2025 – a commentary and review                                                 Prof. Prodyut Das

7^th January 2026

This piece is for Indian Readers and foreign readers may miss the context of references.

ADA and DRDO organized a seminar in Bangalore on the occasion, (I can scarcely believe the effrontery!), of the Silver Jubilee of the first flight of the Tejas. This, mind you, after 41 years of setting up of ADA and not a single usable aircraft to be had, uncertain production plans even for the next quarter and everyone else from the Import lobby downwards being blamed for the complete failure so far. In fact. I am told, HAL was not invited on the platform which if I were HAL would take it as a blessing in disguise. The founding Director of ADA was there holding up some sort of a souvenir released as was the Air Chief Marshal who in his inimitable way did the most sensible thing of reminding everyone that the original purpose of the project was to equip the IAF with a MiG 21 replacement and things are somewhat overdue.   

Given that 2025 was a most eventful year I thought I would give a review. You are cautioned I have no “inside “information. I may be wrong but I shall not be hundred percent wrong, that being a monopoly of others. So here goes:

Tejas Mk1A

The gates of hell, as reported by Dante on his visit there, is marked “Abandon hope all ye enter here”. It is in my opinion pretty much that with the ADA Tejas unless we re-organize. We may get a few in June unless the General Electric’s US cavalry (as in the old Westerns) charges right on time and stops the supply. It will then be a great excuse for a further delay of a few years - notified in the familiar yearly/six monthly/quarterly/ March 31st doses. My surmise is based on the sequences of the very long delays in “coupling” the airframes, the engine installation delays and that missile tests are still going; it justifies my pessimism. You may ask what about the hundred engines on recent order? Surely no one would order engines if things were still uncertain. The ADA babus did that before. About twenty years ago seventy engines were ordered/received yet we got no aircraft unless you count 30 overweight Mk1s at Sulur in 20 years as fair effort. Finally, even if we struggle out of the mire Donald will pull the plug, perhaps not on the F 404 but on the composite materials which is made in Japan. The recent above tamasha in Bangalore certifies that ADA has worked entirely to it’s own satisfaction. The promises of the 1980s have been comprehensively unrealized.

This project needs purge of the cronies. The way one excuse was fielded after the other in series – funding, orders, factory capacity, then further capacity increases- all this after two IOCs and am as yet one unnumbered FOCs, engine supply etc. makes one uneasy that perhaps ADA itself is heartily sick of the mess it has made.

Incidentally by 2012 it was claimed that the funds have been used to develop a capacity of 12 per annum. (PAC report 2018-2019) It was good enough to begin. Now where did that capacity go? Why invest in capacity if further changes in design must be in the offing. If you knew the least bit about aircraft or production you will feel very disturbed.

 

 

Tejas Mk2

 I have already raised the issue of the canards; People tell me the design has been vetted by “foreign” – in this case ONERA. That is NO assurance. If I were ONERA and approached by ADA, I would hardly say “But Messiurs, zee proposed location of your canyards is incroyable in its stupidite. Zee location has violated all the examples of history ve know and has verry little chance of clearing the certification so please re- do and come back- or go away until you learn basic project studies and layout design”. So, they take our money, give a report and we proceed, in my view, to make another Tejas Mk 1 Prototype configuration mistake. Of course, I personally can’t believe the Mk1 configuration was a mistake. People are not so stupid. I feel some very brilliant foreign engineer from abroad perhaps changed the original LCA configurational to “mistakes” so that, development wise, it became the monkey on a grease pole. Never, in my knowledge has a Jet Fighter had parameters that made it so intrinsically difficult to develop.

Comparing the Tejas mk 2 with the IAI Kfir reflects the total and comprehensive incompetence. Faced with De Gaulle’s embargo, IAI took the Mirage airframe, replaced the French ATAR with a General Electric J79, the Cyrano by an ELTA EL-2021and more comprehensive avionics package, added a pair of canards and improved all parameters of performance -all in four years from 1969 to 1972. It was produced, nota bene, against small orders and it was in action on the front in 1973. Engine change, avionics change, Radar Change, canards is exactly or more than the difference between the Tejas Mk1 and what the Tejas Mk2 needs. That the bloody Israelis are bloody supermen is of course a possible explanation but how does ADA justify 20 yrs to extend an existing airframe and production facilities? If we cannot address that question no amount of funding or facilities will do.  Clearly our Ministry officials and the Maalik are being led to bark at the wrong bottlenecks.

 AMCA

We are wasting time and effort. The 5^th generation is a specialist category needed in small numbers. Our specification is “expeditionary” like the F 35 and J 20/J 35. whereas our immediate task is to destroy intruding “stealth” aircraft. The AMCA cannot intercept the F 35. We are relying solely on computer simulation – even the static RCS facility was only recently commissioned and it is my feel we have wasted a large proportion of the money and time spent on this project till date. ADA did not bother to design a simple well thought out TDs. The IAF ( if it is still there by then) will pay the price of further depredations of ADA &Co..

Why this pessimism? My doubt are based on the symptoms. Take this small detail.The AMCA proposes to use a DSI. It required “petty cash” to rig up one Tejas Mk1 as a TD for the DSI and generate real time data to validate the computer simulations. It would have taught us much and eliminated one item from the checklist. If successful it would have also improved the Tejas, ADA has done nothing. This “fart in a trance” stupor (Sorry! there is no other expression) on the part of ADA Leadership is a disturbing.

The Tejas crashes.

If the crash rate was low, it was because the aeroplane was not flying enough and ADA chose to look at the numbers and away from the truth. The current approximate crash rate per 5000 and 7000 hours is not good, the acceptable is 1 crash per 10,000 hrs.  The Dubai crash report is awaited. Some foreign commentator has spoken of G-Loc. I have reservations. The configuration and the overweight give the Tejas thinner margins than say the F 16 or Rafale The tailless delta e.g. the Draken would rapidly deaccelerate in a turn even when on full afterburner. Given the record low aspect ratio of the Tejas after several tightish turns slowed down the ill-fated aircraft to below V_s and it went into a deep stall on rolling out. Face reality; this present configuration will snap and bite unless tweaked.  Be prepared for more.

Of course, Display flying is particularly dangerous but I will include an anecdote about the Hunter which was of course an aircraft all gentlemen should have. “Bill” Beford was flying the Hunter before the Swiss Air Force and he included a13 turn spin over the airfield in his repertoire. Unfortunately, he forgot to reset his altimeter and at the end of 13 turns Bedford ended up having a much closer look at the runway than he would have cared for and barely cleared the ridge next to the airfield- you should see the picture!. He survived. And being Bedford went up to repeat his 13-turn spin presumably this time with the right QFE settings. Switzerland bought a hundred Hunters. Read about it when you have the inclination.

HJT 36 and HTT 40

This aircraft, like the Tejas, has been a such a victim of the repeated pattern of abandoning a good configuration for a bad one. Designed and built in 3 years – which shows that we have the right people- HAL then spent a fortune to get BAC to give advice which could be given by an aeromodeller or if the Chief Designer had looked into the pages of Darrol Stinton. Then they sat on the BAC advise for 8 years before HVT took matters in hand and sorted out the 6-turn spin. His fixes work but we cannot rest on our laurels. The MK2 should take a relook at the intakes shape and location. Improvements in weight, spin recovery and performance will be considerable. Right now, it is urgent that these aircraft are introduced into service.

The Engine collaboration

Completely a waste of funds and time because the Leaders lack the capability  to absorb collaboration. Every license agreement is de facto a collaboration. If we could not benefit from them what makes us think that Engine Makers will reveal their innermost bread earning capacity to us. How will we know that we will get the same heat treatment process data as their own? The Chinese are aways grumbling about it. What the proposed collaboration is that we will spend our money to test their riskiest ideas for them.

Companies are too big and wily to tackle. When China wanted engines, they invited not Rolls Royce but Hooker- not just as a design consultant but also as a teacher. A Company is too powerful to be handled by the “technological amateurs” who lead our aerospace efforts. The logical thing would be to invest the funds on completing existing engines- HTFE , Kaveri, etc and take up the Pegasus.

A special mention about the Pegasus. We have copies of it. It is a to us a treasure especially in view of the IN uncertainties about the next gen Carriers, The Pegasus is a beautiful sensible engine with a correct BPR of 1: 1 and a thrust of 100kN. A small project study not more than four months to be done to see what would be involved if we were to go for:

1.      A direct “copy” to keep our options open for the Navy’s carrier design.

2.      A version modified as a “three post-er” for VSTOL carrier borne fighter or long range “stealth” attack aircraft where the high BPR and the simple TV would be welcome.

3.      A direct straight turbofan which with the VSTOL paraphernalia removed which would improve the thrust to around 110 kN estimate and reduce the weight.

4.      Take small steps- a fit finish improvement here, a weight reduction there, a reduction of combustor pressure there and so on. It would be a very important engine.

Let us put the horse before the cart. We have a system where GTRE with not one complete certificated commercial contribution in 65 years cannot be allowed to continue as the leader. The fault may lie in the structure of the higher officials and their relationship with Raisina. They have not delivered. They cannot be project leaders; we will be shooting ourselves in the foot. Let the Private sector be given tasks with 3- year horizons.

The Dhruv crashes

If you have messed around with steam engines or made working models of them you will have come across the old wives tale of “Piston valves wear out; slide valves wear in”.A similar one is “ if there be swash plates there be brinelling”. It is quite possible that the ALH swash plate failures is due to lack of a “transport bolt” during stowage in small ships. Here I want to rub in a bit two point. The first is that using instincts freely is NOT being unmethodical, it is being an experienced engineer and not a bloody clerk Babu. The second thought is that it is almost certain that everyone investigating the accidents has a washing machine at home. Each washing machine comes with a transport bolt. If those engineers had the mind to enquire why that bolt is used during transport and has to be removed before the machine can be installed and used, they would have instinctively zeroed in to the cause straightaway instead of wasting six months’ time. Funds is not the shortage; The correct minds are. Of course in the seventies, our pundits in education, from the Science Departments such as Chemistry, took all the “German” out of the curricula, and replaced with a so called “Science based” engineering. Which meant lots of mathematics which is unbelievable in the hands of a charlatan- to best students into submission and boredom. 

They also, for good measure, made the IIT entrance exams so difficult- problems from Iridov in Electricity a Russian graduate level text book, for example- so that Kota coaching was essential. Result was our school students drifted away from the humanities- the matrix in which scientific knowledge and the spirit of enquiry is planted.

Summary

1.      The IAF needs the fifty squadrons. The present strength of 29 does not mean our air Power (note use of the word Power) we are at 29/50 = 0.58% of our required strength. Air Power by Lanchester’s law is square of the numbers i.e. we are at 0.335. Do you see the common sense in the Air Chief’s impatience?

2.      The ancient Seneca advised “Do not take action on the urgings of those who will not be affected by the outcome”. Op. Sindoor has comprehensively re- written the rules of the game. We have time to re- organize.

3.      The Fifth Generation and its associated engine collaboration is a diversion. The funds will be wasteful as well as a failure to maintain objectives. The real crisis is at 1, First get the IAF strength right.

4.       Without in any way touching the Tejas Mk1 A production, or the Mk 2 development a second opinion is needed to develop the Tejas to its full potential and to accelerate the HLFT 42 ready for service by 2029. A 3- or four-months study should be done a consortium outside the crony Socialists coterie- Bharat Forge/Godrej/ Tata etc to independently summarize what needs to be done to reach the Tejas Mk 1 to its full potential. Redesign of the Software, fuselage centre section, a smaller wing and reduction of the airframe and undercarriage are indicated. The results will be considerable lightness, cheaper costs , improved performance and ease of production. The same should be done for the Kaveri and other engines as well as the HLFT 42. I don’t think we will have an Air Force if we continue to rely on existing structures and procedures.