A pause before Balaclava?                                                                               Prof. Prodyut Das

The AMCA project

We are organizationally in such a situation that to get in to the development of the AMCA at the present level of preparation is a recipe for certain failure. The situation is:

i)                 We do not have the resources to create the classical 5^th generation. Attempts to do so will lead to un-correctable, cascading failure.

ii)               The use of “un-correctable” stems from the fact any design has to make compromises.  The elements of the “ideal” specification- the F35/J 20 equivalence approach will end up in a configuration that will make engineering of the later “concessions” difficult to achieve. Better sit, discuss and get the concessions in the beginning. We might get something decently workable.

iii)             The situation at i) leads to the need to an independent review of the current specifications to see what is the minimum 5^th generation that will suffice.

iv)              a review of the effectiveness of the current ADA- led development structure to a more open multi option process with Fighter Panchayats and funding of private sector project studies teams.

 

The speech by the head of DRDO on 23 September 2024 on the occasion of the LM Katre Memorial Lecture was depressing. There was no call for the Head of DRDO to publicly acknowledge past mistakes but having taken that call the acknowledgement should have been honest. The development of the Kaveri and the Tejas together were not mistakes. The development of the one (engine) called for different engineering resources to the development of the other, the Tejas. The real “rookie” mistake (if it was not deliberate) was the continued “open loop” control of the projects. The mistake was to allow the Tejas Programme management to continue when 6 years down the road in 1989-90 when, de facto, it failed. Uncorrected then, it led to the present situation where the Government’s hand is being forced to import. Poor basic management sabotage (perhaps the exact word) our development efforts.

Criticism of the inaccuracies in the speech is not my present purpose but without being wholeheartedly honest or identifying of the root causes there will be no improvement. The present structure of development keeps the entire vote, championship and control in the hands of the DRDO/MoD @ Raisina. This is depriving the projects of three particularly valuable inputs

The first is the formulation of the specifications itself; I have used the apt term Balaclava to recall that idiotic charge of Lord Cardigan that wiped out the Light Brigade to no purpose. The wrong battery of guns was charged, the tactical situation was not changed, but the casualties were heavy and very real. I see a similarity between Balaclava and our plan to develop the 5^th generation Fighter AMCA so late in the day.

We are trying to develop an AMCA that has elements beyond our capability and ignores the changes in the scenario. The specifications based on 1995 US thinking is not the best solution and possibly, obsolete. There has been no intelligent discussion on the relevance of the specification to our scenario because DRDO/ADA lacks, in my assessment, the required fanatique level of knowledge. Artificial Intelligence driven data processing, sensor fusion, secure high-speed networks will enable much of the onboard capabilities to be moved off board on and, for our scenario, enable considerable simplification of the platform’s energy related and reduction of technology-based performance of the platform. Indeed, combined with AI missiles and simple ground-based detection systems a combination of a (relatively) low tech platform, low tech detection systems and AI weaponry the threat of the fifth generation can be countered with available or easily developable technology.  This vital “Scenario” generation has not taken place as our experts have not talked to each other.

Design involves making of “either- or” choices. The likely sequence of events is that we will make choices- wing sections, intake geometries, fuselage lengths and many such details which, when they fail to meet the original specifications, cannot, because of our earlier choices, also not meet satisfactorily the conceded parameter. This happened with the Tejas and the Arjun. Recrimination, however bitter, is no substitute for re-equipment Note 1.

The second input is the ferment going on globally on the role of the platform in the weapon system. Thanks to the possibilities of artificial Intelligence (AI), Microchip design, and even innovative use of off the shelf technologies the role of the platform can be substantially reduced. You will have noted that on the one hand the formidable reportedly unconquerable (against T 72s) Abrams Tanks of the Iraq war require anti UAV mods to be of service in the Ukraine and on the other hand the Russians apparently are interested in having their old T 72s- which were supposedly thrashed in the Gulf war by the Abrams, back for reuse in the same Ukaraine. There is a lesson in that i.e platform performance at any cost is no longer necessary. If Europe is sitting out the classic i.e. fourth plus new technologies, 5^th generation, then are they fools or are they waiting for the trapeze to swing right? This is a genuine question (Note 2)

The third vital input missing is that the present development systems does not have enough on History and soft knowledge required in platform design. Nor does it realize its potential as a force multiplier. The reason the present set up does relatively better in certain fields- small arms, artillery, guided missiles is because the rate of change of soft knowledge in these areas is much lower. The much-touted IITs are just as useless in this respect. IITs can very well solve problems that have been reduced to elemental mincemeat. They were never very good in soft knowledge ever and likely even worse now. Despite their reputation the IITs are, for this kind of work, the best fifth rate people in the world. I speak of the faculty of 1990s and am not aware of any recent upsurge of quality.

A very careful, appreciative look at the past history and soft knowledge will show simple things which applied early can slash development times and cost. For example, Northrop Grumman has been doing excellent work on the use of an “off the shelf” technology – the Giant scale R/C model – on the Northrop Grumman XF 40 Golden eagle and the Model 157. Giant scale model technology can give very comprehensive data - beyond what is available in wind tunnels - particularly in spin characteristics and intake locations. It can reduce development costs and risks.  Their Model 157 could be the signpost of the viable 2/ 5^th generation combat aircraft as a superior option to a pure 5^th generation. The point I make is that reliable project studies are the necessary good seed of the fighter   and it was the lack of good project studies- the vital seed – and not funds-that has caused the delay. Delays occurred not because of new technology but correction of stupid “oversights” in the project studies selected.

I repeat Table 1. Note that the HF 24 Marut, with three squadrons in IAF service and a combat record was our most successful fighter development programme so far failed to achieve its full potential due to one single parameter being absent. A chain is as strong as its weakest link. Given the number of zeros in the Tejas Mk2 and the AMCA projects is an estimate as to how these projects will unravel.

Table 1

Sl.No	Parameter	HF 24 Marut	Tejas	Tejas Mk2	AMCA
1	Soft Knowledge	1	0	0	0
2	Detail engineering	1	0	1	1
3	Proven technology	1	0	1	0
4	Funds	1	1	1	1
5	Production technology	1	0	1	1
6	Political Support	0	1	1	1
7	Monitoring for results	1	0	0*	0*
8	Facilities	1	1	1	1
9	Customer Collaboration	1	0	0*	0*

 

*Indicates that there may have been improvement in the Modi Raj but it is still below par.

Shorn of all the labels in the quest of objectivity, the situation about the AMCA can be summed thus:

1.      We have in the 2020s set out to replicate an US  5^th generation specification laid down in the 1990s for their type of warfare.

2.      We are planning to adopt this “over capable” concept without having proven stealth technology or relying on “outside” engines though our development of the 5^th generation will be seen as an attack on US/Chinese hegemony.

3.      The elements of this alien specifications e.g. “economics” and politics of super cruise required informed discussions which has not taken place. The US needs Super cruise, It saves the US 24 hours in a positioning flight; It will save us half an hour. The technical burden is identical. I would like to meet the VCAS (Plans) who can convince me that the development risks of this specification is justified.   

4.      Do not be gulled by this bit of 100% ToT anyone is offering. If our team has engineers no technology or ToT is needed and if we have babu engineers, no amount of  ToT will help. Remember that strange are the ways of DRDO@ Raisina. Remember the Bofors Guns where we got ToT in 1987?

5.      To ensure that the AMCA’s bleak remaining chances are killed we are entrusting the development solely and without alternatives to a non- Industrial organization which has not delivered in the past 43 years. “Rookie” mistake, Sir? We seem to be getting into a habit of them, Sir! Contra common-sense mistakes has stymied us not vague unjustifiable and dishonest complaints about funds and blaming everyone else but oneself.

The discussions on the errors in the IAF’s conception, the possible simplification of the required technology is beyond ADA capability. Ultimately it will lead to Imports. Not because of funds, not because of Industrial base but because of an open loop control system manned by part timers we will lead up to the intended, imports.

Predicting the AMCA fate

What I get from the table (no secret source and you are completely free to rely and believe on the official communiques) is:

1.      The AMCA may be rolled out in 2027-2028. Due to better Customer, owner monitoring and supervision there will not be a ten-year nine- month overshoot of the first flight. However, it will also expose the utter unsuitability of ADA’s for leading such development. It simply neither the acumen nor has done the necessary homework. No homework = primary rework.

2.      Primary rework is not effective as explained and there will be the asking for further funds for  a Mk2 AMCA  when the present adequate funds run out.

3.      It will be seen when the flight trials start circa 2030- 2031 that the AMCA will not super cruise with any engine- Indian or Imported. That is because the DSI (Diverter less Supersonic Intake) will not work, all the CFD studies notwithstanding. No one has bothered since 2009 to develop the DSI on a Tejas the technology of which would have benefitted both Tejas and AMCA. It would not have cost the sky- may be the revenue cost of a centre fuselage. You see why I am not betting on ADA to deliver? Where is the level of proactiveness required?

4.      It will be found that the stealth is not up to the mark and what is achieved degrades very rapidly,

5.      If luck is bad (and ADA development methodology leaves a very great deal to chance and luck) then it will be found unexplored problems of stealth structures which at that stage- on a frozen prototype – will be beyond economical rectification.

So the unending demand for funds and blaming lack of facilities, customers, critics et al to mask the lack of basic planning skills unless it is by intent- one does on occasion get the impression that a very seasoned group of people planned this present mess. Acceptance of “external” assistance is avoided from a need to avoid the light of external audits. Qui mala odit agit lucem*.

Understanding the process

The present problems have their roots in an ignoramus’ belief that technologies and science create a good weapon. The vital role played by “soft knowledge” “old wives’ tales” “history” was ignored. The “babu” designer without the soft knowledge also ignores the fact that’s specifications -specially US specifications- were piloted not by the US Armed Forces but by the politicians and Investment Bankers in Manhattan or Basle in a hurry to get a RoI. ADA thought that if one had FBW, Composites, AESA and a delta wing one would have a 4th gen. fighter. It did not work that way. Aircraft Design starts on the vague “fuzzy logic” of pipe dreams gradually taking shape. He starts with a” fuzzy logic “situation and by quick estimates, small studies, gradually using Maths and Technology to hardens the design from outer edge inwards. Carts come after the horses.

The 5^th. Generation Pipe dream

As the fictitious Chief Designer is walking his dog or sitting quietly on an overturned flower pot in his garden smoking his pipe, waiting, like his dog, for his dinner the following could be his line of swirling thoughts:

“We always have a problem with the bloody engines- Marut, Kiran, Sitara, Tejas, AMCA. For the AMCA India’s safest and best engine is the Kaveri about which there is a fair chance we can get to 53kN /82 kN with the present design if we let the Private sector chaps to develop the “full Monty” manufacturing and assembly experience. Turbo machinery love the skilled touch. Cut your coat according to your cloth, they say so the AMCA specification must lie within the limits set by the Kaveri . Just in case I have to finally use something else as an alternative, we must have an aircraft configuration that allows for quick change of the supplier of the engines without having to tear the bloody design apart as with the ADA AMCA configuration. We don’t want to be held at ransom by anybody- French, Russian or the US. The TsAGI developed “Ponton” concept of the MiG 29 and Su 30 MKI is great for that and as a bonus I can copy the control runs and a lot of the details of the equipment layout to save time. I wonder if the Su 57 is a stealth version of the MKI, … worth a think. Problem is that bare front face of the AL-31 must show up on Radar like a squadron of Hawks and bang goes your RCS. Hmm…. Wait a minute the Yanks used meshes in the direct flow intake approach on their first stealth aircraft the F 117. I can try that and since the first MiG 29s had debris doors maybe I can combine the two ideas to get a retractable RCS grid- you know… use the screens only when approaching Sokonikoff’s point. Hmmm… Damn, there is icing and it occurs most in our tropics and that too in a band between 5000 and 6000 mts. Higher you don’t get icing but contrails blow stealth and requires expensive correction. Must talk to that fellow in LRDE to see what size of mesh we need for L band/ Ku band RCS and must talk to the Commandant of ASTE if he can rig up some test on a MiG 29 perhaps. Also talk to the Air HQ and see what they think about operating altitudes, them buggers will kick like a pack of mules of course but it is their bloody life at stake……Hmmm … of course we must look at the Northrop YF 23 -it has that lovely “s” inlet as well as the Boeing YF 32 … both have “robust” stealth and long “naturally stealth” inlets- no sense in re- inventing the wheel…  How about a MiG 29 with the YF 23 engine arrangement… and I can use the Canberra’s engine mount structure to speed up things. No harm in having a look at it anyway. They may still have a few “Cat D” Canberra airframes in Agra. Any way does Air HQ even KNOW a minimum figure of how much stealth is required-except of course they will probably ask for 100% and all aspect in azimuth and elevation. Can’t ever give all aspect stealth …. they better educate me as how to do it if they want 100%…it would be nice if I could rig up a Su 30 with a full YF 23 style “S” inlet and see how the RCS is reduced. How much effort would that cost, I wonder It would be cheaper at the long run because I would have hard data to incorporate NOW and thus avoid expensive,” tear down” rework ten years down the line when it is damn difficult to handle all the cascading of changes as has happened with the other project. I don’t know where I put that bloody sketch of a non- super cruising 5^th generation- actually a 2/5 generation concept that I made. Let’s go inside and have another search. At this stage our hero is bawled out by his wife for ignoring her third call to dinner and comes in blinking like an idiot and looking very contrite to avoid further trouble.

In the above fictionalization of the “Fuzzy start” process of using soft knowledge and copying- actually looking around, thinking and then looking around again to coming up with the “shape” of the aeroplane I have tried to indicate the need

1.      General Knowledge

2.      Practical Experience

3.      Awareness of sources and locations

4.      History of projects

5.      How things are done

6.      Need for Collaborations

All of the above simple things is lacking today to the required level.

The list is long and it is and a single person will not have all of what is required. Collaboration of experts is required with a willingness and mutual respect to listen and a will to succeed. Most of the troubles we are facing today with the Tejas were due to an inexperienced, ignorant team refused external “interference”- and lacking sufficient soft knowledge created problems that should have outraged common sense - I give you the 13.2 mts long (or short!) fuselage or the extreme low AR of 1.82 as two “visible and glaring” blunders. There were many others in every layer (note 4) - These misjudgments, permitted at the at the start by a weak or overridden review system, have now grown to unmanageable proportions. The Mk2 is de facto a evasive acknowledgement of the mistakes the Tejas Mk1 should not have made.

Mistakes being simple rectifications are effective with equally simple measures.

There seems to be a pattern of accepting ridiculous specifications, demanding excessive funds and faced with pending deliveries perfecting a network of “just round the corner” fan boy buzz. There is also the serious question of using the platform to develop world class subsystems (note 3) with Indian funds but taking no great care about the possible leakage of such technology to the West. The “Abwehr” regrading security of IP is not very robust.   

Have a continuous process of forums for the product specifications will be discussed during formulations where non-Govt. participants, particularly the Private sector with their vast experience of successful project management are welcomed. It will slash delays in testing and concessions.

The process of product conceptualization is to almost “cost free”. You do NOT need 100s of crores and tens of years. 10,000- 20,00 hours project studies would give a wealth of alternatives. Invite several private sector contenders giving them funding to do about 20,000 hours of “conceptualization”. One does not need too much more but more “seed” is needed at the start.

1.      ADA has perfected the art of “just around the corner” and one thinks, employ adroitly the ploy “make the project too big to close down”. The AMCA should be supported to the hilt but the ploy used in the Tejas MK1 -make it too big to shut down” has to be watched out for. If the target for March 2025 is not met by March 2027 the project should be closed down or the management changed. If the 2025 goals are not met by 2028 ADA should be debarred as a lead contractor. End less delays cannot be tolerated as it also discourages the growth of Private sector participation.

2.      The HLFT 42 using a Kaveri with a single stage afterburner and Tejas systems should be given priority as a precautionary measure in case surprise, surprise Tejas production does not come up to scratch even in 2025- 2026. I feel it won’t exceed three aircraft this year. There is nothing reassuring around to see.

3.      Support the AMCA totally if only to call its bluff but shut it down if it falters like the Tejas. It is in any case a doubtful 5^th generation equivalence concept of the F 35 or J 20 and it does not make sense.

4.       A low-cost parallel study should be initiated for an anti-shipping stealth intruder capable of monitoring up to the Straits of Malacca would produce effective deterrence of open hostility from China.

5.       It is just my guess that the 3^rd Modi Raj is prepared to call the import lobby’s long standing well proven bluff of Hanibal ante portas (Note 4). The 3^rd Modi Raj will risk a running down of IAF squadron strength. Its probable assessment is that given the development of missiles and Prachand and the political situation with a Pakistan near economic collapse, an open prolonged warfare involving aviation assets is remote in the next 5 years. It will use that time to re- organize the industry whilst enforcing the use of the Tejas Mk1A and possibly whistle up for the Mk1B with further weight reductions. Hopefully by then the Industry will have got the message and change. May be ADA will be compelled to re- engineer the Mk2 front fuselage along the lines discussed.

6.      Engage the private sector to develop up to technology development prototypes or Giant scale techniques concept studies for a Brahmos carrying anti shipping stealth missile carrying Intruder and a stealth 2/5 generation sniper- separate  and apart from the AMCA programme. When the AMCA falters we can back the probable winner.

Note 1. The AMCA specifications is mission impossible and designed to fail. It may also be largely unnecessary- more is not always better e.g. the Army carbine specifications. Was it necessary to have all the features? How did we meet the crisis and, more to the point, why was the Army’s idiocy not challenged by the vendor. Why did DRDO not support ARDE?  Specifications are often designed to ensure imports e.g. Agusta.

Note 2. the Europeans are going easy on the 5^th generation and talks of the 6^th generation is in whispers. Why? The reason is wise men realize that there are two big problems. The first is that US specifications and doctrines are not made by the Military but the Investment Bankers and are designed to make profits, not “sense”. They are high cost  capabilities of little use in real situations. Who asks why the US had to get out of Afghanistan despite the F 35, B2 and F 22 ? The excuse /cover up of “asymmetric warfare” trotted out by the Banker’ Press should be challenged or questioned. The final phase of Vietnam was, for several months, conventional, not guerilla, warfare. Given the awesome “brochure capabilities” of US equipment why did the US leave Vietnam with what looked to outsiders like a somewhat panicky scramble? Ditto Afghanistan. What was the truth about Bekaa Valley?

Note 3. DRDO has some remarkably good products which it will be noted is for equipment where Soft Knowledge or Background do not play a large role in the product conception.

Note 4 Have a look at the “Heath Robinson” undercarriage of the NLCA and compare that with the brilliantly lighter undercarriage of the stealth, repeat stealth undercarriage of the YF 32. You don’t need funds to think and look. Given the NLCA additional weight it will finally end up as a curiosity unless a thorough Horikoshi weight reduction is done.

* Qui mala odit agit lucem. Trans. Lat. The evil doer dislikes/ is agitated by the light

Note 4 Hanibal ante portas, Trans. Lat. Hanibal is at the Gates. Roman lament and alarm. It will be remembered that the sale of a dozen or so F 104 Starfighters is 1960 to the PAF was used by the Leftist leaning Menon to import the MiG 21 in large quantities including setting up three factories. There was no evidence of the F 104 was a game changer of that order. Focusing on the conceptually superior HF 24 Marut and its engines would have been cheaper but Left-wing Socialism has never been  notable for sensible decisions- particularly if it affected to export possibilities of the Western Economies.