Correcting DRDO’s
duality Prof. Prodyut Das
Why is DRDO is a
formidably powerful organization when it comes to stopping imports become a
limp weakling when it comes to pushing what it itself has developed?
It’s authority over the process of Weapons development
and procurement gives it total control over the re-equipment plans of the Armed
Forces, all in the interest of promoting local development. However, DRDO has used
power asymmetrically. It zealously vetoes imports -even when it has nothing
immediate to offer- but does not use the powers to force the customer to accept
the equipment it often manages to develop. Why this is so is not known but this
behaviour is noticeable.
Let me cite a rather
extreme case of DRDO’s power. In 1983 the IAF was planning for a replacement
for its MiG 21s to be ready for service by 1995. DRDO did not have experience
of aircraft design nor a design bureau or production facilities even for
prototypes, the SA to RM and the then Chief of DRDO stepped into the ring and
he offered to develop the latest 4th. Generation aircraft along with
its engine and radar which was to be ready for service by 1995 and a
development fund of Rs. 560 crores about Rs.
6000 crore in present day value (PDV) was granted- for the airframe
alone- to this (ad)venture. DRDO’s clout
is reflected is not in the fact that he got his proposal accepted. Often the
margin between the hare brained and the brilliant is wafer thin. DRDO’s clout
is reflected in the fact that when circa 1993 , in the teeth of customer IAF’s
misgivings, with nothing to show for ten years of reportedly ceaseless
toil the Project was re- financed with the equivalent of Rs. 7000 crores PDV. This money was also run through
but DRDO managed to have an order placed by the IAF for 40 Mk1 fighters in 2003
when the single prototype had logged perhaps a total 150 hrs. of preliminary
flight trials. That is power and domination for you. The aircraft was given a
FOC that the customer IAF accepted though with 89 concessions it was unfit for
combat-even its gun firing trials have not been completed that is power. The
current debate going on about whether DRDO should have the right to veto import
plans indicates that this power continues.
My purpose of this
piece is quite different. The question I wish to share is why does the powerful
organization suddenly become shy when it comes to pushing the many quite good
product it has managed to develop. Below is an illustrative list of
examples.
INSAS.
I am not a fan of
the 5.56 calibre but the INSAS is an excellent and thoroughly sound design as far as this genre (5.56 mm) calibre rifles
go. Compared to the bloody entry of the M 16 in Vietnam the INSAS, rushed into
its baptism in Kargil performed, commendably. The cracking of the magazines at
extreme cold was both due to a special condition of service at Kargil and was
easily correctable whilst the others- jamming and poor stopping power were
generic to the calibre at that stage of development. Indeed, the initial Indian
Army reports extolled its 400 mts range and its accuracy.
For over twenty
years of its introduction DRDO allowed the weapon to be bad- mouthed leading to
the imports of SIG and the AK 203 being manufactured in India when perfectly
acceptable substitutes were available from the quietly neglected ARDE. Indeed,
the recent modifications to the INSAS done by a small Indian vendor- increase
in magazine capacity to30 rounds, a change of magazine material to stop cold
weather cracking, a change of sling position indicates how little was needed to
be done yet once developed, DRDO’s behavior to the INSAS was step motherly
neglect leading to the cited imports.
The 155/52
Gun
The ATAGs is a
very good weapon, It’s long range extracts a penalty in terms of the weight.
Now it is being sought to be displaced by the ATHOS and there is much of “hai
tauba” going on about the Army’s perfidy in changing the specifications to
suit the Israeli /Adani product. My questions to DRDO are:
1.
Being
in the Howitzer business you knew about the ATHOS’s weight. You also knew that
for heli- transportation at high altitude, weight is at a gold weight premium.
Why did DRDO not be proactive? No other country has our high- altitude plateau
warfare which entails the use of heavy artillery at high altitudes but we do
need such equipment and we won’t get it from elsewhere? Titanium is expensive and
difficult to fabricate but with a bit of craft a composite Aluminum- Steel gun
carriage may provide the answer despite the two different stress- strain
curves. If required the Gun carriage may require periodic re-conditioning. It
can be done. The MiG uses such a composite structure for the MiG 21 for sudden
impact loads. Has some studies been done. Why does DRDO not be proactive where
as in this case not much resources are needed. Why are we leaving the doors
open for expensive imports by inaction over the years?
2.
The
second and painstaking study would be to see how many bridges in the region
have a 15- ton weight limit and what are the PWD safety factors for such range
of bridges (usually it is more than twice) and, like Gen. Sir William “Bill”
Slim did in Burma find out who made the bridges.
Arjun
The same story and
much the same approach. The Arjun Tank- you might read Sankalan Chattopadhya’s
concise summary of the Arjun’s development at @VinodDX9 on X was ready within
time and met performance, the Army Brass was happy and yet orders were not
placed. Why was DRDO not championing the Arjun?
Kaveri
This is a story
where GTRE managed to get a reasonable performance almost first shot (take a
bow whoever you were). After that the story begins to go downhill. Having
tasted initial success GTRE wastes time, money and effort to develop the
afterburner FTB. Finally in 2008 the promising project was stopped and now we
have the selected engine’s production slowly winding down after 40 plus years.
This fanboys
clamour about the US “sabotaging” the Tejas by stopping engine supply is a bit
of amusing self- congratulations. ADA has done such a comprehensive job of
sabotage of the Tejas that US assistance is superfluous. Perhaps the reason
could be that the economic compulsions of manufacturing aggregates required to
make the GE 404 to GE 404 IN20 version is so low it does not make sense to GE
to make the management effort. After all we are looking at an engine that first
ran in the 1980s and is now tailing off in production.
There would be
other examples but it needs examination that why DRDO, the champion of local
development, does not support to its own product.
Comments
Post a Comment