Tejas: Too little, too late?                                 

Prof. Prodyut Das

15 July 2025 issue.V 

I have borrowed the heading from an interview on India Today between Vishnu Som and Shiv Aroor . 

The link is https://youtu.be/sJZZn8Qvd9E?si=cNrpHX8VGRvSC5Jo.

 It is a long interview, damned by faint truths. Messrs. Aroor and Som are of course doyens of Indian defence journalism and privy to much “frontline” information. Had they taken the trouble to distill that information into wisdom, the effect would have been powerful.

Too late?

The question raised is the Tejas obsolete, given that the 5^th. Generation is here? By no means. The 5th generation is a marketing ploy. We do need a small stealth capability but it is most useful under restricted conditions. In VFR conditions combat it may be actually handicapped vs 4th gen.The Tejas equipment level is world class and if we get the platform debugged it will be a valuable addition. We need the Tejas in large numbers. It is NOT obsolete.  

 Perhaps the equations below will clarify:

The effectiveness of a traditional fighter i.e. the 3^rd. generation in securing a successful outcome (achieving the metaphorical “six o’ clock” position) could be given by Equation 1.

Equation 1

(Platform performance + Weapons performance+ Situational awareness) x N² = Desired outcome

where N is the number of units engaged in that combat. The equation can be used to compare the outcomes when two similar but different groups engage in combat.

This simple expression explains why Freiherr Manfred von Richthofen, could with a 120 hp Fok. Dr. I triplane engage with fighters of twice the power and still be the Red Baron. The equation also explains that the brilliant Lt. Werner Voss took on 6 Se 5As of 56 squadron in his lone Fokker Dr. I and lost his life. The N² factor gave him no chance.

 We need approximate matching and rest can be numbers .Within limits of logic, you don’t have to match figure for figure. numbers are important for dominance.

This equation held till about the 3^rd generation but over the last 50 years guided weapons especially intelligent guided weapons) grown enormously in reliability and that has modified the equation above.

Equation 2

(Platform performance + Weapons x AI performance+ Situational awareness x AI) x N² = Desired outcome where N is the number of units engaged in the combat.

AI has transformed “specifications”. The introduction of AI into weapons e.g. seekers using GPS, HMDS, Hypersonic long range missiles and in situational awareness e g MAWS, RWR has changed the left-hand side of the equation so for the equation to hold the Platform performance can – if constrained by technical or strategic reasons as we are -be accepted at a lower level. 

This is why, IF, the Tejas is equipped successfully with the AESA radar, BVR, CCM and HMDS and the MAWS, RWR etc then the need to match figure to figure is less provided numbers are there. Digressing, the above equation is also the reason we should also ,independent of ADA which is in dire need of repairs, look at an alternate AMCA.

The above explains that why the IAF is quite willing to accept the Mk 1A whereas its treatment of the Mk1 is comment of that Mark’s utility. They were parked out of harm's way.

I have always held that the MK1 design  should be re-engineered by an independent team- ADA would be too defensive about it- to achieve an airframe weight of around 1900 kgs (reportedly 2900 kgs in the Mk1) and the undercarriage weight about 80% of the MiG 21s we shall have a very fair little warplane.

Too little?

We are in uncertain waters here. We need numbers. Sindoor has shown what the opening loss rates can be and it is good planning to believe that it may not always be the PAF who loses.

. We need the numbers but will we get it?I don't think so. It has nothing to do with technical challenges. It has something that disturbs me but I will just put down the Historiography of the Fighter development scenario. 

All funds quoted are in Present day 2025 Values in Rupees

1.      In 1976 HAL proposes the HF 25 based on the R 25 engine. A funding of Rs. 374 crores is requested. Proposal is turned down reportedly due to a lack of confidence in HAL to deliver.

2.      ADA is set up as an independent body, not a part of DRDO , to develop a replacement of the 3^rd generation MiG 21 with a funding of Rs. 7515 crores to develop a LCA with a first flight date of April 1990.

3.      The IAF objects in a 200 - page minute pointing the dangers in the ADA proposal, pointing out the impracticality of the proposal but is by- passed. VS Arunachalam, then Head of DRDO and SA to RM, perhaps the Key backer of this daring project, is given circa 1988, a rare extension of another 5 years.

4.      The April 1990 first flight date is missed there is nothing , absolutely nothing, in terms of hardware to show.

5.      Despite 4 above the project is re financed another Rs 6163 crores in 1993 to develop-hold your breath -TDs. Comparison with lack of confidence in HAL HF 25 proposal is interesting.

6.      VS Arunachalam retires in 1994 and joins an US University, Carnegie Mellon on a tenure professorship till his death in the early 2020s. In between there were various unsavoury allegations against him but they could not be verified.

7.      The prototype is rolled out in 1995 in the presence of PV Narsimha Rao.

8.      The First flight occurs in 2001. The earlier funds probably being exhausted a further funding of Rs.9965 crores this time to develop PVs (prototype vehicles). Kota Harinarayana, the first programme director retires.

9.      An order is placed for 40 aircraft. The accumulated flight hours at this time were about 400 hrs. These orders are still under delivery. Funding for a NLCA at Rs.21,000 crores is also sanctioned.

It is difficult to believe that above is the historiography of a critical national programe for an urgent MiG 21 replacement programme or ther was shortage of funds.

 In the interview both M/s Aroor and Som express near awe at the way the Chinese have forged ahead. There is no,  absolutely no , magic in what the Chinese have achieved.  The Chinese would NOT have done 1,3,5. They would NOT have ignored the CPAFAF, they would have shot the Program Director in 1990. And note they always had two competitive bureaux. They also used all their resources - not as in India, relying on some of the poorest paid engineers in a Government monopoly- to achieve the miracles. The Chinese were no supermen but they certainly were more honest - none of the show baazi and " aeronautics is a vast subject" excuse makers but democratic , sincere and focused.

The Chinese simply doggedly moved step by step, like Toyota, to get the process right , being honest in their situation assessment s and making what improvements that they could eg- in the MiG 19s engine they added a variable incidence stator to control the surging, reduced the pressure drop in the Combustion Chamber, introduced better blade cooling- simple small improvements focus being on a clutch of small practical improvements was better than the music in the distance of grand projects that fail. Over the years it has paid off.

 Here we have GTRE with a string of incomplete projects asking to be elected leader of a 5th generation engine which we don't need.

By “rollout” in 1995 there was hard data within ADA about the weight of the aircraft. Even in 2014 the weight of the aircraft was 1400 kilos over the design target of 5300 kilos. The excess weight should have been removed first before starting flight trials or the effort goes to waste. You don't start to test with a 30 per cent overload.  These common sense missteps speaks of certain callous attitude to the success of the project.

My pessimism about getting the numbers is rooted in the callousness of the project leadership. That malaise of attitude would be reflected in the engineering of the design. Design for production is one of the aims of an engineering designer. I have not seen the engineering design but I fear, solely from the symptoms of carelessness about the weight, that the same spirit infected the design of components and quite possibly the parts are unnecessarily difficult to produce. It is quite possible that we may find production rates will be in single digits  for the foreseeable future until jugaad kicks in or we undergo yet another prolonged “learning experience”. This year? Five. Twelve if HAL goes berserk with the 7 airframes carried over.

A word of Costs

Yesterday on Twitter there was a picture of a hydraulic jack for the LE edge flap of the Tejas and much satisfaction was implied in that the Imported jack cost Rs.180 lakhs and this was made by HAL Lucknow for half the cost. This satisfaction is like the Govt. of India deciding that since the US Covid vaccines were being sold at USD 80 per shot we are doing well if we could halve the cost. The US prices cannot be the model for our cost target because as with pharmaceuticals, selling prices of aerospace products, have no relation to the cost of production. The price analyses require urgent work because we need a large Air Force and it must be at affordable costs. The Chinese were quoting $15 M, a few years back for the J 17 and they were not doing charity.

Nil Desperandum

The “Chaiwallah of Raisina” has sent his “Munimji” to HAL to enquire about the Tejas. The visit of the Chief Secretary of the PMO is a game changer though it may not look like one. In advertising they say “The medium is the message”. I do not think I can recall anytime before that a Cabinet Secretary has made a Tejas specific visit.

Does it matter all that much? Well experience shows that “Nigrahni” -keeping an eye- works wonders. The Tejas project is delayed because it made terrible mistakes in the seed, cast them into hardware and then spent time correct those infantile mistakes,as inevitable in honest development of which there has been very few signs.

The process of sanctioning a project cannot be allowed to drift into the zone of “vote bank “ politics by the usual suspects.

1.      Show cause Tejas team why Tejas MK1A cannot be brought down to empty weight of 5700-5900 kgs. despite adding the weight of the additional new equipment. That should be possible. 6600 is simply not good enough.

2.      We have hit the Deep State with Sindoor. The Tejas will be vulnerable to supply chain issues for all its life.

3.      From 2 above it is incumbent that the HLFT 42 with Super Orpheus be given super priority.

4.      There is an unfailing pattern of excellent systems being developed and much ahead of world class technology developed but which languish for want of platforms. 

Platforms fail because somehow, we arrive at the most difficult to develop configurations often rejecting much more stable configurations which were initially proposed. 

How did the Tejas fail when the Dhruv is such a happy success under identical conditions.

Even the historiography speaks of manipulations. This and the Historiography of the Tejas project requires NSA level This was a CREATED Mess. How and why is important for the future.