A rebuttal to Deccan Herald’s article on the proposed re-organization of DRDO-
Prof.
Prodyut Das
On 5th May 2024 the Deccan Herald (DH)
published a piece authored by two top level DRDO officials one an ex-Director
of ADE and the other an ex Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister (SA to
RM) and the then head of DRDO. The following are my personal
observations on the views expressed by the Authors.
The link to the piece is at : https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/before-redesigning-drdo-learn-fully-about-it-3003915?commentID=d3f47c02-1819-432d-8eea-61d93b8cc0cc
.
I will put down
some disclaimers to preempt the usual mud that is slung at anyone who criticize
DRDO.
1. I
have never applied for a DRDO job. I do not carry a grudge at not being
employed by DRDO.
2. I
am not a foreign agent. I express my personal assessment of a precarious
situation.
3. I worked in Indian Defence and Aerospace Industries
in the top Public and Private companies for decades and was Professor at IITs
and elsewhere and now live in modest retirement.
4. I have no secret source of information, the figures
quoted were gleaned from “open source”.
5. I
have never met or known Dr. Aatre. I do recall a chance meeting with one
Dr. K.G Narayanan briefly at Aero India 2005 who told me “Professor, we read
everything you write,” which was very nice of him, and also “Believe me,
Professor, the LCA will be in service by 2007” which in my then naivete,
I half believed. I have no way of knowing if it is the same gentleman
who is the co-author of the piece on which I am presently commenting.
The DRDO employs five thousand Scientists and thirty
thousand Technicians. In this piece by DRDO I mean the top few Levels,
Scientists “F”,” G”,”H”, the holders of award like “Platinum”, “Vanadium” and
“Carborundum” not forgetting the Directors and SA to RMs. This is the DRDO that
needs reforms. Failure at this level to
provide Technical Leadership- stemming from an utter lack of Domain
Knowledge in product Design- has caused the
delays. We are looking a corpus of about a hundred seniors Scientists.
The project delays are due to lack of requisite level
of knowledge made worse by knowledge xenophobia and lack of an interested
“ownership”. DRDO, publicly funded, is self- sufficient structurally and can
resist external audit; The DRDO Chairman’s Cabinet Secretary rank outranks the
Customer. Since the Certification Agency is also DRDO controlled there is “self
-certification” which has resulted in farces like a Fighter being given FOC
without firing it’s specified guns or a UAV being certified to fly when under
strength and resulting in avoidable structural failure. Ignorance, Political convenience or Folly
cannot be labelled “Risk Taking”. As a
SA advisor to the RM he has the RM’s ear and a persuasive SA can mould the politically
preoccupied and domain wise naïve RMs opinion- unlike the Private sector where the
CEO by sheer continuity, experience ( he is not nominated to the post!) and familiarity has a shrewd idea of what is
what.. The Customer may have much to say but can be over-ridden. In cases, even
the customer very well thought out criticism in writing was kept at arm’s
length to push the project through -until of course it was too late and the
mess had been cast in stone. I refer. of course, to the Tejas project. An outside
audit of the Tejas, for example, may show much potential for improvement and the simplicity of some of the solutions may be astonishing but will be fiercely resisted because of considerable
embarrassment as very gross, possibly primitive, mistakes are likely
to be exposed. In sum DRDO has votes everywhere but no one else has votes in
DRDO.
That the DRDO’s performance is deplorable seems to have
escaped the notice of the two gentlemen who authored the piece. In reading the
piece I was struck by the:
a) Complete
lack of any contrition at the uncontrolled delay. No one knows when any
target will be met.
b) Lack
of any sense of responsibility to the customer about the mess created; The
phrase used by the authors, “However, many of the development projects
exceeded the timelines stipulated, causing problems in induction plans of the
Services” cannot be the vendor’s
(DRDO) absolutions to the delays including a delay of 28 years
for the Tejas Mk1A- the Mk1 being quite unfit for frontline service. The
authors dismiss a 30-year delay in having a useful warplane (it sounded so weird
that I can’t resist quoting)- Despite some dissatisfaction on this count…”. I
am sure that the Air Chief will be greatly reassured that the consternation
of his VCAS (Plans) for maintaining Air strength is viewed by DRDO only as “some
dissatisfaction”.
c) Consequent
to DRDO’s failure any interest taken in alternate imported equipment - is then
labelled as interest in foreign import! The impudence- this is after ordering 40
prototype Mk1s to help finance unending development, surrendering an airfield
to the parking the aircraft for the past 12 yrs and putting a brave face on it
all- is breathtaking. Quiet mature gratitude is the least in order.
d) There
have been regimes where such “performance” would have resulted in the concerned
Babus being made to face the firing squad. Regretfully such is not possible in
India but the idea, though old fashioned, has its merits.
e) DRDO
exists to serve the Armed Forces. If it cannot satisfy the Customer, who has
been patient and reasonable, then no amount of self-satisfaction by DRDO
counts. The customer must be satisfied, if it fails in that then the DRDO is de-facto a
Babu’s Science Club and should be prioritized as such.
The self- assessment by DRDO about its contribution is tinged
with victimhood: Regrettably, the recommendations of the committee on
reconfiguring… DRDO into 10 national laboratories… disclose a strong preference
to pre-determined ideas, with little inclination to analyse the root causes of
what keeps India in the top place in the global arms importers list for over a
decade now (a subtle re-writing of History here; Had ADA/ADE performed as envisioned
there would not have been need to import Rafale and Reapers)… keeping in
mind the moral of the wise fable about the goose that ..... This kind of
grievance can only come from outlooks that have been pickled in “Crony
Socialism” for decades. It is not that DRDO met the customer’s requirements
substantially yet here is resentment that too after10 years of wait and
watch- by which DRDO should have got its act in order-, when the Government
cracks the whip, and we have attitudes like this from the “top leader” material of
DRDO !
No doubt the many
changes of Governments from 80s and 90s (Note 2) and the consequent absence of “ownership”
and “leadership” was responsible for the situation running wild but blame must
lie on the ambitious (and ill advised) expansion of DRDO under the Leadership
of SA to RM VS Arunachalam who ruthlessly broke many rules. Had he succeeded he
would have been hailed as the Bhaba or Sarabhai of Defence Research but, as
subsequent events showed, he lacked the skills needed outside of South Block, slipped
badly, landing DRDO into its present opprobrium. (Anecdote 1)
Apart from an international plot to bore and discredit
the scientists of DRDO, why is it ISRO succeeds where DRDO fails both within
the constraints of the same process? A partial answer is that in Space Science
and Technology the rate of change of Technology and tactics is slower
than the Weapons development process. In weapons development the thinking
changes every ten years and so and DRDO -an organization low on engineering Testosterone-
is always waddling about twenty years behind the action. The specifications of
the IGMDP missile did not change much in 40 years but in the same 40 years
specifications for fighter aircraft and tanks have changed substantially.
The authors are indignant that DRDO’s point of view has not
been given much credit and I quote “Worse, the report appends the
presentation made by DRDO to the committee highlighting its achievements amidst
the challenges and distances itself from it with the statement that the
committee does not endorse the DRDO presentation. It is difficult to believe
that any good review can come out of such adversarial attitudes.” As an
example of maturity of thinking of Senior DRDO Leadership, such peevish lack of
responsibility is remarkable. Compare with sense of responsibility of the young
employees of Taj Mahal Hotel, Bombay who staked their all to fulfil their
responsibility. The Armed Forces would have thrived had DRDO shown the same
spirit. It seems that at long last people at South Block are waking up to the grim
realities. The pattern of Modi Raj seems to be patient watch, careful planning
of details and then the fall like a Thunderbolt. I can’t say I will mind too
much if that happens. It is overdue.
It is not our case that Indian industry cannot be
entrusted with this entire (emphasis mine) chain of responsibilities.
This sentence seems to hit the nub of DRDO’s angst - a fear
of formal loss of hegemony and after the re-organization of being exposed as to
the true measure of incompetence foisted on the nation.
There is certainly
a strong case for the Indian industry to take up full responsibility for the
development and production of select projects, based on objective assessment of
capabilities. That is the way to go in the long run. How does one determine
that we have arrived there already, without analysis of evidence and realistic
planning? To exclude the DRDO and its decades of experience in defence systems
development is to commit hara-kiri with national security.
I mused for a long time as to where I had come across such patronizing
pontifications – it seemed vaguely familiar. Then it all came back to me -the language
was the pompous paternalism of the Leftists of the Planning Commission who kept
us in wilful poverty till the economic collapse of 1993 and the attitude
was described by the great Indian Novelist Sarat Chandra Chattopdhaya’s “Srikanta”
who wrote with amusement about his elder cousin Mesda who kept a rigid and
elaborate watch on the way the younger cousins used their time during evening
study but would himself fail regularly in his own Matriculation examination.
Here we have a “fail-toos” organization, never able to maintain and
manage its own schedules, wanting, like Mesda, to monitor more professionally run
organizations. You see the problem?
That bit about “To exclude the DRDO and its decades of
experience in defence systems development is to commit hara-kiri with
national security” made for a wry smile. The IAF is in an advanced stage of
disembowelment -a promising god send “fall
back” project like the HLFT 42 is sucking at the hind tit yet no one to know about the delivery status of the just
about usable Tejas Mk1A and he talks about hara kiri. The Armed Forces have
already had their hara properly kiri-ed if that is what it is. The AMCA- watch the fun-unless the 3rd Modi Raj puts an end to the shenanigans
and re-organizes.
History has been much re-written to cover abject nonperformance. Rewritten History claims that the initial funding for the LCA programme, Rs.560 crores in 1984 (Rs.7000 crores in Present Day Rupees) was only for initial studies. Not only untrue it is unjustified and indicates extreme waste and inefficient contractor. Just as a comparison the development of the much more sensible HF 25 asked for 65 crores in 1976 -about 650 crores in PDR. It was denied…. Contd.
Below is my
summary of the current status of some of the major defaulting the
programmes.
|
Sl.no. |
Project |
Start Date |
Current Status/In service? |
Remarks |
|
1. |
Nirbhay |
2005 |
Under testNo |
Based on Klyub Russian Missile. |
|
2 |
Tejas |
1984 |
/No |
Not in frontline service. Service entry of Mk1A uncertain.
|
|
3 |
IGMP |
1990/1972 |
2 out of 5 missiles in service |
The Missile programme started with the Devil project
in 1972. That is about 60 years and slow rate of testing is holding up full
introduction |
|
4 |
TAPAS |
1980 |
Under development/No |
DRDO has been fiddling with UAVs for over 40 years.
None in full service. Structural and performance failure of TAPAS platform. |
I have not included the “successful” project – e.g. Netra,
they were merely delayed by a few years- because no one is failed for the
papers he may have scraped through. the INSAS, the HUMSA, and the many sub
systems – AESA, various missiles including AGNI and the NETRA. Let it be noted
that barring one or two they too took just as long to develop but we consider
them “successful” because at least at the end we had a product. We have
unfortunately a slew of products- long running and extensively funded which
have gotten nowhere. It is for the aggregate that he is deemed to have failed.
Unfortunately, DRDO does not consider itself to have failed. Any re-
organization will have the sullen resistance of people who benefit from the
existing arrangement and led the present failures. This is why a purge will be
necessary after re-organization so that new opinions are brought in. Developmental programmes running into
uncertain decades cannot be acceptable this requires correction however
hurtful.
One of my worries that these non-available programmes still
allow for sub systems developments- in
radars, computers, software and technologies. What is the security that the brilliantly good bits- the high temperature IR sensors of the Nag ATGM for example- are not
being sold to parties abroad?
The situation is not entirely the creation of DRDO
alone- an absent-minded Government 1984-1998 was a reason. This is why leadership
by the Private sector is essential. They have the time to be dedicated.
Fortunately, correcting DRDO to perform does not
require mountains to be moved. Some purging may be inevitable.It is ancient
wisdom “Pars sanitates velle sanari fuit” or “the wish to be cured is a
step to good health”. To submit to being cured one must wish to be cured but
unfortunately in the above piece I see NO evidence that desire to be cured-
only a sense of (completely unjustified) injury that somehow DRDO has been
unfairly treated and a sense of victimhood.
Correcting the DRDO
Given honesty of purpose correcting DRDO is not going
to be particularly difficult because the mistakes are fairly basic and confined
to the top echelons. The changes made in the past (1978-1993) were such that it
became possible for a small networked coterie to tightly control -and delay the
process of development.
1, The first reason was the continued adherence-even
post liberalization- to the “Socialist Pattern of Society”. Its interpretation
led to the more dynamic more professional half of our Industry being considered
Taboo.
2. The lack of “Ownership” and “Lack of Leadership” by
the Owners who had far too much on their plate to devote the attention required
to the running of what is arguably the most challenging business on earth.
3. The leadership and domain knowledge abilities of
the top hundred Scientists needs re- examination; there have been some
outstanding leaders and regrettably some charlatans. How the charlatans could
survive and do damage to the projects needs to be examined- shouts of
conspiracy theory notwithstanding. Conversely the post- retirement utilization
of the contributors need to be examined. It would seem that there were cases of
wastage. Paul Arogyaraj’s of HUMSA fame case being well known.
4, Given the poor leadership no clear statements can
be made about funds. 5% of Defence Funds is about as good as it gets. If it is
deemed inadequate it indicates funds are getting wasted by the poor Leadership.
5.Life time captaincy of projects has returned bad
results. It encouraged the incompetent to lobby for and cling on to leadership of
big projects. Projects are funded based on plans and any failure to adhere is
to be closely monitored. Projects moving sluggishly should be stopped early and
re-started under new captains. The occasional loss will be more than made up by
the dynamism of fresh starts an as already said – it will keep the “opportunity
seekers” away. This will require an "Independent" rather than "Crony" Board of Directors for each Lab.
6. There are serious “Conflicts of Interest” due to
DRDO’s position in the development chain.
a) Any new project brings funds to DRDO. Therefore, it
has to be assumed that DRDO power to veto imports may be abused so that DRDO
can get new funds. Let DRDO establish its credibility before it has right to
veto imports.
b) Testing, facilities and certification is another
conflict of interest. DRDO as a possible “competing” vendor will play step
mother to the Private sector vendors. Test Facilities e.g. Vehicle testing
Range at Ahmednagar and CEMILAC etc should be moved out of DRDO umbrella.
In sum
Shorn of its self- created aura DRDO is but a government
owned vendor (of technologies) which exists to cater to the anticipated needs
of the Customer i.e. the Armed Forces. By a series of Administrative changes over
the period 1958 to 1993 the Armed Forces controlled development units about 10 in number were amalgamated starting in 1958 into a civilian controlled DRDO where the customer the Armed Forces were gradually
sidelined and their valuable inputs ignored-possibly from a lack o
comprehension of the domain . It is the usual petty sordid Civil/ Military
conflict. A powerful chain developed totally self- controlled which could obtain
funds, control development, condone unacceptable delays and secure further development
funds and certify half- baked products as a matter of routine. The
possible aid to the import Lobby due to delays by having such a powerful tool
under Raisina control has never been carefully studied as import of weapons had
its beneficiaries amongst the powerful. The obvious anomaly of a vendor being superior
to his “Jajman” (customer) was an inconvenience that has been steadily ignored.
Correction of this simple fact will make for vast improvements.
Supplementary Observations
A look at the order of precedence
Much is made of DRDO being a victim who is given step
motherly treatment by the customer who is always demanding changes. In the
Private sector the maxim is “Convince (the customer) or be Convinced (by the
customer). This attitude of being made a victim by the customer- comes
from having one’s thinking process pickled too long by “Socialist Commanding
Heights of the Economy and Keynesian Economics which believed that any Public
Spending was good for the economy-never mind if it delivered results or not
(Note 3). IN the order of precedence, the President of India is at position1.
The relevant ones for our discussions is: the precedence is
Order Rank
11. Cabinet
Secretary Principal Secretary/ Scientific Advisor
12. Chief
of staff holding ranks of Full general Defence Staff
21, Members
of Parliament (MP)
23 Secretary
24 3
Star Generals (Lt. General, Air Marshal)
2
The order in this
Table of Precedence is meant for State and Ceremonial occasions and has no
application in the day-to-day business of Government. -
Note The order in this Table of Precedence is meant for
State and Ceremonial occasions and has no application in the day-to-day
business of Government.
That is the solemn assumption but as they say- an old
Soldier will break wind by numbers- even when home on leave. I am reminded of
the story of 1952. A DH Dove aircraft carrying the top brass of the Indian Army
and piloted by Flt. Lt Suhas Biswas had an engine fire on take-off. The engine fell
off but Flt.Lt Biswas managed a successful landing in near darkness and the
passengers were able to walk away. One of the survivors wryly noted they all
got out calmly and in the order of precedence.
Anecdote1
The time- honoured advice to those who like to imbibe
but cannot hold their drink is not to imbibe. If that cannot be managed the
advice is to remain quiet for at a pinch a quiet drunk will do but being “Drunk
and disorderly” is very difficult to cover up.
Note 2 VS Arunachalam was Scientific Advisor from 1983
-1993 and served 5 Prime Ministers and 10 Defence Ministers. He superseded his
seniors e.g. APJ Abdul Kalam and served for somewhat unusually for two terms and reportedly played a key
role in re- financing the Tejas project when it ran out of the initial
estimated funds with very little to show for in 1992- without
changing the Project managers.
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