Answers to Tejas &ADA questions                                              Prof. Prodyut Das

28/02/2025

The following was received on X from @lachit1621:

1.      What problems do you find with ADA’s design philosophy

2.      Talent vs Resources crunch   

3.      Sabotage by external Players

4.      Reasons for frequent change by end users.

Would be great if you write in depth

It is always quite flattering if one’s opinion is sought but let me put down the cautions and aide memoires:

1.      Opinions expressed are personal & based on analysis of what is available freely. There is no secret or inside information.

2.      The defaulting organization, ADA is NOT a DRDO Organization. It’s failings are not are typical of DRDO’s.

3.       None of the top 5 key people who were at the birth this organization had requisite technical experience.

4.      Examples cited are mostly from DRDO’s own book “Radiance In Indian Skies- The Tejas Saga”. Strongly recommended for its information to be gleaned from its pages and the pomposity of the principal actors assumptions, make for wry smiles.

I cite the above to emphasise that we discuss an organization whose behavior cannot be generalized. It is a special case. To assume what the Government is currently doing to push up production i.e. discussions with private sector etc will bear fruit is optimism. The Government’s present actions are of an absentee Landlord trying to get some semblance of order after the entrusted Naib managing his estate has failed beyond redemption. The government- any Government- does not know the business and in a democracy, does not have the spare time to learn. The present Govt. efforts will rectify only one of the many lacunae of this benighted project i.e. routine follow ups. The Government will fail to achieve the production rate sought because it is going by procedures rather than acting from intimate knowledge -which it has not got. The Privat sector succeeds because it is intimately knowledgeable about where the shoe is pinching.

The probability of further “unexpected hold ups” is large. These “unexpected” appear to be “streamed”, first it was orders, then size of orders (with the possible irony now of splitting production) , then production facilities. After the present engine fracas, I fear we shall find the truth that was possibly being sought to be hidden i.e. the aircraft, by its design, is difficult to produce.

We are not by no means out of the woods with the Tejas; some desultory improvements is guaranteed because of the total lack of earlier of any monitoring. If pressed I would venture, we can expect 3-4x3 lines of production, perhaps 8-10 aircraft per year before we hit the next obstacle. Given the quality of Design Leadership, innumerable other “dyed in the wool” engineering flaws must exist. These won’t go away so easily, professions of patriotism/ brilliance/ sundry excuses notwithstanding. I fear without a breaking of Barriers and barricades and re- organization, of the industry and process of development even the next few Air Chiefs will be disappointed men.

With that as a grim introduction I will tackle the very last question first.

Reasons for frequent change I presume Lachit means the much- heralded case of the switch from R60 to R 73. The IAF swears that is the only change they asked for. It is supposed to have delayed the project by 1 year. Changing a missile is, or should not be, a big deal if the team knows it’s job,.

i)                  When the PAF, which used to be quite a respectable Force back then, got their first MiG 19s after the 1965 war, they very quickly put in a new system so that the MiG 19 could carry two sidewinders. (Note1)

ii)                In the Kargil war the IAF fitted the Laser designator system for the Paveway bombs to the M2K in a matter of two weeks.

The R 60 to R 73 change is not, as insinuated, a cunning ploy by the IAF to get imported aircraft. Due to reckless delays in the Tejas programme the R 60 had gone out of production being replaced by the same technology (IR homing) R 73 which offered superior effectiveness including a IR seeking head “cueing” system. In the cases (i) and (ii) above the PAF and IAF had to introduce additional aggregates in aircraft where there was no provision. In the Tejas it was largely a replacement with possibly only the HMDS cueing sensors and their harness being new addition. The very fact this is being cited as a cause speaks badly of the “experts” commenting but what better can one expect of ADA? Even it’s supporters are sub- standard.

Regarding the weights of the missile requiring re- stressing of the wing this is another excuse that will fool only a gullible babu. The change is so miniscule in terms of stressing that nothing needed to be held up; one just needs to juggle the schedule of incorporation. ADA had not done, as of 2015, the failure load test so how they can say this at all is a wonder. It is, literally, baseless.

Sabotage by external players

Sabotage by external players is one of the rules of the game and more talented and established Industries in the West have been eliminated. ( Note)  It is possible that the Financial Houses of London and Manhattan are involved, the usual tactics being to call through the usual channels, for more and more complex specifications beyond the capabilities of all but a few. The long-term aim could well be to create a Monopoly supplier who controls prices. In our case the problem has been built in. In the name of Socialism, the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 de facto throttled Indian Private sector much to the benefit of the London Bankers, the Soviet Union and the then Political rulers. You may like to read further details at https://prodyut7.blogspot.com/2025/02/nehru-and-his-industrial-policy.html

I will construct two tables to summarize the problem as I see it. 

Table 1. The Project Leadership CV summary (E & O.E)

Sl. No	Dramatis Personae	Qualifications	Total Experience	Lab./Office Exp.	Industry Exp
1.	SA to RM	M.Sc. Ph.D	35yrs	30 yrs	0
2	RM	LL.B	45 yrs	0	0
3	Professor	B.Sc. Engg. Ph. D	40 yrs	40 yrs Teaching, Ph.D Guide of #4 below	0
4	Chairman BARC	B.Sc. Ph, D	45 yrs	Atomic Energy	0
5.	Chief Designer	B.E. Ph.D. LL. B	16 yrs.	10 yrs. at HQ NDLI	6 yrs. total

 

Table 2. The Configuration of the aircraft as proposed by the consultant (compared to similar F 404 engine a/c)- Cause & Effect.

Sl. No.	Parameter	Industry Avg.	Tejas	Remarks
1	Length	14.5	13.2	Inadequate space for fuel & eqpmt.
2	Aspect Ratio	2,2 upwards	1.76	V. unfavourable region of L/D curve requiring extreme weight consciousness which is not evident
3	Weight (kgs)	5800-6300	7300 mk1) 6600 Mk1A	Possibility of a 100% wt increase in ADA designed structures over consultant estimates. Think: how could addition of eqpt reduce wt of Mk1a.
4	Stabilization	Stab/Canard	Tailless	Development will be held up by constant need to rewrite software with every change in weight accentuated by factor at 2

 

Table 1 shows how we arrived at Table 2. Why the Table 2 figures were accepted from the consultants is not known but they are shameful. Given what is indicated by cross readings of the Tables a further foreign hand was not necessary. The foreign hand , if at all any, may have been in setting up Table1.  

Talent versus resources crunch

It is clear that there was a very serious lack of any engineering talent in the upper echelons of the ADA leadership. This was self- created by ADA.  Possibly n order to run the project completely free of any oversight including that of DRDO various steps were taken. Indeed, the usual checks and balances insisted upon do not appear to have been present. No single person or organization will have within itself all that is required for such projects. It requires the co-operation, even amidst acrimony. ADA short circuited out any opposition because it was knowledge wise very weak. It would be interesting to analyze the IAF’s 300-page critique of the design in 1988- psst! Copies anyone? The critique must have been very embarrassing a challenge because Prof. Roddam Narsimha took the bypass by getting funds sanctioned as a technology development project- doing in the process great, possibly irreparable, damage to Indian Aviation.

As we have seen from Table 2 the configuration selected was grease pole for the monkey to climb. The original 560 crores, (Rs.5600crs@ INR 2024) , assuming reasonably competent leadership, was more than enough to develop the Tejas. An incompetent team will create its own resources crunch. My studies show that the Tejas, even at its current inadequately developed state, was 20% more expensive than comparable, ready for service, Western Projects where it is always to be remembered, manpower costs are 5-10 times higher. 

It is worth repeating a lack of talent created a resources crunch. No matter how much coaching and text books you give to a “fail-toos” (no translation needed)  the incompetent student will still not achieve satisfactory results. There is no lack of talent but the defense of the indefensible comprises of three layers i) Deny there is a problem ii) Blame the import lobby iii) resist and sabotage an audit that can show how simple the correction may possibly be.

5.      What problems do you find with ADA’s design philosophy?

Good design is like cooking or tailoring. The challenge is to use technology as frugally as possible to give something the customer wants and, as they say, “then some”. This requires absorbing a vast amount of data, processing it and coming out with wise decisions of one’s own. Good Chief Designers are often with strong ideas. An example would be the comparison of the MiG 15 which used a large low powered “old technology” engine to produce a very realistic challenge to the best fighters the Western Industries could produce. How did they do it? By careful and ruthless engineering logic. People comparing MiG 15 combat scores to evaluate the Mig 15 forget the duty for which the ‘-15 was designed for was to destroy the Boeing B 29 and it proved devastating in that role the combination of 2x23 plus 1x37 (sic) mm being ideal for collapsing large monocoque structures. Against the Sabre, the Chinese pilots generally fared badly being without any combat experience, suffering a loss ratio 14:1but when flown against equally experienced Soviet veterans of the WW2, the term used was “Honcho”. Even comparison and evaluation of published figure requires vast amounts of back ground information Refined versions of the MiG 15 including the MiG 17 with a thinner “banana sweep” LE, lengthened fuselage and many general improvements, fought creditably against the Mirage III and the F 4 and remained in widespread service as a considerable threat into the 1990s..

 Below is a comparison of the Klimov VK 1 with the J 47 of the Sabre. 

Table 3

Sl. No	Engine	Length	Diam	Weight	Thrust	Sfc kg/Kn.H	Rotating Assly
1	Klimov	2600	1300	872	26.5	109,1	1 CC+ 1T
2	J 47-GE-13	3700	933	1158	27.12	103g /Kn/H	12+1

 

What the table seems to show that a relatively “old fashioned” engine technology- the then UK Government sold the Russians 50 Nene engines in 1946 as obsolete technology, the MiG 15 actually returning better figures than a more advanced concept by careful engineering. An example of careful engineering would be the fact that tolerant centrifugal engine permitted the wing spars to be carried right across the fuselage saving weight and with minimum interference drag. How Slavic!

So why did the US who were actually building the Nene (as the J 40) from which the Klimov came as a “Chinese” copy prefer the heavier J 47? It could not have been the slightly lower S.f.c. The answer would lie in the minds of Ed. Schumed. One reason could be the frontal area of the engine which was 70% less and would be an enormous factor if the Sabre was to be developed further but we do not know.

If you are a bit puzzled don’t worry. What I have tried is to show you that much subtle thinking, “back of the envelope” calculations, apparent regressions of technology, have to be gone through before making even a straight selection as the above.

Compare the doubting's and enquires of the above with the certainty of one of the Tejas babus saying “We were certain that we had to incorporate four technologies- Fly by Wire, Composites, An advanced engine and AESA radar. The approach by ADA is like believing if one puts Tomatoes, Onions, garlic and olive oil in a bowl one has got Tomato soup. Unless you cook ,even after 40 yrs the mixture remains unpalatable. It was Descartes who long ago had said “If you are content to begin with doubts then you may end up with certainties but if you begin with certainties you will end with doubts. Perhaps Tejass has proved how right Descartes was.        

Anecdotes

Anecdote 1.

I had worked with this UK based Multi-national at Calcutta as an young engineer spending time working mainly on Hypoid Gearbox vibration trials and Homopolar brushless  geared alternators before leaving to join the engine development cell of a very top Tractor design group in Faridabad. A couple of years after leaving when the Calcutta firm’s project of introducing pneumatic brakes for passenger coaches and Railway wagons got into serious troubles over development delays. Somehow, they remembered me and made a “cannot refuse” offer- Company Flat, Car with Driver, Club Membership, free gas, water electricity, phone, Super annulation an all the other usuals. The CEO and I met during one of his NDLI trips and when I asked him how he was going to handle the fact that I was in my early thirties and one had to “go grey to be a Manager in the Company”. He promised he would take care of it and he did and I delivered remarkably well.

Anecdote 2

In my late forties, I had applied as a Works Manager with India’s largest Plastic Extrusion Machinery Manufacturing firm. I did not have works experience so they recruited me as VP (QA) to replace the incumbent VP (QA) who was due to retire shortly i.e. after I would be confirmed,

The purpose of citing the two above is not to say what a top shot I am as an Engineering Leader. I have no doubt about that. I cite them to underline successful Private sector Companies grow because the dare to think differently and the "deciders" ( in the Tejas case they would be Raisina) knew where teh shoe ws pinching or even where it was going to pinch. At Raisina ,the most powerful have to be extensively briefed - introduing possible errors?.  

Also their top management are more cued about all aspects of the business than the PSU counterparts. I have no doubt that Baba Kalyani has picked up more about Howitzers and Jet Engines than many of the Scientist Babus in the Ordnance Factories. In the PSUs and Labs for various reasons well known, precedence takes precedence over Thinking.

Corporates and Educational Institutions may like to contact if they wish to run a series or courses on General design (Full Course- The designer- creation of Design- producibility, Testing the design- Project Competition as at IITK- was 40 lectures) or on Aircraft design which can be tailored to suit. In that case kindly DM ne at X. Generally, my lectures on site and tele- are considered interesting and thought provoking.

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Note 1. For general details of the MiG 19s in PAF service I would recommend reading Air Cdre. (retd) Kaiser Tufail, PAF posts on the Net. Very Interesting and professional

Note2. In the 1950s, Canada with a population of 16 million people had a clutch of topline aircraft projects- the Avro Canada CF 100 (600 built in 6 marks) serving with NATO and the Orenda engine for the same fighter. Put into service after 6000 hours of testing during which cracks in the turbine blading showed up during bench tests - the Orenda quickly went from 27 kN to 33 kN and over 4000 were built. There was also the Canadair CF 102 airliners as well as the CF 105 Avro Arrow Mach 2 interceptor. These projects failed not because design competence was lacking but because of various behind the scene machinations apparently at the Cabinet level .

The prolific British aviation Industry dwindled from being a world leader to its sad present-day state. Nothing is spared. A sprightly Australian trainer, the Victa Airtourer which was selling briskly began to suffer when the Australian Parliament brought down the import duties. It is not a fair world.

Note 3) The subsequent history of this project- the delays, the failures to meet specifications, the complaints of lack of funds, development difficulties all follow from Table2. Perhaps- said he slyly- the possibility is that a really expert designer who was a “pervert” took delight in recommending a configuration that would have the maximum built in difficulties in it proposed the figures in Table 2 “to see the fun”- and that was somehow accepted by the worthies of Table1.