The AMCA orders- A personal assessment                            Professor Prodyut Das

iss2 13/03/2024 

 

The Government has decided to fund the AMCA programme to the tune of Rs. 15,000 crores for building 5 prototypes. The delay in sanctioning is being blamed on the usual suspects – The IAF, the Import lobby, the Babus etc without of course mentioning the real culprits. It seems ADA had as of 2023 not completed the RCS tests. Stealth being a key feature of the 5th generation this should have been done right in the beginning when contour changes required could be made. Delayed by over a decade the authorities may have had to accept whatever was offered. Without the RCS tests sanctioning would be only a clerical procedure. What the tests have revealed is secret but the probability of the project being another disaster is considerable. We may just end up with a large 4th.gen.e,g, unstealthy aircraft.

The Tejas Project has been in my assessment a disaster. It has run for 40 yrs, the aircraft it was meant to replace from 1995 is out of service and no one knows even after building 30 aircraft when the remaining next will be delivered. The Mk1 was 2300 kilos above the 5300 kilos estimated by the consultants, Marcel Dassault. The “improved” Mk1A aircraft is still 1300 kgs in excess which destroys the Tejas’ considerable potential and the IAF has lost more squadrons due to the Tejas programme’s failure than to war. This cannot be an aircraft programme from which we can learn.

To understand the impending chaos of the AMCA programme we need to compare it with the mistakes of the Tejas programme.

1.      The leadership was not equipped for the job.

2.      The developing Agency excluded everyone, even the customer, from the development until every error was cast in stone and the blunders were beyond easy correction.

3.      The delays have been caused not by technology but by absence of management.

4.      New technology was introduced without sufficient any previous experience.

5.      Monitoring of the Project by the Government was infrequent,  done by people who lacked knowledge of what to look for; people who had knowledge were outranked. 

6.      When it was found in 1993-three years POST the planned first flight date of April 1990- there was not a gramme of the aircraft in sight-and there was no fallback programme the only administratively “safe” action (though highly debatable) was to continue further funding of the lame duck. If one believes in conspiracy theory one has to admire the crafty planning somewhere by some brilliant aviation project management expert to ensure-ultimately- imports!

The situation vis a vis AMCA is similar.

1.      The Top Leadership leading the AMCA continues to be below par in the area of Domain knowledge. What has been learned from the Tejas is GET level stuff. There is no realization how much domain "soft knowledge" play in shaping an aircraft.

2.      Chastened by the Tejas experience the developing Agency has admitted the customer in but the agency’s lack of domain knowledge (anecdotes, old wives’ tales, superstitions, customs, Aviation history, Copying skills) is so near non- existent it reduces the quality of interaction. There is a reluctance to admitting independent inputs.

3.      New technology is being introduced without any previous experience. This is a repetition of the Tejas. 

4.      There may be improvement in Government monitoring. The problem is a government in an electoral, multi- party democracy does not have the time and expertise or even the continuity (e.g.  in a stable political era, Mahavir Prasad Tyagi’s replacement by Krishna Menon in 1957). This is why one either has Government control or an efficient Industry.   

5.      There are no fall-back projects to the ADA AMCA.

We have not learnt from the History of the Tejas. We are condemned to repeat it with the AMCA.  Given the similar weaknesses as earlier it is illogical to expect different results for the AMCA. 

A mention of the Funds.

Any figures of funds quoted should be treated with the utmost caution. The US figures are the most transparent being quoted in “Today Dollars”. In India the figures are misrepresented. One has to view claims of “XX” or “YY” billions of dollars with careful corrections because the figures are probably meant to mislead. The Dollar is vastly overvalued , corrections to present day Rupees is never made, Manpower costs are reportedly not included. When corrected of these anomalies our development costs are much higher than in the US (Ref.1) whereas it should be about one third to one fifth of US figures. That has been the experience and is also borne out by ISRO projects. Our project costs should be about one fifth of the US  costs.  

The way out

It is too late in the day to make large changes to the AMCA programme . We need to make a series of less radical changes. The first is to break down the Crony Socialism” silo within which ADA is operating. The second is to have alternative proposals which are funded to explore possibilities should the AMCA fail which is certain to happen.

1.      There used to be a BIFR for re-construction of ailing PSUs. ADA is a bankrupt organization in terms of project management. The first would be to purge ADA of Legacy management and put it under a new Board of Management comprising of the Customers, Industry, Knowledge experts and all else necessary  to monitor and control the programme as “Shareholders of Interest”.  ADA is not a part of DRDO but a “Society” and that should help in teh re- organization .

2.      To have a first flight by 2027 there has to be a plan with intermediate milestones. This has to be agreed and monitored on a monthly basis by the Board/PMO etc. If progress continues to falter funding projections have to reworked or stopped .

3.      Flight testing outputs in India is far below international standards. An US aircraft of this genre would generate about 1000 hours in 6 to 8 months with 8 aircraft. This is becaus eUS Military certifications are serious business. Aircraft must be acceptable to the customer as an independent empowered entity rather than as a chain in an “interdepartmental/Works transfer”.

4.      The private sector has developed a new Light Tank in 17 months using technology available within India with DRDO help. Neither DRDO nor L&T could have done it alone as Mr.Jayant D Patil, Director  of L&T Defence recently stated. It is an indication of the possibilities when silos are broken down.    

5.      The same must be repeated in Aerospace and the 5^th generation. The times and funds demanded by the present system are not only unaffordable but may have been “wasted” (one should not buy a wooden wind tunnel models for Rs.3 crores when the US buys three of the same size and purpose for $15,000) going by figures given in INSDOC publications.  

In short   

1.      1. Good the AMCA prototypes have been ordered. It calls ADA's bluff.

2.      2. It will fail in every way except perhaps the Government may not allow it to drag..

3.      3. ADA is presently like a powerful computer without an OS.

4.      4. ADA is too inbred. An intellectual BIFR is a must to revive ADA which should have an independent Board of Management formed by professionals, experts and stakeholders.

5.      5. In view of 2 above and the good result already being seen with the Zoroawar Tank it is vital that at least 2-3 teams funded to the tune of 4-5 crores each is made to provide viable alternatives because of 2.

6.      6. There is considerable scope of improvement in our project costs and times. The ISRO costs are indicative.

References ( contd)

1.      Prof. Prodyut Das 2:  The Tejas costs                                  ... https://prodyut7.blogspot.com/2022/09/the-tejas-costs-prof.html?spref=tw

 

2.      Prof. Prodyut Das 2:  Developing Stealth Technology Prof.Prodyut DasSat... https://prodyut7.blogspot.com/2024/01/prof.html?spref=tw

 

3.      Frugal 5th generation AMCA –India’s only alte... https://prodyut7.blogspot.com/2024/03/the-frugal-5-th-generation-amca-indias.html?spref=tw