Funds, facilities or Panchayats?                                                                       Prof. Prodyut Das

Any discussion on our track record of weapons development is always explained away by blaming inadequate funding of Defence R&D. Some point out the massive defence R&D funding of China and the US. I hold that given our inefficient Defence R&D structure even if we spent the same amount as the US on Defence R&D we would still be importing weapons. This is because we are structured wrong. One of the several wrongs is a focus on developing in isolation, the fashionable rather than the needed e.g. one does not design a fighter by deciding it must have this or that technology. One designs a fighter by the “Panchayati” approach: listening and arguing with the customer, absorbing what they want, and then deciding what is the minimum needed to be done.

A Panchayat is a traditional village meeting held literally between five i.e many people in colloquial bhasa who meet as equals to discuss a mutual problem. Unfortunately, our Defence Development Programmes have been structured (dare one say deliberately?) as an “Open loop” control system. A few individuals control the process but there is no feedback, no correction when things begin to go wrong. When ADA failed to show a prototype even years past the scheduled FF date, no correction was made to the management; the programme was re-financed and continued exactly as before. First flight took place some ten years later.

Matters were not helped when the inexperienced team avoided experts’ inputs who foresaw the impending disaster. ADA is now struggling to solve “problems” it itself created. These problems originated not in unavailable technology but by DRDO working in private silos. Those glossed over problems now cast into hardware, they are difficult to correct because the corrections will cascade. Yet the mistakes were such any open review would have exposed, easily corrected, and some fix found out. As an example of fundamental self-created problems.  I give one an illustration.

The Tejas Aspect ratio

Above is a C _L / C_D curve (Fig.1) of the kind an Aeronautical Engineer will be introduced to in his second year UG course. It shows how much drag occurs to generate an unit of lift for a given aspect ratio (AR) of the wings. The blue line indicates the situation for the Tejas AR which has an aspect ratio of 1. 78, nota bene the lowest of any fighter and the red line represents the conceptually identical Mirage 2000 that the consultants had produced for themselves but with an aspect ratio of about 2.3. The graph shows that to the generate the same lift from the same area of wing the “Tejas” aspect ratio will generate 25% more drag thereby requiring or using up more thrust and fuel resulting in shorter range and poorer STR and other energy related parameters. My back of the envelope calculations shows an increase in thrust consumed of 8kN. which is wasting 1/6^th of the installed cold thrust for the Tejas. My figures are approximate but serve to confirm the problem exists and it is considerable. Now why did the officials’ (they could not have been engineers, surely?) allow the consultants to propose such a ridiculous low value of AR when their own design, the Mirage 2K had 2.3. The AR is so ridiculous I am sure had this been put to a knowledgeable “Panchayat” someone would have piped up to the Dassault team with a “Pardon me. M’sieu, isn’t your AR a bit too low. Please to explain why?” Are funds needed to ask that kind of questions?

The above is just one oversight. There are many others I have listed previously.  

From the very dubious value of AR follow:

1.      The aircraft drag would be very sensitive to any weight increase.

2.      It is well known that some weight increase, usually 2-5% is often a fact of aeronautical life. It is an elementary precaution at the detail design stage to have a simple “jugaad” built into the design to make adjustments for the weight increases without involving major re- design of the airframe.

3.       It is unlikely this provision kept in the Tejas airframe. I say this because wherever one looks one finds one finds the attention to details missing. Even corrections carried out show lack of understanding of the fundamentals e.g. the intake of the primary heat exchanger for the ECS.

Panchayat is a two- way process. Super cruise

A panchayat is a two- way process. Sometimes the Customer takes the lead and sometimes it is the designer who will explain in detail what the customer’s given specifications (all specifications are to be considered drafts pending intense, informal and free discussions) will cost him to in terms of reliability, costs, TBO and in general suitability. Sometime it requires for the Engineer to tell the customer that he is plain wrong. (pl. see Appendix 2 sometime)

An illustration of this lacunae in our development structure- competent “democratic discussions”- is the case of the Army’s multi role, multi calibre, multi cartridge carbine; there was no one from the designer’s side with sufficient authority to suggest to the Army Brass of an appropriate place in the human anatomy where the Army could keep their proposed weapon. Forceful counters and exposition of views was necessary and would have saved money and time. ARDE is known to be a competent organization; it is for the Authorities to find out why ARDE did not confront the customer? Lack of confidence? Lack of seniority? This is a serious concern when expertise is either lacking, unsure, gagged or ignored. Funds were not lacking, but plain “Badda Body personalty” was and ARDE suffered in silence and reduced the INSAS export potential.

The AMCA specifications ask for super cruise and like unprepared school boys our DCAS (Plans) has asked for “super cruise”, copying it faithfully from the US military down to the exact super cruise speed of M1.6. “Super cruise” is wonderful but what is the reality?

The technology “fundas” are: Supersonic drag is a function of cross section area. Stealth aircraft, because of internal weapons carriage have a 30 to 40% larger cross section and thus a corresponding increase in power. Add super cruise to the specifications and both the airframe and engine technology required goes up and out  through the skylights. Super cruising requires engines of very small frontal cross section (i.e. CRs> 25) and consequently TETs of the orders of 1800⁰K plus. Turbine engines, unlike pistons, burn a disproportionate amount of fuel when operating at part throttle- which is most of the time. So, putting two and two together, provided one has the technology for TETs and CRs of > 25 plus the machining technology and the thermal management of engine casings to control tip clearances you are just a jump away from a super cruiser engine- even though at a fairly stiff bill in terms of procurement and maintenance.

To answer why the US has asked for it and the IAF may re- examine I have considered two typical sorties:

1.      A typical USAF sortie from San Francisco to Hawaii (3376 kms) staging on further to Wake/Midway onto Japan prior to deployment in Mainland Asia.

2.      An IAF a/c deploying from Gwalior to Jorahat, Assam which is 1600 kms.

If we take about subsonic segments of 20 mins to taxi, take off, climb to super cruise altitude, accelerate to M 1.6 in both (SAF- Hawaii and GWA - JOR) cases and then after super cruising at M 1.6, take another 20mins to decelerate, descend, land, taxi and switch off we find that compared to the IAF which will have saved about 33 minutes the USAF will have saved 92 minutes. Actually, on the final deployment (San Fransisco- Hawaii, Wake, Asia) the US will have saved 7 hours which in terms of deployment may mean saving a day. “Super cruise” makes sense for the US, the technological burden is already with them, so perhaps the US specification to them as the World’s premier “Dada” justifiable specially as we know that NATO is the marketing arm of the US MIC.

What about us? I agree it is nice to have supercruise but we need to de- prioritize it- unless the idea is to set the project up for “Mission Impossible”. DRDO should have fought tooth and nail against super cruise but nothing is known about how much GTRE/ADA opposed this sure fire de -raileur.

Dog Homing won’t work

The reality is grim. Here we are in 2024 trying to catch up with the US and Chinese 5th generation aircraft which have been in service since 2007. We are ignoring the fact that thanks to the rise of AI, remote control abilities and chip design capabilities the entire concept of the 5^th generation platform is going to change and even if we succeed in rolling out a platform in 2034 it is in all likelihood going to be obsolete.

To cut a long story short I put down some of the many areas which need expert “Panchayat” discussions.

1.      Modern specifications are often shaped by Investment Bankers who fund the new technologies and want an early RoI.

2.      US specifications are some of the most over complex specifications in the world and they apparently (sic) refuse to learn. The other explanation is they are creating technology barriers in the market.

3.      The Indian Private sector has shown to be remarkably adept, as always. in mastering technology and fending off competition. A little noticed feat is that Indian Automotive Companies were the only ones in the world to survive the Japanese onslaught.  

 

4.      The Indian AMCA is so uncertain to succeed that a separate effort must be made for

i)                 A means of denying US and Chinese 5^th generation aircraft the use of Indian Air space. Some of the system i.e. detection of stealth EAs, can be ground based.

ii)               Development of a hybrid 2^nd (sic) generation /5^th generation “hunter” and a stealth subsonic intruder is to prioritized.

iii)             Urgent continuation of the HLFT 42 on a super priority basis as a possible replacement for the Tejas Mk2 which, I estimate, is headed for skid row.

iv)              Since aircraft cost nothing during the project studies phase these can be farmed out to the private sector.

v)               About 60% of the design of an aircraft can be done just by thinking and looking around and then thinking some more again plus some “chitti” calculations. This is followed by “panchayats” with experts and more thinking.  This requires little or marginal funds, certainly not hundreds of crores. Claims that project studies costs hundreds of crores are motivated.

vi)              The Private sector should be encouraged to set up design bureaux for these projects and be funded at par with the State units.

vii)            The AMCA is not going to be ready in 2035 in one jump. Nor the Tejas Mk2. ADA must submit a time plan and that must be clearly monitored against actual performance. In case of serious infarction management change or closure of the project is essential.

A glimmer of Hope

I want to celebrate a small incident and hope it grows into something big. The incident is the “speaking up” by the CEO of SSS about the treatment he feels that his product an Infantry Small Arms Weapon has been given. I know very little about the merits of the case; I celebrate that this is the first time an Indian weapon has had a “champion” who is willing to speak up for his product which  ADRDE did not or was not allowed to do.

I remember with sorrow and resentment that when the crucial HF 25 project was shot down in 1977 the project died without a whimper. No one stood up to tell Raisina that it was the best replacement for teh MiG 21s.

 One swallow may not make a Summer but who knows what the speaking up of the SSS CEO may lead to? May the Gods be beneficial to the Indian weapons.

Appendix 1

Since Funds is blamed for out-of-control delays let me put down the Historiography of the Tejas project as a typical case. The Tejas project’s timelines are recorded according to Hercule Poirot’s method of tabulating main and related events chronologically:

1977. The HAL HF24/R25 project which asked for Rs.65 crores to develop is not sanctioned.

1982. A M.Sc. (Physics) background Scientist is appointed as the Chief of DRDO superseding many of his seniors including APJ Abdul Kalam.

1983. The above gentleman as head of DRDO is ex- officio also the Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister and is a Cabinet Secretary rank post.

1983. The above gentleman, teams up with a Lawyer Politicians, a nuclear Physicist, and an IISc. Professor to form a society outside of DRDO to have an Agency, somewhat like ISRO, to develop a 4^th.generation Jet fighter to replace the MiG 21 a requirement beginning to acquire urgency. It is to be noted that none of the team had neither any Industrial experience nor knowledge of aircraft design let alone fighter design. It is an indication of their “clout” or “backing” that despite their lack of appropriate “CV” the Agency is set up.

1984. ADA is set up and the Head of NAL is the Chairman of the new Agency and he chooses the Chief Designer of HAL to be the Project Leader. The project, estimated to cost Rs.560 crore, is sanctioned. The Rs 560 crore is to be compared against a HF 24/R25 budget estimate of Rs. 65 crores (1977 value).

1985. Questions are raised in the parliament about the nationality of the wife of 40 year standing of the ex- HAL Chief Designer leading to his removal and the resignation of the Chairman. It is alleged that the questions were “planted” once the sanctioning of the funds was over.

1985 The replacement for the 40+ years experience Chief Designer is the Ph. D student of the IISc. Professor. At that time the selected incumbent had about three yrs. Industry experience at the GET level and ten years DRDO HQ. level experience at New Delhi. It is alleged that the then Chief Designer Nashik (CDN), who had cured the aileron flutter of the early MiG 21FLs in 1970, was shunted out to IIT and the selected candidate got about three years’ experience as CDN. This was followed by a six months stint as Director ADE before his finally moving in as Programme Director, LCA with a self-declared target of a first flight in April 1990. This dateline was apparently re-affirmed circa 1987 at IIT Madras.

1993 The SA usually has a tenure of 3-4 years but in this case, the SA was given an extension. In the early 1990s when not even a gramme of the aircraft was ready, he was still at the helm and the project was financed to a tune of Rs.1400 crores (Rs.1993) for further development. The SA retired and was given a tenure Professorship at an US University which he held for almost 30 yrs till his death.  

2001 The Tejas makes its first flight.

2003 An “order” is placed for forty Tejas when the aircraft is still raw and total number of flight hours is perhaps a hundred hours. I leave it to the reader to decide where it is that inadequate funding was the cause for delays.  

Appendix 2

Look at the way the INSAS was bad mouthed for decades without someone pointing out that as gas. operated 5.56 mms go  it was about the best there ever was, It is also interesting to note that how little “correction” the benighted weapon needed- a material change ( polycarbonate?) for the magazines, an increase of ammo. capacity to thirty and some change in the slinging arrangements. Why did that take thirty years?