The saras Accident report-  A dissent note.


 


Whilst collecting material for a feature on prospective Indian Civil aircraft I came across the DGCA report “The Final report on the investigation on the accident to the NAL Saras PT2 aircraft VT-XRM at Sheshagirihalli near Bidadi’ Karnataka on 6th March 2009” report dated  6 December 2009. The full report of 75 pages is available at dgca.nic.in/accident reports. I understand that there are no other reports available to the public.

I am uneasy with the findings of the report and its recommendations because of the following:

i)                   The report does not explain the type of wreckage or the wreckage “foot print”.
In addition the report does not seem to have investigated the following:

ii)                 The configuration of the aircraft ( rear engine T tail turboprop)
iii)                “deep stall”
iv)                flat spin”
v)                  The possibility of the CG position of the aircraft having travelled beyond the rear CG limit.

Without having investigated and ruled out the above possibilities the report may have drawn erroneous conclusions and corrections.

If my prognosis is correct the aircraft may crash again if tested under the suggested corrected test parameters.

Unfortunately the report does not contain the data needed for me to check my own apprehensions. Since the Saras test flying has resumed I am taking the risk of publishing my views for a wider discussion.

Introductory Glossary:

The rear engine twin turboprop configuration:
The engine, nacelle, propeller and mountings of this class of aircraft- twin engine light commuter- is around 15% of the mass of the aircraft. If such a mass is located at the rear, as in the Saras, the CG moves backwards by a considerable account.

To “balance” the aircraft for stability the wing has to be moved back. This reduces the tail moment arm significantly and it is normal for this configuration to have either reduced yaw and pitch stability or have larger keel (fin) and stabilizer areas so as to maintain “tail volumes”. The lateral stability is worsened by the fact that there is a larger “Side area” ahead of the CG further reducing the yaw and pitch stabilities.

The location of the undercarriage is more sensitive in a rear engine layout. It can affect the stabilizer sizing (by about 30% in one case). However there is no evidence that this aspect played any immediate role in this accident and is therefore not being further discussed here.

The spin
An aircraft if yawed at near stall speeds it will inevitably flick into a spin. It happens as follows:
The aircraft is flying straight and level at near the stall speed. If yawed, say as in this case, to the left the left (port) wing’s airspeed falls and it generates less lift. This causes the wing to dip which increases the angle of attack of this left (port) wing. It is now well and truly stalled. The wing is past the inflexion of the Lift /Drag curve and so it generates less lift and more drag. Exactly the opposite happens to the starboard (right) wing. The entire wing is now subjected to a rolling couple (because of the different lifts) and a yawing couple because of the different drags. The aircraft becomes uncontrollable because of the low airspeed which makes the control surfaces forces much less than in normal flight. Recovery happens by diving the aircraft- to get the entire wing “flying” again- and correcting the yaw. A spin is a frightening situation to be in and requires preparation and mental “psyching”. Due to the lower moment arms a rear engine aircraft takes longer to recover from a spin.

Deep stall
At stalling speed an aircraft is at around an AOA of 15-18 degrees. This may increase as the aircraft begins to sink due to loss of lift. In a rear engine aircraft with a T tail the disturbed airflow past the engine nacelles “hits” the stabilizer and reduces its effectiveness partially or completely. The pilot is unable to pitch the aircraft nose down to recover from the stall. The BAC 111 prototype accident in 1963 brought this phenomenon to public attention. The Deep stall is peculiar to the rear engine layout.

The alternative construct of the accident

The starting point of this hypothesis is the examination of the impact point and the description of the wreckage:

1.      The ground is hard and stony. The wreckage should have slid along and formed the usual “wreckage trail”. This has not happened.
2.      An aircraft has fallen out of control from a considerable height (about 7000’). The scatter would have been like that of a bomb explosion with an elliptic/asymmetric scatter of debris.
These are not reported.
3.      It is reported that all the components are within a 20 mts. radius of the wreckage i.e. hardly greater than the wing span of the aircraft. This was caused by the fuel tanks exploding and not due to kinetic energy As reported rightly, this indicates there was little or no forward speed.

This type of the wreckage “footprint” happens when the aircraft has crashed whilst in a flat spin or deep stall or if the aircraft CG has travelled beyond the rear limit.

How did the spin happen?
The aircraft as per report was at around 132 knots at the beginning of left engine shutdown. The speed decayed further due to additional rudder trim drag and due to lower power from one engine. At the beginning of the engine restart point approx -1.32 minutes time before the impact the speed was around 120 kts. At that altitude and at the probable then weight of the aircraft the stalling speed was around 115 kts.

When the propeller was accidentally unfeathered, the asymmetric drag pulled the speed down close or below the stalling speed and also yawed the aircraft. The spin then became inevitable.

The spin then developed into a flat spin which was probably mistaken by the crew as a (momentary) recovery. If the aircraft was in a normal spin it would have impacted “nose down”. This is not indicated by the wreckage. Recovery from a flat spin is impossible. The crew did not have a chance.

Deep stall
According to the report the aircraft was losing height at 10,000 fpm. This works out to around 95 kts. The IAS of the aircraft had (to be noted) further decayed to around 110 kts. The relative wind was in the order of 60 degrees. Even if nose down pitch angle is considered (the report is not clear on this) the aircraft was definitely stalled and the stabilizer was in the disturbed air of the nacelles and therefore ineffective.

Rearward shift of the CG.

The pilots repeatedly complain about the excessive drag. The Saras aircraft is not per se a “draggy” layout (note 1). From the TO weight given the aircraft was not ballasted for the passengers. In a rear engine layout this results in the CG moving back. It is quite likely that the CG had started at a very rear ward position and as the fuel was consumed it moved further back beyond the permissible limit. This made the aircraft uncontrollable. An aircraft out of trim- like a car being driven with the parking brake “on” will feel “draggy “and be ready to depart control. This condition can demonstrated easily and simply.

Other factors.

1.      The pilots had over 2000 hours experience but less than 300 hours on turboprops. They were likely from the fighter stream. Test piloting is a precision engineering job.
2.      The aircraft had a three lever engine/prop control unlike the usual two lever system. This particular test required instant and instinctive reactions as well as utter familiarity with turboshaft engines- preferably not even turboprop. The Crew( apart from the Flight Engineer) were not suited for this task ( Note 2)

Conclusions:

The aircraft crashed due to problems associated with the layout, deep stall and a too rear position of the CG or a combination of all three.

If the test is repeated at the same speed but even with 15000’ AMSL altitude recovery from uncontrollability is not certain. The low speed close to the stall was definitely a factor.

The verdict of pilot error is to be reviewed and downgraded.
Recommendations

1.      The spin recovery and the deep stall characteristics of the Saras needs further study and revalidation
2.      It is presumed that prototypes were under 24X7 CCTV surveillance and monitoring. Prototype security on the ground is mandatory and standard assumption in accident investigations. IF not unauthorized tampering and or sabotage cannot be definitely ruled out.
3.      The behavior of the two pilots prior to the start of the tests, the wrong reporting of heights etc and the decision to press on despite misgivings of all three needs further investigations. It is presumed that the post mortem included checks regarding absence of harmful medication.
4.      The verdict of pilot error needs review. They were not briefed about the possibility of the aircraft spinning. Any flight test plan should be subjected to “Failure Mode Analysis” so that pitfalls are not overlooked. The failure to anticipate the possibility of proximity to stall speeds at 10,000 feet is worrisome.
5.      The report should include, in tabular form, the aircraft attitude parameters, the altitude and the control deflections, particularly for event after -1.36min.
6.      It should be mandatory that any crew member can order abort of a sortie and return to base for debrief and check. It is cheaper and faster than accident investigations and building another prototype.
7.      A sortie cannot depart until all instruments and sensors are tested for uniformity of readings.
If the root cause of the accident is not correctly identified then these men have died in vain.


Note 1.

There is no reason to surmise that the drag reported by the pilots is inherent in the design. Some views have been heard that the fuselage diameter is too large for the aircraft and that the wing aspect ratio is too low.
The fuselage L/D ratio is around 7.5:1 and is suitable for this class of aircraft and speeds.
The aspect ratio of about 8:1 is standard practice for Russian designs who use this even in their long range bombers. Interestingly the Americans use around 11:1 and suffer from structural fatigue problems. The C5A Galaxy had its entire wing replaced in most airframes and the B 52 has had so many “Band Aid” patches it is claimed that the airframe carries its own weight in these reinforcement patches. Since induced drag is a reciprocal of AR the Russian approach is technically more correct. This is a personal opinion.

Note 2
Flying safety requires quick reactions to the point of being instinctive. Wg. Cdr. Guy P. Gibson V.C.  the legendary bomber pilot of the RAF died in a crash of the DH Mosquito aircraft to which he had recently converted and was out of practice. It is surmised that when one of the fuel tanks ran dry and the engines cut delay in switching tanks because of his being out of practice may have caused the fatal crash.
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Sunday 16 September 2018

The riddle of The MMRCA RFI The symptoms of an ancient Malaise?



They play “Abide with me” at the end of Beating the Retreat Ceremony on 28th January. It was Gandhiji’s  favourite hymn but truth to tell I do not care much for Victorian Hymns. The words and the music is all right I suppose and in this case there was a tinge of tragedy- Lyte, who wrote the lyrics was dying of tuberculosis when he wrote it-but generally, being on the Native and therefore, receiving, side of Pax Victoriana- the humbug, hypocrisy and self righteous sanctimony of that era spoils the flavours for me. My remembrance of “Abide with me” comes from my recollection, perhaps faulty, of the phrase “the encircling gloom” which is a pretty accurate summing up of the present situation vis a vis the MMRCA and the LCA and the morass that passes for a process of building up of our Air Strength.
The RFI
My gloom was not lightened when a friend sent me a copy of the recent RFI for the 110 MMRCA aircraft. Seventy three pages long it seems to be an amalgam of Pilot’s notes, vague questions and a lack of connectedness. Coming from one of the innovative and experienced Air Forces in the world it does not impress.
First is the style. What is the kind of answer that is expected from a question like “Is the canopy material prone to “crazing” and cracking? Do we need to ask this question in the 21st Century from vendors like- in alphabetical order- Boeing/EADS/LM/RAC Mig/SAAB ? If the answer is yes then go whole hog and specify 2.8 kW/sq.M/Hr.radiation strength with UV of such and such strength etc. The same “questions for question’s sake” is noted in asking if the ECS is good for 45 degrees centigrade. Is it 450 C on the tarmac or 450 C at 450kts LLXC?  Should we ask if the parking brake lever is in the cockpit? Isn’t it that black and yellow striped pull thing on the left? I don’t buy aeroplanes but if you will pardon me I found the style slightly effete- “pansy” is the word one wants to use!
It has been ages since I have forgotten all the carefully taught lessons on accusative voice and passive voice, dative and nominative case but I felt that a certain more assertive style of writing would have shortened the length of the document considerably. If we are in market for a 110 fighters we can be more firm about it e.g. the Technical life of the airframe should be at least 4000 hours for single engine airframes and 7000 hours for twin engine types when flying a profile as outlined in Fig X, if you see what I mean?. Why the two different figures for life? Because, for one reason or the other, the single engine type won’t last much longer than that in low level fighter missions!
I have a charitable explanation for the 73 pages of “bumpf”. It is quite possible that someone in DASR, Air HQ  got a “rocket” for the previous RFI which I believe was just one page. There seems to be an extremist inside Air HQ! Having received the said “rocket” the receptor’s reaction was “All right you so and so of uncertain parentage, if it is length you want try ploughing through this!” In a way I rather hope that is the case because it would show that all is well with the Air Force.
Style is subjective, but it is a matter of concern when an endurance, with flight refueling, of ten hours is being called for with night capable FR! If all this capability came for free and with no penalty in terms of performance then one could let that pass and pity the aircrew but otherwise this is  serious outrage. What kind of mission are we having in mind when we are asking for this capability? Has that been requested/approved by the cabinet? Or was it put in to favour a particular type? Only the Americans will have the need, specify or have this kind of capability? If it is only to join “Red Flag” then it will be cheaper to route through Cairo and Paris. Cairo is, alas, no longer what it used to be but I am sure the aircrew would endure manfully the boredom of being stranded in Paris for the whole night!
The second objection is that this RFI does not seem to be any different for what would have been released for the heavy fighter such as the SU 30 MKI or the SU 35. It seems illogical that we take on the complexity of inducting three types of combat aircraft – Heavy/MMRCA/LWF from three different countries and not reap the benefits. The greater effort of keeping three types in service must be compensated by having sharply “optimized for the role” kind of capabilities. All the sorties will not demand the same kind of capability. Particularly for the light weight types the percentage of war load/MTOW load goes down sharply. Therefore equipment levels have to be carefully pared to retain performance and range-payload. We need a large air force but we cannot have it by having a series of Bonsai –as in Japanese gardening- aircraft.
The other idea would be to have a “stripped to essentials” airframe basic equipment for VFR short range strike against average “non Bekaa Valley” targets with ground based /AWACS control) and have fairly comprehensive sets of mission packs carrying just the few sensors required for the more exotic missions. The argument is that any capability that is not required in a mission is a handicap of that mission. The example of the MiG 21s used for cratering Tejgaon in ’71 can be cited. The pilots would have much appreciated if they didn’t have the radar which was never needed but had more fuel and two 30mm NR revolver cannon which the MiG21PF originally had and which were deleted in the FL and later sorely missed.



Transfer of Technology
More than one third of the RFI, about 26 pages covers the wish list of Technology transfers. It covers everything but the proverbial kitchen sink. The following were my reactions:
i)                    TOT does not come for free. It will pad up the bills and the commissions but is it relevant to us.  For example the Technologies for Blisks and Single crystal blades (SCB) has been asked for. Suppose we get them where is the engine programme to use the TOT? Will an engine development programme be funded keeping in mind the negligently planned Kaveri/GTX programmes? Do we have the engine test beds? A Blisk is not an unmixed blessing. At the cost of more expensive FOD repairs it gives maybe a 2-3 % improvement in compressor performance- once you have reached the 80-85% ( for example) compressor efficiency ranges. If we are at say 55% efficiency we better spend effort trying to get the efficiency up to scratch. Acquiring technology without sanctioned plans to use it reveals callousness with funds and an un engineering like expectation that all we need to get a serviceable engine is to cram it with high technology stuff.
ii)                  The same applies to the SCB. This gives better sfc as well as longer TBOs. It is essential for an “expeditionary” air force like the USAF even in peacetime because of their need to “transfer of assets to various theaters”. We have no ambitions to global policing. We can have a matching if not identical capability usually by degrading TBO. There are more ways of killing a cat than drowning it in cream! Why are we steeplechasing something we do not just now need? The Chinese engines DO NOT match the US engines in terms of TBO and TTL but in terms of Thrust to Weight they are probably close enough to the US engines. The Chinese are not losing too much sleep with such a situation because they have designed their airframes for quick engine change and employing more people- they can afford that sensible solution. In the meantime they beaver away, sometimes by fair means, to improve the ever narrowing menu of lacunae in their engines.
New readers may wish to read “The Lessons of the Kaveri” in Vayu III/2014 for more on our engine options.
It would be cheaper and more certain if we spend a decimal fraction of the expected TOT costs and without “socialist” bias, fund companies that are already in this approximate field and with the right spirit – for blisks Bharat Forge comes to mind -and get them to do a”cold” i.e. non flying, blisk of the LP spool of the RD 33 or Kaveri compressor and measure the aerodynamic efficiencies and creep and other relevant properties as well as the problems of manufacture and heat treatment. Just that- not a ten years pie in the sky programme. We will learn, at very low costs heaps more than getting “Blisks for Dummies” in three volumes as I suspect is the hopeful expectation. We should remember our past dismal track record where the taxpayer paid good money to get TOT which was then allowed to be wasted down the drain.
i)                    The HDW submarine programme ended and we had no follow up programme. It was only when the entire workforce at MDL had retired that people woke up to the need to replenish our submarine fleet. Of course the TOT had to be paid for again.
ii)                  TOT was paid for the Bofors FH 77 155/37 technology. Then we sat on those drawings for thirty years- until the artillery requirement had changed to 155/52 before suddenly waking up with a start. Perhaps the hope was for another round of TOT! The change was in another magnitude of machining, heat treatment and propellant technology. In the interim what happened? Firstly we did not build one single howitzer to those drawings for which we had paid TOT. Whilst our people sat on the Bofors drawing there was a separate induction of light weight howitzers- something which we could have cobbled together from the TOT if we had let our engineers loose with a brief and a little funding. An aluminum gun carriage was a possible solution at a fraction of the cost even if the carriages had to be remanufactured more often. Did anyone responsible even think? If “no” why not? Even if it failed- in a short period experiment- we would learn.
iii)                Why is it invariably that feasible projects are never funded and the less feasible the project the more sustained support. Who sanctions these open ended projects and why are they condoned?
Unless this disconnect is removed TOT would only waste money. TOT does not happen. The fact that Jubbalpore factory could get out the 155/46 calibre gun out in a commendable short time indicates that there is the ability to “figure things out” at the rank and file level. If one can’t then one should not call oneself an Engineer but an “Engineering degree holder”! There is a difference between the two.
Finally I have a fundamental doubt about buying TOT. The Chinese have an embarrassing trade surplus with the US about which the US complains. Why is it not that the US sell and the Chinese just buy the TOT. Perhaps the Chinese enjoy Industrial espionage or do it just for the sport of it.
The cost of the horses
If wishes were horses beggars would ride!
The cost of the buy without TOT It is currently at $ 18,000/kg X 8000kgs./aircraft X Rs 66/$ X 110  that works out Rs. 104540 crores upfront to buy and at least another Rs.3,12,632 crores to keep them in service for just the next twelve years at 225 hrs per airframe per year. ?  This does not include the flight refuellers (see ten hrs sorties as referred above) and AWACS as will be required to make the BVRs work properly. Given that sanctioning a paltry Rs. 6600 crores to modify pensions to OROP took a mere 42 years it is clear that we are not going to go anywhere in a hurry as regards the MMRCA.
 Those prices are if we buy the whole lot from abroad. If we make the mistake of making it in the Government Factories it is likely to go up by another forty nine percent. In the case of the Sukhois that HAL built even if we accept that HAL costs should only equal and not be less than Russian costs we have lost 18,700 crores. Any wonder why we don’t have money for the Forces? Why do we continue with this wastage when “saving foreign exchange “the old explanation holds no water today?
One small but encouraging point is that there is no “bobbery” (Hobson Jobson Baap Rey! –an exclamation of awe and shock) about AOA that great requirement of a decade ago. If not by oversight it is good that we are not letting the ghost of the Phantom II’s spinning characteristics wag us anymore.
To sum up. This is an RFI produced by the IAF working in isolation. It is a “wrong” RFI because it is for an “expeditionary” Air Force. What we need is a self Defence Air Force. We need a large Air Force but this is not the way we will get there.
The plan(c)e of Wails  ( excuse the lisp!)
Digressing  for a moment to the LCA- the delays in which has perhaps got us where we are- seeking a face saving solution by labeling a LCA replacement/ supplement programme  as the MMRCA- we see the same encircling gloom. The aircraft has more than one IOC and the FOC is “just around the (by now perennial!) Corner”. The production line has been set up and augmented to cater to eleven aircraft per year. Can we expect we shall have two fully equipped squadrons (never mind if it is to FOC1 as seems to be the fashion with this project- standard) by September 2019 and four squadrons by September 2021. That should be possible but to believe that would be, like a second marriage, a triumph of Hope over Experience. My prediction is that we will get perhaps four aircraft by the end of this financial year. If there is a fifth it will be delivered on 29th March 2019 at 23 hrs so that it can be said that five were delivered in 2018-2019. One speaks only from past experience.
The LCA situation continues to be dismal and I will share my reasons for being gloomy about any sudden improvements in this regard if only so that you will know how much salt you will take with my assessment.
i)                    The aircraft will not meet it’s speed and energy related performance parameters. The aircraft is claimed to be supersonic at sea level but there has been persistent reports that the aircraft is not meeting its Mach 1.6 max speed which is one of the reason for holding up the FOC. In my experience an aircraft that does Mach 1.1-1.2 at SL will do Mach 1.6 at the tropopause. I have always been skeptical of the drag of the airframe. Mind you I would value transonic acceleration rather than the max straight line speed. Readers are referred to Vayu I/2015 The LCA… beloved aircraft or lemon?”……for a more complete exposition.
ii)                  During the Second World War the Russians found that they could improve the speed of the Ilyushin IL2 M3 Shturmovik by about 32 kmph on a top speed of 400 kmph by improving the fit and finish of hatches, covers, gaps between the control surfaces etc. I was reminded of this when I was examining the picture on the cover of Vayu V/2017 of an LCA. My interest was caught by the pattern of light reflecting on the upper mid fuselage /wing root area. The light pattern indicates the presence of an irregular large kidney shaped depression of poor finish in that area. It is fatal to performance. I cannot think of any excuse for that. This is on a LSP aircraft not an early TD series. I do not believe that the LCA  programme has any engineer in any responsible position or else one would not get to see such shoddy work.
iii)                There has been some mild cheering about the move of nine LCAs to Sulur. It is being hailed as a proof that the programme is finally out of the woods and the aircraft is “operational”. I too would like to believe that but it does not square up with common sense. Here we have the MiG 21s requiring to be carefully looked at for signs of popped rivets and cracks and no doubt spares are no longer as plentiful as they were sixty years ago and here we are sending it “red hot “ replacement to the deep South. There have been no reports of swarms of people invading the Coromandel Coast threatening to set up laundries and dentist shops. So why? Is it that the aircraft has been declared “fit for service” as a point of honour (Why? Whose?) but the Air Force does not want its forward bases and hardened shelters cluttered with a operationally useless type. Sulur is a good place where the Aircraft can be parked without harming themselves or the Air force. Please base the aircraft at Halwara, Hasimara or Nal before we roll out the barrel.

iv)                 The aircraft has flown 1000 sorties with 45 squadron. The usage rate works out to roughly 64.9 hours/aircraft / year which is half of the 126 hours/aircraft/year of the FC17. The RFI expects an average utilization rate of 225hrs/ aircraft /year.

v)                  The reports of the pilots being delighted with handling and the cockpit interface etc is no consolation to the IAF. Even if we get 100 out of 100 in these areas the aircraft is still a lemon. The Morane Saulnier MS 406 was a very pleasant and nice to handle aircraft but it simply did not match up to the ME 109.
At this point several questions surface.
The first is why is this periodic “blooming” of the MMRCA requirement e.g. 2001, 2007,2017, 2018 etc and how can something “urgent” continue to be deferred. My construct is that the MMRCA is the dog that is being wagged by the LCA tail and to mix several metaphors we get involved in chasing the MMRCA wild goose round and round the mulberry bush. We are in a crisis because of the continued failure of the LCA programme. If we had ten squadrons of LCA in service and more in the pipeline the MMRCA deal would not have verged on the “compelling circumstances” situation. To break this circle we need to tackle the LCA problem first. This programme is where it is because generations of Politicians could not care less.
The LCA is unlikely to be a top ranking aircraft but it can be made serviceable if we break with the past thinking. The political leadership must hammer out a compromise between the user’s expectations and the designer’s capabilities within the restrictions imposed by the unfortunate tailless delta configuration. Having got that compromise the production has to be ramped up to about forty aircraft per annum. The LCA/Mig 21 replacement is the critical shortage in the IAF’s inventory and a production line set up for thirteen airframes can also do forty. In any case we have nothing better. Air Marshal Tipnis said before Kargil “We will have to fight with what we have”. Kargil was  twenty years ago. We cannot be ,like Ethelred, continue to be Unready! This time we expect the guilty to hang- if only to encourage the others
The second question is why is it that we have a specification that seems to be for “an expeditionary Airforce”?  That is because only the Air Force wrote it out. Whilst the Raisina Babus vapour that war is too serious a business to be left to the Generals they evidently have loftier things to do. Our planning should be a joint effort between the Military and the Bureaucracy presided over by the Political Leadership. We enjoy an enormous advantage in that we are not expedition minded. Our war planning for the three weeks war can go into very precise details, targets, times, sortie rates, losses squadron cycles.  Our adversaries cannot create “Bekaa Valley” all along a 4000 km. front. So we should have some squadrons of “Bekaa Capable” and many squadrons of Tropical VFR combat capable squadrons. It will be a big relief in terms of budget and technology and “do-ability”.
The third and most damnning question is that why for a most crucial requirement there is not even one Indian vendor bidding? There is good money and we are nothing if not enterprising. For this we have to go into the politics so batten your hatches- I will be concise..
Some researchers hold that during the First World War- around 1916 to be more precise it became clear to the Financiers of the British Empire that India’s independence was inevitable and the new nations Industry would be a considerable threat to their investments worldwide. To safeguard their interests they started several processes aimed at reducing the efficiency of the Indian economy. These included the fracturing of the market and long established supply chains by Partition and encouragement of secession. Post Independence regime changes in Pakistan and Bangladesh prevented commercial reconsolidation of the fractured markets. The excellent education system, once vaunted to be second only to Oxford and Cambridge were politicized to its present mediocrity. For hobbling the Industry in particular there was a strong movement for a “socialist pattern of Society” in some of the UK Universities and their Indian acolytes. Unfortunately this got an ill considered support from our then inexperienced Leadership. The proposed Socialist pattern of society was a regime almost Soviet in its rigidity and central authority and significantly never allowed to be applied in the country of its origin.
The espousal of a “socialist pattern of society” in the garb of welfare for the masses had to characteristics:
i)                    It allowed a relatively small number of people in power to stifle the inherent enterprise of the people.
ii)                  By a “dog in the manger “ policy the Government created  big “no fly zones” where, illogically ,in an era of shortage of capital and management skills, private capital was shut out. When licenses were given the permitted production rate was always and unfailingly below the level to make the product globally competitive.
Just how crippling this policy was and what opportunity was lost can be gauged by examining the decline of Air India .Under JRD Tata it was a prized airline. It is now unsaleable.
iii)                The opposite and happy example is the Indian Automotive industry which pre liberalization produced a very limited variety of models of unfailing bad quality. Volume wise it was nowhere. It is today the fifth largest producer in the world exporting to several countries with a fairly good design capabilities and in some segments it is the largest producer in the world. To note with pride is that India was the only country where the home grown products were able to fend off the challenge of Japanese competition. Usually the Japanese annihilate the local industry.
      The teeth of the Elephant
I will now begin with a scenario. We have fought our 2 front three weeks war. Our losses will be around 200 aircraft lost and another 80 or so are being dragged back to the BRDOs to be repaired. They will be there for the next six months before starting to trickle back. If the adversary were to realize that thanks to our numbers we have been able to rotate our squadrons and having absorbed the lessons- retrain our crews. He is aware that after this battering and the loss of some of the cream of our crews our critical close support and strike strength remains effective he may think that discretion is the better part of valour -and not start the fight in the first place. As they say so wisely in Hindustani- “An Elephant has two ( sets of) teeth – one to show and another to eat!”
We are now caught between a rock and a hard place as far as our air strength is concerned. We need a 45-50 combat squadron Air Force not because that number was sanctioned in 1963 but because of the above scenario. The loss of 200 machines can be guaranteed given the single factor of increased effectiveness of SAMs and MANPADS since our conflict in 1971.We need the numbers .
Unfortunately if we go by the RFI we will never have that large force because no country maintains forces of this size using imported equipment. Please name one. Making in India won’t help- thanks to our “socialism” the Government factories will be even more expensive- about 49% is the quoted figure.
Political Leadership –the magic ingredient.
North Korea (NK) is to me a Business School case study of how a totally involved political guidance can maximize slender resources to achieve incredible results. It is certain that the NK missiles are below par in sophistication (pl. note) and their nuclear weapons are equally doubtful The North Koreans have succeeded in being the proverbial Indian folk tale of being the ant in the (US) Elephant’s ear. The magnitude of North Korea’s achievement can be gauged if we remember that North Korea is in terms of size population and resources about the size of the Indian state of Chhattisgarh. It is a little difficult to imagine Dr. Raman Singh, the Chief Minister of Chandigarh keeping the US President sleepless at night.
NK being a totalitarian state has nothing to do with the validity of the example. China ,under Mao , was equally totalitarian but Mao’s obsessive preoccupation of staying meant that the vast Chinese Armed Forces were obsolete. It was under Deng Xiao Ping’s monitoring of the weapons programme that China made rapid strides. Note that in an age of Body bag sensitivity Mao never blinked when dealing with the US. For us the lesson clearly is having large forces with home grown equipment even if slightly below par. With all these widely varied perspectives to the problem we can visualize that the way out is with the political leadership alone. The Leadership must, in the words of Shakuntala’s Dushyant /47 squadron motto live up to ““Karmani Bypritam Dhanehu” - my Bow is bent to its task.
Staking the elephant.
In pre colonial India a Commander signaling his intention to force the issue would tie down the forelegs of his command elephant to stakes driven into the ground. In doing so he exposed himself to the risk of being killed. Warfare being a mind game such an act often had the effect of unnerving his opposition and he would win the field. Political maladroitness has got us here and it is now for the political leadership to stake the elephant.
Pakistan applied the doctrine of “compelling circumstances” to their political life. They do not have a political life. If we apply the doctrine of compelling circumstances to our weapons procurements then we will neither have a weapons Industry nor finally a large armed Forces. The political leadership must reject the doctrine of “compelling necessity” This spectre will continue to haunt unless firmly dismissed. Given the nuclear deterrence no one will overrun Assam or Ladakh. Given Political will it will we need five to ten years to turn the tide as regards weaponry. We are in this dismal spot because our political leaders have almost since Independence never taken a comprehensive interest in matters of defence except as a source of funds.
Nobody can afford large forces with imported weaponry.  
In sum
The RFI reflects the malaise of organization of our overall defence planning. The decision process is narrow liner and vulnerable to a disruptive force however small. Defence plans must be made by the Bureaucracy and the Military under the yoke of the Political Leadership. Once the scenario is clear then our war plans become simpler and more focused and the need for a technology package then becomes affordably reduced. A careful review of the threat may show that the S 400 and bullet proof jackets and night vision equipment may be a compensation for the present weakness in our air strike strength. It will buy us the time.
The quick development of the LCA Mk1 A is the key to the stability of the acquisition process. The present situation cannot just have happened. It was allowed or contrived to degenerate because the Politicians of the day were too preoccupied to monitor and supervise even to the very simplest levels. This needs correction. If we do not get six aircraft by September 2018 the Government must have an internal white paper on the LCA programme. If after Rs 70,000 crores  (PDV) all w e have is nine partly operational aircraft then it requires Political intervention. The cost of the Indian production does not tie up with common sense and indicates the presence of a Tatra like Scam. What is needed is not questions but a scrutiny.
It would be willful neglect on the part of the Government if it makes the LCA mk2 the sole contender for funding. The Honeywell F 124 N powered development of the HF 24 and the GE F 414 powered adaptation of a MiG 27 ( No VG, radar Nose ) are not only viable but being proven airframes are closer to the ASR for the Mk.2 than the LCA Mk1. Their airframes are proven and have the room for all the avionics that the IAF insist on asking.  The bonus will be certainty of time scales and the ability to “tweak” the design to perfection. BRD Nashik /Air HQ can do the initial project studies for the MiG 27/F414. The LCA Mk2 must be paced if it is to deliver.
If we are forced to acquire the MMRCA from outside for factors unknown buy the cheapest and smallest- size is the LCA’s only considerable advantage. If the smallest is not the cheapest detune the equipment fit- VFR tropical warfare rather than Bekaa Valley- until it is the cheapest! Or buy the cheapest! For our needs they are all as alike as peas in a pod.
Every time we have come to the edge of the woods we have guided ourselves back to the deep woods. Only strong political will and direction – like Deng Xiao Ping of China- can change things.
Let them keep “Abide with me” for ceremonies. For the Defence Industries the tune must change to “Kadam Kadm baraye Ja” – March! March! Forward March!




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Monday 29 January 2018

Ugly Duckling, Swan or a hunt bird in hand? The JF 17- an open source assessment.

The assessment of a rival’s warplane suffers from a primary lacunae in that the information is secret. There is perforce reliance on secondary sources but this is inevitably heavily dosed with rivalry, jealousy, envy, disdain, NIH ( not invented here!) racialism and similar human failings. The task therefore becomes difficult and the output subjective. To illustrate my observation I will mention the case of two very well known warplanes.
The existence of the Mitsubishi Reisen ( Zero) first came into US knowledge almost a year before Pearl Harbour. The American Volunteer Group (AVG) Flying Tigers sent back reports from China of an astonishing Japanese fighter with unimaginable maneuverability and range. The US experts discounted these frontline reports because such a fighter could not exist. One can sympathize with the experts. Going by their lights such as aeroplane could not be designed. They did not know that the Japanese had got rid of everything which the West would consider “essential”- armour, bullet proof windscreen, self sealing tanks radios etc to produce the ultimate dogfighter that swept everything before it. It is an illustration of how human emotions cloud judgment that when the first wrecks were examined after Pearl Harbour much time was spent and much evident satisfaction gained  on “identifying” what part of the Zero was copied from which American aircraft! In fact this copy allegation was so sustained that much later, Jiro Hirokoshi, the Zero’s Chief Designer was to say, perhaps with testiness, Japanese style “The Zero was a copy of all the aircraft before it!” Even today there is a persistent view that the Zero had erred by sacrificing protection for performance. This misses an important point. Battle damage resistance would have improved pilot survivality but given the Zero’s phenomenal long range and the fact that it operated over the ocean and over tropical jungles did Japan have the resources to ensure pilot recovery? Without pilot recovery battle damage resistance is less meaningful. Note that when the fighting was over the homeland the later versions of the Zero was given a fair measure of battle damage resistance- it was not all Bushido and Banzai as is popularly believed. The real weakness in the Zero was it had to fight an enemy industrially ten times as big. Putting it in another way if Japan had the Corsair and the Hellcat and it was the US which had the Zero the outcome would still be the same. This, by the way, is an argument for maintaining large forces. It pays on the long run.
One would think that things would have improved with time but the MiG 21 case is illustrative. To the Indian Air Force used to the fit and finish of the Mystere IVA, the MiG 21was “brute force supersonics” possibly because it was at the time of its induction the most powerful fighter in IAF service. The truth is both the MiG 21 and the Su7 were the lowest powered aircraft in their categories though one must add the Soviet aircraft often had no exact equivalent because they were designed for different scenarios. In 1966 an Iraqi MiG 21 F 13 defected to Israel and very soon afterwards a leading US Aviation Magazine carried a very detailed examination of the aircraft. Much of the focus was on the poor fit and finish of the aircraft and the mushroom head rivets ( discoloured) used in the rear fuselage. The three shock two position translating cone intake ( the mighty EE Lightning had a fixed cone and encountered intake buzz problems during development) and the semi encapsulated SK ejection seat ( surely the best for high altitude supersonic ejection) must have been covered but the overriding impression one carried away was of gaps and discoloured rivets on the aeronautical equivalent of a combine harvester. Generally the MiG 21 s lack of F104 and F4 Phantoms level of avionics and long range missiles were disparaged. Unfortunately the Viertnam War started in earnest soon after and it was the Americans who had to go back to school- the excellent Red Flag ,the F 15 and F 16  being a typical energetic US effort to correct things.
The point of citing the above is to accept that assessing a rival’s warplane is difficult not only because of the lack of information but also because of the “schooling” one has gone through.  I sometimes envy the Chinese in that they generally know less English and being “unschooled” look at things in their own pragmatic Chinese way.
 With that as both a caution and as disclaiming any infallibility the following is a very personal assessment of the Sino /Pak JF 17.
Enter the (JF 17) Dragon
 Wikepedia carries a review of the JF 17 Xiaolong ( Fierce Dragon) with several pages of references. The figures cited below are drawn from this review and I will presume that the reader has access to the Net to avoid total repetition. I am therefore confining myself to a commentary. Because both aircraft originated as MiG 21 replacements comparison with the LCA is inevitable.
 The Chinese have made so many MiG 21 based derivatives that one can be forgiven for initially thinking it was yet another derivative with a nose job like the Qiang JiJi 5 ,surely one of the ugliest jet as I ever wish to see. This impression is quickly corrected by looking at the Table.
The JF 17 is no MiG 21 clone. It is altogether a more potent aircraft, reminiscent of the Northrop F 20 Tigershark. Though Yang Wei, the Chief Designer, did not have access to the F 20 he may have had opportunity to examine ex Vietnam Air Force F 5A aircraft or airframes and why not-only an arrogant fool will not “flatter” a good piece of engineering by imitating? Mitchell of Spitfire fame was “inspired” by the Heinkel He 70 Blitz’s graceful lines and Yang Wei may have been similarly “inspired” by Welko Gasich/Lee Begin’s work on the F5/F20 series. Northrop of course threw the game away by adding 80% more power and 20% more weight without changing the wing which remained the same as the F5 series. The figures of the wing loading speak for themselves. Digressing for a moment one sees the same reluctance in BAe to design a proper light strike aircraft using perhaps the Hawk systems in a Gnat derived airframe ( see Vayu III/2016- Going against the Wind) instead of trying to fob off native Air Forces with an inappropriate airframe too big for the job.
It would seem that the JF 17’s able Chief Designer Yang Wei carefully studied the F 20 concepts and made very well thought out “nips and tucks” type bespoke tailoring of the F20 design so that the JF 17 did not carry an extra ounce of fat or skin. Comparing the lengths the JF 17 is 0.53 mts longer but that is largely the difference between the F 404 and the RD 33 engine lengths. The empty weight of the JF 17 is 622 kgs. heavier but again if you factor in the weight differences of the two engine types and the additional 5.8 sq.mts of wing area that the Sino/Pak fighter carries the weight is commendable. The weights indicate that either the weight control supervision on the JF 17 was up to US/International design standards or Shri Wang Wei had enough domain expertise to tell the powerful PLAFAF faction where they got off regarding equipment fit standards of the JF 17! One can recount that when the US Navy wanted any additional equipment on the little A4, Douglas’s Ed Heinmann would reputedly take off fuel of weight equal to the additional equipment requested. Of such stories is aviation is made. One final point on weights that should make us think: The JF 17 is a larger aeroplane with a heavier engine and with an all metal structure and yet it is “as near as dammit” the same weight as the largely composite and smaller LCA Mk 1. That is an indication of how much we have erred and how much we can correct.
Having accomplished his weight control Wang Wei pulled off the first of his two coups de main in that the generally conservative approach to the Northrop- like design was modified to a mid wing layout of increased wing area. Despite the weight penalty of longer u/c struts and ring frames to carry through the wing bending loads- an additional 42 kilos somehow comes to mind for the frames-it cured several big problems. The F 20 suffered in that though the warload was increased by twenty percent the low wing meant that fitting the store and the Ground clearance certifications must have been nail biting. The mid wing of the JF 17 avoided this easily and the larger wing area meant that the high induced drag of the F 20’ in high “g” turn and the increased CDo caused by the higher AoA, was lowered and dog fighting and general handling improved significantly. The F 20 gave the later F 16s a hard time during fly off competition and the JF 17 should be very much better. One will also note that sweet handling aircraft e.g. Hunter, MiG 21 and the Lightning were mid wing layouts which reduces or eliminates roll coupling and the JF 17 is a beneficiary. The second of his “coups de Main” was the introduction of the DSI after seven years of parallel preliminary work. DSI reduced weight and drag. Summing up: a very competent airframe has been designed on the lines of the Northrop F 20 but as with the F22/F31 resemblance the Chinese design somehow manages to look more elegant and dainty! There has been some gloating references on the Indian Net circles to the fact that Yang Wei has been recently severely criticized  for the shortcomings of the J 20   ( AMCA team beware!).The Gloaters have missed the significant point. Weapons development Programmes are of National Importance and there is no room for fellowship if things are not delivered. “You fail; you go” is the grim rule for running successful programmes-outside of India.
Programme Management: Hare and Tortoise
The Diagram 1 shows the difference between the timelines of the JF 17 and the LCA. The Sino/Pak team started eight years after us and reached where we are today i.e. a handling flight of three aircraft ten years ago (nota bene!). To rub the salt in properly they did it at one third to one fifth the cost calculated at Present Day Value PDV. Below is my conjecture as to how they did it:
i)                    They chose an utterly conventional layout. That way they could “decouple” any delay of FBW development.
ii)                  They chose no “glamorous” technology and were almost sanction proof from the word go. Being all metal the prototypes could be built faster- the shop floor people were dealing with a material they knew from infancy- and also airframes could be modified faster if things did not work out as predicted. Remembering Boeing’s problems with production of the 787’s composites it is clear that the Chinese by choosing all metal could focus entirely on the airframe development without being harassed by how to do it. As they say in the backwoods “if you are up to your ass in alligators it is difficult to remember that what you had actually set out to do is to drain the swamp!” 
iii)                The Chinese chose a pitch only FBW. This is less “advanced” than a four channel all axis FBW system.There is a size limit below which FBW becomes “doubtful”. To illustrate: would you fit FBW onto a Cessna 172 club trainer? Theoretically yes but in actuality the FBW weight and complexity would kill the bird. In my view an aircraft like the LCA is just teetering on the brink of this size limit. The “pitch only” FBW. This is a very good example of “engineering”  approach. If you think about it, pitch control benefits maximum from FBW in reducing trim drag; roll and yaw have less scope for “improvements” in “performance”.  The Chinese solution is not “brochure glamourous” or exciting but as the inventors of the Panhard-Levassor gearbox said so long ago “C’est brutal mais ce Marche!” – It is rough but it works! As if to add insult to our Injury the Chinese the FBW software was written in C++ and not the more elegant ADA language. The Chinese have reached a stage where they are very respectfully examining what is going on and then instead of being overawed they are doing there own thing. It is this arrogant (and I use it as a compliment!) self confidence that must be noted carefully in assessing any Chinese defence technology product.

The emphasis in flying the thing!
The Chinese flew the first prototype on 25 August 2003 i.e. within four years of funds being sanctioned. They had little faith in that if you calculated enough you would get the thing right first time! Once the third prototype (9/04/2004) was flying they built another three introducing a modified LERX (which needed enlarging) an enlarged Inlet (the RD 33 was smoking like a juvenile delinquent!) and the second significant improvement, a diverter less intake (DSI)  with the first modified prototype flying on 28/04/2006. It must be acknowledged, howsoever grudgingly, the Chinese/Pakistani team got their fighter in Squadron service in two iterations, six prototypes and within seven years of funding. The alarm bells are ringing here! We are being out developed and the advantage of a big economy is being neutralized by Pakistan through sheer efficiency and better organization!
The LCA Mk 1 still needs major redesign about 35-40% before it will be fit for service. I guess that the slow production is a cover to buy time to effect the changes. Those readers who have seen the dramatic cover of Vayu I/2017 with the LCA will have noticed and disapproved of the deep boundary layer diverter plates and the bleed off channels (which would have reduced the local lift fields). The Chinese were working on the DSI since 1997 and introduced it in 2004 claiming reduction in weight, cost and drag. Seventeen years after the first flight the LCA fore fuselage and the merging of the intake bulges with the centre fuselage still requires considerable refining. It is bemusing to compare with the undershot of the JF 17 (Vayu III/2016 p 94). Similarly if one compares the front views of the two aircraft the LCA’s excess of reentrant corners and deep channels indicate excess wetted areas and drags. Out of curiosity I estimated the distance from the rear pressure bulkhead and the tip of the radome for the two aircraft and the JF 17’s figures are 5382 mm compared to the LCA’s 4661 mm. If correct it indicates the effort and care taken ab initio in getting the forebody drag right. Visually the cross sections of the LCA’s forebody have a squarer section compared to the JF 17s and this increased cross section will tell on the transonic drag.  Incidentally the JF 17’s radome works out to 690mm compared to 648mm of the LCA, both in the plane of the antennae but the longer nose length compensates.
The Avionics
Reading so far one would think it was the Chinese who had done everything but that would be injustice to Pakistan’s contribution. Though clearly the Chinese were in the driver’s seat w.r.t. the airframe, Pakistan played a very competent and independent role in the development of the JF 17 particularly in customizing the aircraft for PAF use. Using it’s better networking and contacts with the West, Pakistan took what amounted to an independent charge of the avionics development for its aircraft, the Chinese going in for their own aggregates which were always on offer to Pakistan. It is noteworthy for example that Pakistan chose a Martin Baker PK 16LE seat over the Chinese model. Though the Chinese had launched the JF 17 project in 1991 Pakistan came on board in 1995 and the funding for the actual aircraft development was signed as a contract in 1999. Hit by sanctions- as with us-the Chinese/Pakistan- decided to decouple the avionics development in 1999 and it speaks well of the level of teamwork and the “can do” spirit that both sides were willing to re-engineer the design as and when needed. It will again be noted that choosing an all metal structure for prototypes must have been a great help Today ,with its West Asian connections Pakistan or perhaps the PAF is an “owner “ of the Project and bids fair to do a good job of Marketing. They did what we should have done with the PAKFA. Given our experience with the DARIN mods, clearly the expertise and ability were not lacking; aims and organization were.
The JF 17s Blocks 1&2 equipment fit is more than adequate for the job- HOTAS, MFD/EFIS, Holographic HUD, HUMS, VHF,UHF, ATE. The leading edge and trailing edge flaps are computer controlled to ensure controllability at high AoA. The FBW of production machines has quadruplex FBW in pitch and duplex in roll and yaw. The defensive aids include RWR, MAWS with 3600 scan, chaff flare dispenser and there is a provision for a jammer. Block 3 design was finalized in September 2016. The only sardonic cheer for us is having got a decent fit the PAF is now trying to load it with “goodies” such as IR targeting systems etc. God speed is my wish!
Propulsion
Soviet origin engines were always derided in the West. One remembers that when HAL was trying to see if the HF 24 could be fitted with the Tyumanskii RD 9F the story (probably untrue) went around that the engine was so surge prone that it would flame out on the test bench if someone so much as coughed at the other end of the Bangalore factory. The actual reason was that the Compressor stress limit was Mach 1.4 and the Soviets point blank (naturally!) refused to redesign it for Mach 2 which was our “must have” specifications at that point of time! Shows how fashions dictate “sacred” specifications and opportunities are lost. I mention the RD 9F  because when the Chinese laid their hands on the RD 9F they re-engineered the first stage of the compressor, put in a variable angle inlet stator, completely redesigned the hot section and put in a new afterburner stabilizer of reduced losses. It is possible that the variable inlet stator details were inspired by the close examination of the wrecked J 79s available to the Chinese during the Vietnam era. The fact is that the Chinese Wopen 6 of the F6 fighters did not give the PAF any more than the usual problems in service. This tradition of sensible engineering to improve a base product means that the Taihang WS 13 based on the RD 93 will probably emerge an acceptable engine though it may not have the 4000 hr service life demanded of Western engines. Such design targets are dishonest for countries like us. It is much better to design for quick engine change.
The cost and the prices
Cost consciousness is important because if there is a significant lowering in the cost of projects as has happened with the JF 17 , it means that there is more money to go around for other projects- bullet proof jackets or Infantry assist vehicles for example. Unchecked spending without results can cause a ‘drought” which will wither other possible and vital projects. The current asking price for the JF 17 is roughly $25 M which works out to $3800/kg compared to the $17,000-$21,000 per kg for current Western aircraft. The usual explanation is that these prices are “political/friendship” prices. This is wrong. One’s own considerable experience in the Industry confirms the following:
a)      The only cost really known for certain is the RM (raw materials) and the BOC (bought out complete) costs.
b)      When it comes to the labour costs escalation starts from the shop floor supervisor and goes right up the chain, though everyone concerned will scream blue murder and horror at the merest suggestion of downwards revisions.
c)      When it comes to overheads it runs riot and again figures are padded up just to be safe. For PSU’s this practice is safe but drives up project costs which finally affect local development.
d)     In technology transfer a five- fold reduction in costs is usual.
This is not the entire picture. Thanks to our colonial past there were rules that were actually designed so that India would NOT develop a local aeronautical capability. Some of these were:
i)                    An import duty structure that allowed complete aircraft to be duty free, accessories had a substantial duty and raw materials were prohibitively taxed.
ii)                  A system of “aircraft quality materials” (AQM) was the norm where the sources of this AQM was invariably from the Home Country.
These laws and there were many may or may not have been repealed but the spirit lives on and the Bureaucracy with nothing to gain and not tamed by the National Leadership, staunchly obstructs any attempt to reform. One will hear many arguments for maintaining status quo but there has been little reasoned debate as was done in China and Russia who do not have this anachronism. Finally with PSU’s operating at a cost plus 15% basis and Western Weapons Suppliers with a stock of horror stories if any initiative inimical to their interests it is we who have been “schooled “ into believing what should be the price of warplanes. The Sino Pak prices are realistic and can be reduced further.
An estimate of performance
Readers are referred to Vayu (I/2015) in which I had said that the LCA Mk1 would not be able to outperform the JF 17 as a fighter. It can be used as a strike aircraft but the outcome of any dogfight would be in favour of the FC17. I have not seen anything in the past two years that need me to make a drastic revision of that view. The only parameter the LCA Mk1 potentially is superior to the JF 17 is in TO performance The JF 17 will need a 25% longer run but even that difference will be reduced as this is not corrected for the CD0 and the reported lower engine installation efficiency for the LCA. Readers may raise the point that an aircraft with a sprightlier take off should perform better but this is not so because at combat speeds the CDo drag of the LCA will be much higher. Incidentally I did compare the TO values for the LCA and the Harrier and assuming equally efficient intake design and CDo s .The LCA should be marginally better/similar to the Harrier in the STO mode. If the Navy’s disappointment is purely technical than the weight and drag problem in the LCA is still significant.
What perhaps HAL should do is to take a deep breath and clean up the entire fore fuselage with particular attention to the blending of the front fuselage with the mid fuselage. The clutter is visible from afar and must be worse in detail! If ADA is ready with the DSI, (only if!)  it should be brought forward. They should do it in metal to begin with so as to get the prototype right quickly rather than have a nice sub project of making it in composites! With the clean up and the weight reduced the LCA stands a very good chance but not as things stand at the moment. C’ne marche pas! The LCA is unlikely to be clear for production until 2019-2020-if that!
Like the LCA,  the JF 17 was a MiG 21 replacement but it is now something more – nearer to a F 16 supplement at one fifth/one sixth the price and no threats of being sanctioned in which the PAF has much experience!.It has potential to become “fashionable” i.e. over equipped .What the JF 17 lacks it does not need and Pakistan should leave the aircraft well enough alone. Summing of this section:
i)                    The LCA has the potential to have significantly better field performance even at the current empty weight of 6650kg.
ii)                  In low level OAS the small size and the 5% better fuel fraction (internal fuel/ installed cold thrust) the LCA may be a better choice.
iii)                In any close combat as of the present the LCA is inferior. ( See Vayu I/2015)
iv)                Thanks to more power and a bigger ( by about  52 mm ) antennae the JF 17 is the better BVR platform but I think it is stupid to fit BVRs simply and just because they can be fitted on an aircraft of this size. BVR capability is a specialized capability which ruins general capabilities to install.
v)                  The current availability (raw figure)  of the JF17 is 113hrs/aircraft/year as of 2016. There has been two accidents in 19,000 hrs which is close to the 1 per 10,000 hrs for “bedded down” equipment and indicates  reliability,
vi)                Production has now moved to Block 2 and about 90 airframes are delivered or on the slipway.
At this point of time the JF 17 is the better aeroplane and the LCA is not even achieving its potential in the areas where it has the potential to be better! Sadly the comparisons are academic. At this point the PAF can fly 200-250 OAS sorties per day on the JF 17. The LCA?
Exports
Any Asian product is bad mouthed. The twelve Hindustan HT2s supplied to Ghana were routinely disparaged by the foreign instructors seconded to the NAF. The sturdiness, low prices and the fact that they served the IAF for over thirty years “faults and all” was overlooked. The more recent case of the ALH refers. The Chinese are in a better position. Over the years they have exported fair numbers to European, African and Asian Customers and have acquired useful skills in marketing, selling and sustaining a product on the field.  The FC17 has attracted the attention of about 21 customers with Myanmar, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia as confirmed customers. The weak link was the RD33/93 engine of Russian origin but if the Russians refuse the engine because of fears of the JF 17 cannibalizing MiG 29 sales they have little choice because the Chinese will develop the WS13 Taihang. Even if the TBOs are not quite upto the ‘international standards” their prices will be extremely attractive and ‘international standards” are not an operational necessity. I would not have minded buying the JF 17 myself. The Chinese have exported over two thousand aircraft and the FC17 bids fair to add to those numbers and customers list.
The reason why
The JF 17 is either an unremarkable warplane or a coolly brilliant piece of engineering improvisation superbly managed. The judgment will depend on one’s “schooling” but what cannot be denied is that the Sino Pak team has raised five squadrons on the type. There is an old adge  “ An engineer is a person who can do for sixpence which any fool can do for six shillings”. The JF 17 demonstrates that. The LCA’s so called “technical superiority” has been its undoing and If we confine ourselves up to correct the technical shortcomings of the LCA Mk1 then we shall be setting ourselves up to fail in the AMCA. The present situation is bleak and near collapse. I do not see any evidence of the energy and the interested management that is the need of the hour.

The organization for effective development is not the present topic but that is the crux. What the Sino /Pak team achieved with the JF 17 they can do in AFVs and submarines and rifles and every item required in warfare. We shall be out resourced and out timed- and out gunned! India’s weapons development programmes are in the “fire and forget “mode which will not work in a hundred years. By preoccupation with other “priorities” The Politician, the Bureaucracy and the Armed Forces have abdicated their role of leadership in weapons development to the technocrats.. None of the above, singly, can manage a Weapons anymore than the blind men could “see” the elephant. Yet the solution lies in them working as a team with respect for the undoubted competence there is in each organization. Unthinkable in our bureaucracy dominated committees, Pakistan had serving Air Marshalls in charge of the project who reported directly to the Air Chief whereas we had the IAF actually ‘shorted out” so that the LCA project could be “Fast tracked”! The Cheek of it! Left to themselves the Technical people went on a Technical Picnic!
The Armed Forces whose responses have been clumsy and indignant rather than studied and moral (why did it accept pressure when things were obviously out of control and so much is at stake? Recall Air Marshall Dowding’s stand just before the Battle of Britain: He stood up to that old steamroller Churchill. Of course he paid the price but he saved Fighter Command for the Battle. The Bureaucracy’s sniping of the Military- I think the business about Batmen being one of the latest must stop or be regulated. If the Batman must go so should the Chuprassi!. This tribal warfare between the Bureaucracy and the Forces has to be tamed and yoked by the Political Leadership. The country must form a WEDOG (weapons development Group) so that realistic threat scenarios are generated for the next say ten years that we need to become sanctions independent. China used its large Armed Forces and its nuclear deterrent to buy the ten years it needed. Given our large armed forces and our nuclear capability we have those ten years. We have the expertise to do so-if we work in a team. Realistic threat identification will lead to realistic specifications. Realistic specifications will reduce technical challenges and prioritize weapons programmes. Close monitoring will stop shocking wastage and ensure timeliness. We may yet surprise the World.

Table 1.


Parameters
JF 17
F20
LCA Mk1
F 16
F7
Length
14.93
14.4
13.2
14.52
 13.86
Target Volume
1.34
1.03
1.0
1.44
0.866
Wing Area
24.4
18.6
37
27.87
23
Empty Weight
6586
5964
6580
6857
5275
Internal Fuel ( KG)
2350
2450
2458
3162
2080
Disposable Load
5914
6510
6680
9200
3825
Wing  Loading Clean/MTO
312/ 512
485/ 670
256/ 356
372/ 576
306/408
Fuel Fraction
0.45
0.5
0.502
0.47
0.47
Dish Dia.
 ( estimate)
690mm
n.a
648
n.a
n.a
Nose Tip to rear pressure bulkhead
5382
n.a.
4661
n.a.
n.a.
TO Run
1.27
1.84
1.0
1.49
0.91

1.      Pakistan has an excellent replacement for the F7
2.      The LCA’s 10% higher disposable load should be noticed. With drag reduction and weight improvement it should be quite respectable but there is no evidence of any timely addressing of these long pending tasks.



Table 2: Costs sanctioned ( Rs. Crores unless otherwise stated)  and PDV( present day value)
Sl
Date
Amount
PDV
Remarks
1
1983
560
17,920

2
1993
1628
16512
FSED
3
2001
3302
15172

4
2009
2475
5305


Total

54,969

JF 17 project





1998
$ 500M=2250 Crores INR
Rs. 13,065
Equally shared by Pakistan and China

Note: The above does not include Rs 1729 sanctioned by the Navy ( 2003) for the NLCA PDV ( Rs. 6512 crores)
This excludes Rs. 4353 (2432+1921) PDV Rs. 9331 crores sanctioned for LCA MK2.
If we further ignore the Rs 560 crores sanctioned in 1983 the comparison of costs on the common base of PDV is:
LCA ( 16512+15172+5305)= 36,989
JF 17 ( 13,065)= 13065
Financially we are being ‘ resourced” by at a rate of 2.83 :1 at least.

Readers will be interested to compare that the entire XST/F 117 stealth development programme was funded in 1973-1978 to the tune of 4997 crores PDV in small stages to produce the required cutting edge technology aircraft. Unless financial management is tightened we will not have the funds for local development.

Prof. Prodyut Das
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