The Tejas and the Air Marshal Iss 1.                                                               Prof. Prodyut Das

The recent statement by the VCAS Air Marshal AP Singh on the unsatisfactory state of development of homegrown equipment for the Vayu Sena is welcome. He has said no more than what was very succinctly put by Field Marshal Philip Chetwode a hundred years ago: “The safety, honour and welfare of your country come first, always and every time”. The present dismal situation with respect to Weapons development – in this particular case due to moribundity of the Tejas and AMCA programmes -cannot change for the better without an admittance by all concerned that things are very bleak. The Air Marshal has cast the first, one hopes, of many stones Such stones are sometimes necessary. In another time and country, at a time of the crisis of War Air Marshall Hugh Dowding of Fighter Command told the political leadership of Great Britain that if “part timer” muddling and not listening to the professionals continued and if  further fighters continued to be sent to France the Defence of the United Kingdom could not be guaranteed. Dowding was not forgiven and replaced rather ungraciously as soon as the Battle of Britain was over but the RAF still has Dowding ‘s original Letter to Churchill’s cabinet on display at RAF College, Cranwell as an inspiration of what RAF’s “good and great” means.

It is a commentary on our weapons development that there was a spate of “bobbery” about whether the Air Marshal should have at all said what he did. A perfect case of “shooting the messenger”. The real culprit is not the Air Marshal but the advocates of continued “Socialist pattern of society” structure of the Weapons development in spite of Liberalization because it helps the Manhattan bankers. The chagrin and the pity is that the “import lobby”- Raisina Babus, DRDO Senior Scientist babus and elements within the Air Force are not even getting a good bargain for “Judas”-ing the Country- a villa in France, a scholarship in an US University for a dumber than average child or nephew, a Tenure Professorship post- retirement. Ironically that inability to drive a good bargain comes from a lack of job knowledge which was, of course, the original sin. They can get more for their perfidy.

It is not worth a tinker’s damn whether a Mk1A is delivered on 15th August 2024. It will only show that Programme’s Leaders have not lost their penchant for nautanki. The forty Mk1’s are paperweights which have to be tied down and the Mk1A is going to be just about acceptable. The promises of delivery are just hot air. The best we can expect and my prediction is probably more accurate than a written statement signed by the whole DRDO/HAL Board is 2 to 4 Mk1As by March 31, 2025. What we need is a 50 squadron Air Force and we have no hope of achieving that figure, imports or no imports. With a professionally managed Industry, as our defence exports show, a 50 squadron air Force with top line equipment and Exports it is literally baiyen haat key khel.    

The problem facing the Tejas is not at all of technology or funding or supply of engines. It is simply requires very strong management actions but that unfortunately that action will be publicly visible. and will attract unflattering publicity” The real problem then is one of finding of an acceptable excuse that will not give away the fact that the project has the dimensions of a swindle. Everyone knows what needs to be done to get the programme back on the rails but how does one explain the original “derailment”- and that too 43 years after starting the programme with “We’ll show ‘em” fanfare at every opportunity. That hype has now come home to roost. The most affected are of course the Raisina babus. The BJP can  say that the Congress were always known to be scoundrels, the culprits of the DRDO have retired, expired or given to making maudlin presentations to the ignorami but how does the IAS explain that they, “the famed Iron Frame of India” allowed things to come to this pass? I feel that the Tejas programme in its 43rd year does not need much except a face- saving, “ cover up the faeces” excuse to start the re- organization direly needed.

I estimate that the ADA designed bits in the Tejas - mainly the airframe and the undercarriage, but also the systems plumbing and looming are very badly “out”- almost by 70% in most cases-one can actually see some of those defects. Given the re- organization the Tejas can be completely de- bugged and ready for mass production in about 24 months and the cost of the airframe tooling because much of it will have to be scrapped or re-worked to allow an almost 100% improvement in airframe weight savings. I presume of course that the systems design per se has been largely validated and only requires detail correction. 

The big question is what should we do now and in this situation.

1.      Put the Prachand Attack Helicopter (PAH) on super-priority production. The old Bengali wisdom “Nahi Mama-r thekey kana Mama bhalo” (a blind Uncle is better than no uncle) i. The PAH is no LCA but may actually be quite as useful as the Tejas in defensive warfare. Yes I have heard that offense is the best form of defence etc but then you should not have sat on your haunches waiting for the miracle of the Tejas to happen for so long.

2.      Hurry up with the HLFT42. This could be a saviour but precisely because of that the import lobby has instructed to go slow on that. One has not heard anything about it though I would be delighted to hear that it is going to be rolled out soon. It is such a brilliant airframe that even with the “dry” Kaveri it would be  better than the Tejas Mk1. Importantly the aluminium fuselage means once less “choke point” in the supply chain and with the Kaveri engine, almost unsanctionable except for short terms. It is much cheaper. The Afterburner development ran into trouble because attempt was made to develop the A/B before stabilizing the engine. Getting Brahmos Corporation into the A/B development shows that when the tails are twisted people will shift their behinds. Given that the Kaveri was designed to be a drop fit for the F 404 it should be possible to transfer all the systems- ECS, Electrical, Hydraulic etc without too much change and redesign.

3.      The Tailless delta of the Tejas is one of the most “fiddly” of all configuration and was less than ideal for inexperienced designers. The Tejas Mk2 is probably an elaborate ploy to correct the Tejas 1 mistakes without admitting the mistake. In any case the Tejas Mk2 as shown so far is heading straight for the rocks. I have not been able to get the exact dimensions of the LCA Trainer but the Tejas is too small to be a satisfactory trainer. Those who mention the Gnat fail to appreciate that the Gnat Trainer (RAF) was actually  a different (engine, wings, ailerons, systems, guns) aircraft to the fighter. If we cannot get the weight of the Tejas airframe down to <2000 kg within the next year we should review the funding after the Mk1A.

4.      One hopes that the AMCA has been funded to “call the ADA’s bluff” because they will not deliver. Given the path taken and the “progress” so far, we are likely to end up with a  big “non-stealthy” 4th. Generation aircraft. The worry is that these funds could be released to more professional design groups.

The problems facing the re-equipment of the Indian Air Force with Aatmanirvar weapons is not technical or fiscal or even of time. The situation can be corrected very satisfactorily and quickly in a matter of months. It is the ego and the faeces to be swept that is getting in the way,

 

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