Realizing the 50 squadron Air Force                                           Prof. Prodyut Das

04/04/2025

For the “Si vis pacem para Bellum”(if you want peace prepare for War) part, the current squadron strength the IAF squadron strength is inadequate. There can be defensive war doctrines NOT involving the Air Force but no serious work has been done to develop them. If plans require the possible use of the Air Force, then the present Air strength is inadequate; 50 squadrons is the figure to work for.

A 50 squadron Air Force is not just “unaffordable” it is “un-realizable” with the  current “socialist economy” model. However, a 50 squadron Air Force using locally developed warplanes by an efficient local Industry is not only affordable but can be equipped and maintained on the same expenditure currently expended on the present 30 squadrons but it will need re-orienting both the way we manufacture and develop the aircraft. A system that allows a fourth- generation aircraft programme 42 years to be under development has to be dismantled and re-organized or else steady build up of air strength will be impossible.

My assessment of the future Tejas supply situation is below. Where brevity allows, I include brief reasons for my pessimisms.

1.      After the present seven Tejas “hulls” have been equipped, the 24 air craft assembly lines may give us another 4, i.e. total 11 for 2025. We may hope (note the irony, hope, a quarter century after first flight) to close 2025-2026 with an actual delivery to the customer of 11 aircraft from a system capable of producing 24 and a need finally for about 270 aircraft of this type.

2.      The engines delivered by GE in 2025 and onwards will rot, (“reduce to produce”) and tie up the working capital of HAL who will come up to ask for more funds to sustain Tejas production.

This is completely against what officials have promised. How and why? Below is my estimate based on pattern recognition:

3.      Engines supplies cannot be the cause for non-delivery. The arithmetic of engines already in the book indicate persistent deep development flaws in the Tejas. The engines supplied earlier, the total Tejas flight hours flown in the squadrons, the engine TBO and TTL does not even remotely add up. Nor this excuse about “– IN 20” mark of the engine makes any sense. What it means to me is that the Tejas Mk1 is junk not worth producing so excuses were needed until something barely acceptable, the Mk1A, could be readied but that too requires constant tinkering to produce.

4.      Have no hope for the Tejas Mk2. The proposed configuration is high risk. One can predict three concessions: “non availability of using the canard as an airbrake after landing, excessive nose wheel tyre wear and or instability of ground handling and rough engine operations. Should the aircraft manage to sustain M 1.3 surging of the well- behaved F 404 can be expected. It is my sour but well thought out prediction the Tejas Mk2 may end up as a bigger “paperweight than the “Mk1; I go strictly by the design skills displayed by ADA show far.

5.      The AMCA is a re- run of the earlier project- a clueless design leadership trying to develop a current generation (5th in this case) combat aircraft. Mutato Nomine de te Fabula Tejasum.(?) Change the name and the tale is told of the Tejas. The same mistakes of the Tejas- using unproven new technology- have been repeated. How can we expect different results?

Pretending things are “just round the corner” will not work. What we need is to drop this poodle-faking and get down to doing the right things;

1.      The first is getting the Mk1 right. It will require skill and honesty. ADA should show cause to a competent and independent audit committee how a configuration weighing 5300 kgs was allowed to put on weight of 7400 kgs. The Air Force did not add equipment resulting in the weight increase. Had the IAF done so it couldn’t be fitted in the small frame. So how did that weight get on? This may take a day or so. Everyone knows what needs to be done but no one knows “how will we tell  the people” . To decide what can be a feasible plan has to be done in about two weeks or the work will expand to fill the time available.

If weight improvement exercises reduce the Mk1’s weight to around 5700 kg mark and a skilled design team can do so without re-writing the software- it is well worth a try- then go along that route. MK1 B with F 414 and so forth; the Mk2 will not be needed unless the real problem is that the Mk1 fabled software is so useless that it requires a re-write of the entire software every time a change is made. The timing for hiding blunders is long gone.

2.      Weight correction, supporting HALin getting production up to volume and the AMCA is more than enough work load for ADA. It must get out of the Manger of future projects until it clears its plate. The earlier dates slipping the “Gadai Laskar” (ambling at one’s own pace) style of functioning has to be monitored. IF the MK2 or AMCA begins to slip the project should be taken out of ADA’s hand not just for the delay but because the essential spadework has not been done, “-de te Fabula Tejasum”.

3.      Fund the development of a real 5th generation TD using existing sub systems as the US did to explore what we don’t know about 5th generation technologies- data fusion, stealth, and stealth tactics and practices i.e. uncovering the unknown unknowns. It will be faster than designing the AMCA the way we are going about it. Begin asking for project studies from multiple vendors for a compact carrier operable aircraft using a 2x Kaveri/404/414/ engines with an internal weapons bays for 3x Harpoon, 4x IR, and 4x 23 mm . The programme is not to demonstrate areas we do know but to uncover what we don’t. Project studies doesn’t take as much time and cost as much as has been asked for by you know who. Begin with the competitive project studies then encourage the performers and weed out the fakes. The idea is to check out the realities of 5th generation at the earliest lowest cost method. Read my blog on “Developing stealth Technology” for the spirit and the costs of developing the F 117. ADA has wasted time. It will not deliver and in case of repeated slippage should be closed down.

4.      By the same token the Kaveri should be put on priority. No foreign collaborations should be permitted. The engine needs painstaking care during assembly and faithful recording of results to see considerable improvements. It seems that GTRE was frightened to test in case something went wrong. Not only will we get 50kN guaranteed but the instability of the 78kN afterburner will largely disappear.

Let GTRE play the role of second fiddle and let a proper Industry e.g. Godrej/ Consortium assemble and test a batch of 5 engines to TTL on a round the clock basis. This will mean about 20,000 m hours and will be a wonderful teacher. Jet Engine development as a project is beyond GTRE’s ken.

5.      Let the HLFT 42 /Kaveri and a similar Super Marut /Bharat Orpheus programme be given to HAL and a Private sector effort. If two near identical programs seem expensive it must be remembered that:

 a) the current crisis warrants such steps

 b) that programs are expensive only if they do not deliver and are allowed to continue c) the Super Marut/ Bharat Oprheus is an unique platform- which is why it was stopped so may years ago.

Finally we must abandon trying to design aircraft to a specifications and start designing to tackle a problem or a threat. Does acquiring 5th.generation tackle the threat posed by US or Chinese 5th.genertaion is a question that should be tackled independent of the urge to acquire 5th generation. It is my view modern Fighter designs are “specced”, finally, by Investment Banks, to have substantial entry barriers. Their aim is to restrict possible suppliers so that customer operate in a near monopoly.  Any thinking of cheap alternatives shunned. We cannot afford to fall in that trap.

Note1

Depending on the terrain the Air Force can expect to lose about a 110-120 aircraft in the first 72 hours and another 80 in the next three weeks. This number-50 squadrons, is required to i) act as a dissuasive factor to any misadventure and ii) to have a residual organization after the first major clash and to rebuild.

Note2

The sale of Indian Howitzers and other defence equipment has given the general public a proof of how much cheaper Indian designed and built equipment can be, the common-sense figure being about 5 times.

 

 

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