having fired its guns.Ethically there is a conflict of Interest. This leads to undesirable outcomes.

At this point of the narrative the Betaal would summarize. The IAF’s specification cannot be faulted but can it be endorsed ? Can hoping of better performance by ADA and leaving it at that be sufficient due diligence before investing in their 15,000 crore proposal to the total exclusion of others? What is the basis for such hopes and what will be the fall back in case- and this case is very likely- ADA fails? The alternate AMCA proposed is a limited solution but well managed it can be certain of having an aircraft getting ready for production by 2032. Of course with ADA management restructured the AMCA can also be ready by 2035 but the main obstacle to better management of ADA will come from within ADA itself. A further point is the ADA AMCA would be at least three times more expensive because of the overreach in specifications. So .Raja Vikramaditya, given our realities, the fundamental question is that given the state of development of proven if expensive AI weapons is a high kinetic performance platform an essential requirement and is our proposed method of going about it the most likely way to achieve it?     

Here endeth the Twentisixth tale! 

 

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