The Frugal 5^th generation AMCA –India’s only alternative?          Prof. Prodyut Das

Iss.3 08/03/24

The possible induction by the PAF of Chinese 5^th generation stealth fighter has not caused a flutter in our dovecotes. Neither China nor Pakistan is  in shape to indulge in open warfare and if the push does come to the shove there is always our Infantry to sort things out. There has been no cry about a “crash development” of the AMCA because the Government realizes that without restructuring of our Defence R&D the effort would be in vain. Given the current structure, it just won’t work. Developing a full-fledged 5^th Gen i.e. (4^th. Gen + 5^th gen additions) is just “A bridge too far”.

Developing 5^th. generation is deeper waters because it is political thing- rather like getting a permanent seat in UNSC. A country developing a 5^th gen. sends a challenge and a message that is not welcomed. Any reliance there for any of the equipment is fraught with risk. They will trip up the programme especially if it has potential to export. The recent IA order for Arjun’s Mk1As improves its sales prospects in the Gulf- river crossing not being quite the excuse there. A sale in the Gulf region will have domino effects elsewhere hence the reluctance by the engine makers to supply engines. The manufacturer may be German but bankers are International. They - the Bankers-may have stopped the engine supply. It sounds conspiracy theory but I have seen this happen – Foreign bankers pulling the rug from under an Indian client whose product was beginning to eat a little into their older client’s market. Therefore, as a policy, development of any platform using critical US/Chinese equipment is ill advised. Attempts to export will be “dealt with”.

 If on the other hand we are stoic and ask ourselves what is the best we can develop by ourselves the answers are quite encouraging and needs exploration; We can rewrite the “rules” of the game and come up with a sensible weapon. US weapons- for all their capability-are not. If the IAF and the IN will modify- after discussions- the requirements of super cruise and Mach 1.6 top speed it should be possible to design a better (smaller, lighter, cheaper, longer range, better maneuverability and with the same internal armament) “cherry picked” or “frugal” 5^th generation fighter around the Kaveri. 

Specifications are haphazard things- rather like packing for vacations (note 1)

The proposed fighter a,stealth 2^nd generation airframe with 5th generation systems optimizes both dogfight capability which Is not going to die and BVR capability which is not going to go away.  Unavailable in the market, such a combination will interest  “budget” Air Forces because it fulfils a  need of sensible modernity. Operationally such unusual technology combinations are formidable. Bekaa Valley was used to market the concept of quality over quantity i.e. buy expensive weapons. It is clear that if the Syrian AF had in the Bekaa Valley its MiG 17s with some simple (by 1983 standards) avionics and missile upgrades it would have deterred the Incident which is even better than fighting and winning. You might sometime read it at: Prof. Prodyut Das 2: Lessons from the Bekaa Valley https://prodyut7.blogspot.com/2020/01/lessons-from-bekaa-valley.html?spref=tw  & ( note2)

The (heretic?) design beliefs

Any proposals a minimum combat aircraft will have key “heretic” design beliefs. The Messerschmitt Me 109 centred around a small wing (25 % smaller than a Spitfire’s) tamed and made to work hard by a then unheard-of combination of high lift devices. Indeed, the Me 109 high wing loading approach was so expected to fail against the competing He 112 that the trials were regarded as   formality. The DH Mosquito design was centred around the belief that a bomber without any defensive armament could not survive by relying on speed alone. Met with disbelief of experts both designs vindicated their designer’s belief.

What are some of the beliefs behind the concept of the “frugal” 5^th generation?

1.      Specifications are made by the Military who do not pay for what they buy , its usage is controlled by Politicians who have don’t know about war. The design is made by people who  think that the Customer is an unnecessary nuisance. The result is that weapons are usually a compromise of the efforts of disconnected people with disconnected ideas e.g. the blind men and the elephant. When the people do talk & respect each other and collaborate the results are of the legends but as you might know legends occur but rarely.

2.      Argue- and this is where you need deep domain knowledge- the specifications. An engineering product-even your family car- never uses all the capability built into it.

3.       Often one specified capability will eat into another e.g. High Mach no cuts range & fuel storage volume- see 2 above.

4.      Neither BVR nor the Dog fight is going to go away but the aerodynamics required for the one is damagingly different from the other. Again 2 above.

5.      The Kaveri/HTFE 25 will not achieve their latent potential just now. Start with the realistic pessimism that for the present the best that the Kaveri can give is circa 45-50 kN and no A/B and 55kN and 82 kN with A/B can be hoped for by roll out. This indicates a clean i.e. “stealth” TO weight of around 10,000 kgs. The only task we can do with the present power will be a sniper against enemy 5^th and 4^th generation combat aircraft. Therefore, as of now follow “Not a pound for the ground” approach of the F 16A.

6.      An improved 2^nd gen. airframe with 5^th gen. features will make the 4^th gen completely obsolescent & be more practical in certain roles than any pure 4^thor 5^th generation.

7.      There is economics in warfare. A cheap deterrence to the enemy’s expensive capability e.g. the IAFs Gnat’s restricting the effectiveness of the PAFs F 104s and Mirage IIIs was a significant contribution.

8.      The introduction of AI in weapons has changed the importance of the performance of the platform and performance no longer hefts quite the same weight.  

9.      The brochure claims not only contradict (pt.2.) but also obfuscate. Super cruise is achievable only at altitudes. At sea level a super cruising 5^th generation would have a combat radius of perhaps 110 n.m. Any takers?

10.   The maximum BVR ranges quoted are for a combination of circumstances that do not occur in combat. Indeed a 5^th generation a/c at 15,000 mts (for best BVR range) is very vulnerable to a low flying “frugal 5^th generation”  fighter.

11.   Fitting guns on to a supersonic airframe does not make a “dog fighter”. Exercises like “Operation Feather Duster “showed that fitting guns only tempted aggressive pilots in supersonic airframes to engage in turning combat where they were at a disadvantage against 2^nd generation airframes. In the experiment a vintage F 86 H consistently out fought the F100, F 101, F 102, F 104, F 105, F 106 and the F 4. A “conventional” 5^th generation with guns is not a solution for “close” combat. It is tempting fate.

12.   Stealth or the RCS is affected positively by both size (e.g. F 5, Gnat, MiG 21) and shape (Vulcan) even with non- stealthy design practices. For a given level of Design competence the smaller the aircraft, the smaller the RCS hence a premium on small size.

13.   The subsonic (Mach M 0.95 at SL) airframe is about 40% smaller and requires 50% lower power carrying the same internal payload as a comparable Mach 1.3 fighter.  This gets worse as one goes up the Mach scale. The Americans, as is their habit, made things worse by adding VSTOL in the F 35 and YF 32 airframes. One thought they would have learnt after the F 111.

14.    Swing role is illogical for Stealth generation being a specialist tool. Its capabilities in a non-stealth mode is non sequiter. It should not be used for bomb truck work.

15.   What we generally know about stealth is not worth anything. What is worth knowing is not available.

Going about it

What we know about stealth is not worth knowing. What we need to know we cannot access. We have to start from first principles e.g. Sokolnikoff’s equation, that stealth is not an omni- directional “fuzz ball” but RCS spikes can be tailored, that the increase or decrease of Radar returns “cuts” both ways. Without a previous programme of acquisition of stealth technology, we will go off the rails. The Private sector is unwilling to join the SPV for the AMCA..  They may not know aircraft design but they know that the required level of homework has not been done.

Amongst the many details required would be:

i)                 Stealth shapes

ii)                RAM coatings

iii)              Fits and finish requirements

iv)              Manufacturing tolerances specially at joints & hinges

v)                Weapons cuing and launch

vi)              Compressor face RCS reduction

vii)             Cockpit coatings

viii)            Maintainability of stealth

The list is indicative of the degree of “fiddle” information that we will need to have before we can have a viable 5^th generation “stealth “design capability. My estimate is that with the present level of preparation ADA will end up with a large 4^th. Generation aircraft.

A bias for action

My insistence on putting emphasis on developing practical stealth data is based on experience. Excellent organizations have a bias for action which is a preference for doing something - anything - rather than sending a problem through cycles and cycles of analyses and committee reports.

ADA has in 15 years not developed applied stealth data. It may have done computer simulation by the ton but it is easy to be gulled by colour Computer displays. The following story illustrates. As everyone- barring those two Lamas in North Tibet- know by now, the F 35 for USN failed in its “trapping “tests leading to a two years delay in service introduction. The crisis was caused by the tail hook being too close to the mainwheel. I am told the story went like this: The arrestor wire should stand off the deck by about 350 mm so that the hook can firmly snag it. If the hook is too close to the mainwheels there is no time for the wire, after being pressed down to the deck by the wheel, to regain its set height and the tip of the hook will simply ran over it without snagging. This would never have happened with Grumman or Vought but LM was doing it for the first time. (Note 4)

The story of course improves with the telling. It is told that when the LM people turned up with their F 35 for trial an ordinary sailor, picking his teeth, asked “Haven’t you got the hook too close to the mainwheel, Mister?”. My reason for including this delicious last bit is to emphasis that if one is willing to carefully listen to aviation old wives’ tales, folklore and even superstitions and use those carefully to buttress one’s formal knowledge then quite heavy design loads can be easily carried on slender resources. Methinks the Turkish and Korean successes being hailed in India can be explained by the above.

The lure of “Socialist Funding” is too much to resist and often the primary concern is exclusive control of considerable funds.  Much of our problems with the Tejas arose from the initial unwillingness of ADA to listen to the Customer. For the next project please please (sic) hold a Fighter design Panchayat involving all the cognoscenti from all levels of involvement to buttress our fighter design resources. Nobody or Organization can design a fighter singly without involvement- as equal amongst equals- pares inter pares- of others stake holders. Pulling rank or strings does not work in Fighter Design. We see what happens don’t we?

Short Cuts: Using the existing knowledge base

It is a stupid to waste talent to re-invent the wheel. Copying – looking carefully, thinking some and then looking around some more again- saves both effort and provides the assurance of risk reduction if not a proven solution. Providing one has sufficient experience Copying is a part of the practical engineer’s tool kit. If you have nothing better to do you might be interested in my notes on this at Prof. Prodyut Das 2: Copying- its role in engineering product development. The Twitter link https://prodyut7.blogspot.com/2019/07/copying-its-role-in-engineering-product.html?spref=tw . This is based on parts of my lectures on engineering product design.

Copying: Looking around

Who to “copy”? Casting an eye at Stealth aircraft it is best to not attach too much importance to “Artist’s impressions”. I remember a fairly recent a Chinese Fighter rendition that looked like a Northrop F5 that had crashed into a Victorinox (Swiss Knife) factory. They are interesting and amusing and should be scanned carefully just to check for hidden gems or, more usually, laughs but the trick is to focus on stuff that has been actually prototyped. It means that some cold- blooded banker with only profit opportunities in his ROM found the proposal of some promise and believe you me those bankers are better at assessing an aircraft’s potential than you would like to credit them for. We should use the due diligence they have done for us. Given the uncertainties of the technologies only configurations that will not require FBW mandatorily to fly initially were examined because FBW may not be ready on time. Below is the result of my trawl:

Boeing XF 32/ Sukhoi 75

Very Compact dimensions which would be of interest of the Navy. Wing folding (130 kgs avg. wt. savings) may not be required as in the AD4 Skyhawk. Good “acreage” for 5^th generation sensors. Well located high cockpit to give the pilot good visibility (at least for the upper plane). Good emphasis on “robust stealth”- faceted sides, nose intake.  carefully masked jet pipe a feature perhaps “looked around” from the OKB Yakovlev. The stealth is carefully tailored to minimize signature in the forward hemisphere. The YF 32 aircraft is also cousin to the Sukhoi 75. Shorn of the “Super cruise” and “VTOL” requirement a Kaveri engine version would be more compact and lighter and still may hit about M1.2-1,3 without a/b. Twin HTFE 25 engine version also possible. What I find most exciting is the structural possibilities. The Wing for example can be designed in one piece tip to tip like a big fuel tank again as in the Douglas A4. It can additionally form a “Ponton” chassis or raft foundation for the fuselage which will be a space frame containing the engines and systems and attached to the underside of the wing and the whole skinned with stabilized composites which in the YF stage would be a boon for fine tuning stealth signatures. Serviceability would be excellent. The YF 32 may be ugly but engineering wise it is beautiful even though the US-as seems to be their habit- complicated matter by adding VSTOL. The swing ramp of the inlet is a neat solution for inlet flows during carrier approach. Another possibility of the high wing layout of the XF 32 base is the variable incidence wing. Used by the Vought F 8U Crusader from the ‘60s the wing was hinged along the rear spar and raised by Hydraulic jacks to 7 degrees it was linked to drooped LE and TE Flaps and allowed the Crusader to approach carriers at comfortable attitudes and speeds.   I feel quite kindly of the YF 32 but please don’t tell anyone that. The polloi will not stop laughing.

Northrop YF 23/Sukhoi 57

This design was studied because it is not only of a twin- engine configuration which always make the Navy feel comfortable but more so because the design permits relatively quick redesign to suit a range of similar engines. If engine A is embargoed the designer can always fit engine B from another source without having to change the issue nos. of x thousand drawings. Providing for possible engine embargoes is KPR for Indian Chief Designers. The Su 57 seems to be a stealth flavoured Su 30 MKI which can be a way to go. I mean start with the Su 30 MKI or MiG 29 and see how we can reduce the RCS of those engines- and keep going on from there accepting some reduction on max speed. The Su 30MKI’s “ponton” structure makes such “stealth-ification” modifications easy,

AMCA

ADA has spent about INR 2500 crores @ (Rs.2024) on developing the design. I would release funds to build 2-3 AMCA prototypes even with the F 404 engines subject to a quick due diligence of ADA’s claims of preparations. Let there be a bias for action so that some hard data and validation of our stealth technology. It will be such a waste of time to wait for the “perfect” engine i.e. F 414 etc only to find that a now hidden problem having nothing to do with engine thrust  holding up the project. Use the time now to sort out those issues. - the stealth design of the gun port for the 23mm or a pilot entry handgrip or the position of pitots perhaps-the usual frustrating minutiae of aircraft design- let’s get that out of the way.

 Even if shortage of F 404s is an issue it still makes sense to allot 6 or so to the AMCA programme. The F 404/414 engines are a drop fit exchange and only the ducts, plumbing & mountings need some fiddling. This contingency (alternate engine mountings) should have been anticipated and worked out long before. If ADA thinks that needs more than six months to do that, they should not be in aircraft design. The Tejas has low priority because the Mk1A needs further weight improvement (5600 kilos) to reach its true potential. At a pinch, take the engines from the Sulur Mk1s which are at 7300 kilos empty weight and their engines are idling. I hv been assured by someone in Twitter that ADA has on hold 17 F 404 engines of various marks and therefore shortage of engines is not an issue . He gave the list with mark nos. Thank you.

Gnat /Ajeet

I was lucky to have worked on this aircraft and it was an education in engineering ingenuity. Brilliant to the point of genius (though a somewhat erratic genius) It deserves attention because we have much information on the aircraft. Its airframe was optimized precisely for the regime where combats most occur. It is also simple and easy to build the Gnat being the first production aircraft that this firm built.

The aircraft has naturally stealthy features which made it difficult to pick up on radar or acquire visually. Apart from small size an examination of its 3 views shows that somehow it followed basic rules now being used for stealth -its wing L.E. sweep angles are the same as that of the tailplane and the lack of fences and LE devices lower RCS without affecting its proven dogfighting capabilities. As a bonus It was also “naturally” area ruled it.

Joint and Panel lines are bad for stealth. The Gnat’s use of fewer control surfaces- e.g. Flaps & ailerons are combined as are undercarriage covers and airbrakes and will assist in RCS reduction.

The modest power of the engine is another naturally stealthy feature.

The above low RCS features are combined in the Sniper Gnat with a DST (more for weight and stealth than performance) a shielded engine exhaust and a modest use of composites at the start.

The Gnat Gun Bays housing the Adens and the ammunition system will be extended to form the missile bays for up to 4 missiles the sizes being identical to those of the AMCA.

The Gnat was based on a smaller Midge and it is proposed to use the Gnat as a basis for the 5^th gen, Sniper Gnat using at the start, an un reheated Kaveri as the powerplant. The Table gives provisional dimensions and shows how small the aircraft will be- between a Gnat and a Tejas in size.

Some figures

The final figures will be arrived at after the panchayat meetings but the figures below are seed for thought from what some half a dozen initial Project studies indicates: A small light fighter armed with 2 BVRs and two CCMs or 4 SDRM e.g ( FAB 100/200)  plus a pipedream “dogfight” armament of 4x 23 or even 4x15. The beauty of the flakvierling arrangement increases the area of Lethal density of a burst compared to four individual weapons. The default would be a GSh 23- or 30-mm AO 65

The ideal engine would be a 50kN class Turbofan with a relatively higher BPR (1-2) than is used in fighters to optimize the fuel consumption in the design best regime of M 0.8 but this being a political” aircraft the Kaveri or 2x HTFE 25 is the only choice though the Chief Designer must keep in mind a plan “B”. The internal fuel will be around 2800 kilos giving better range than the Tejas Mk2/ AMCA because of higher specific fuel availability (kg. of fuel /kN of thrust). Flight refueling will be available but initially no retractable probe- it makes stealth and weight management difficult.  The a/c size of would be smaller than the Tejas- between 12 and 13 mts length, a span of 9-10 mts and an empty weight of 4700-5200 kgs which would include about 400-500 kgs in “black boxes” (i.e. without cabling, brackets etc.) for “stealth detection”.

The first prototypes will require no FBW or Composites and would check out specific stealth performance and mechanical problems. To speed up prototype use of existing systems and accessories from various programmes would be maximized. It is possible to develop such a politically independent “sniper” for one fifth the time and one tenth the cost of current standards. What we have today is because we completely sidelined for too long the better half of our Industry-the expertise, management abilities and resources of the Private sector.

Managing the programme

One way or running a programme is to believe that one can know everything and all that is needed is to send a question or problem through cycles and cycles of analyses and committee reports. When the refined idea is converted into hardware the assumption is that it must work.   When it does not work redesign is near impossible. Plans are long term made assuming that the project will succeed. When the project does inevitably hit road blocks it is found that the project has become too large to be shut down and even though deliveries and cost overruns are unsatisfactory the path is doggedly ploughed till the product becomes outdated because there are no local alternatives.

The more successful approach is to assume that the project can get stuck at any and every step. One sets up only short-term goals initially -as in the case of the development of stealth XF 117- three people working for six weeks- to establish a particular point.  Each “firm base” leads to the next. firm base. There are a large number of rapid small steps and this is the model to follow   short term plans ensure  that promises are made and received by people who will be there. 

Below is what I consider to be feasible. It covers just the first year & the project is to be closed down if it is not going anywhere. The purpose would be to be generate data & “objects” with which to discuss and market the Sniper with the Indian and Africa/Gulf air forces in 2025 Aero India and similar exhibitions.   

Table 1 A plan of exploration for developing a 5th. generation

Stage	Period	Manpower ((Man hours)	Deliverables	Estimated cost
1	6 months	4  (4000 hrs)	1.Comparison of 10-12 configurations. 2. Building of R/C “Free flight” models, Initial RCS studies 3.Contacting potential Customers	80-100 lakhs. (this will vary with Company)
2	6 months	10 (incl. 4 above) (10,000 hrs)	1.      Refine select Configurations 2.      Build exhibition models 3.      Work out a project study in case phase 3 is sanctioned 4.      Exhibit at Aero India ‘25 and build a full -size mock up 5.      Review	300- 400 lakhs

 

The task is to have a number of competitive proposals (Last year the Army got 28 proposals for an AFV RFI) about the Sniper. The proposals will examine what is the best “sovereign” product we can have. Given the very small sums risked the Government should fund the Private sector to set up at least one or two teams/consortiums- more if some teams come up with interesting ideas up to the above steps as an insurance for the AMCA project.

In closing

I o not believe there is sufficient preparation to commit to a full- fledged 5th Generation fighter. To call out ADA’s claims of preparedness- five airframes should be sanctioned to salvage and glean whatever can be gleaned. One as a fatigue airframe, one as a spare and three as flight test vehicles to check whatever can be checked out- stealth, systems, exploration of envelope etc the airframes being equipped with whatever we have in terms of engines and systems. Even this should be closed down if it begins to delay. The ADA AMCA by the insular process of its creation is going to be mediocre. Our chances are zero.

Inadequate Funds,”first time doing”  and lack of facilities, usually cited as causes are not reasons. They are the symptoms of a lack of will and commitment. The reason is our neglect to marshal all resources available and harness them to good management practice.

Finally, it is a question of choosing between two difficult options. One option is to wait for the risk and time it takes to develop the appropriate engine and then proceed to develop a “full house” 5^th. Generation.

 The second is to redefine what should be the specification of an IAF  5th. Generation and develop one using the power of what we have from the Kaveri/ HTFE 2500 at the moment. No single entity – the IAF/IN, GOI, ADA/HAL, DPSUs, the Cognoscenti can individually get the right answer The wise men can see only a part of the problem. It is only by blending of all the inputs we will be able to see the whole elephant which is why it is so important to have a Fighter Design Panchayat. Let in that panchayat conflicting ideas be heard and examined and gleaned of their merit and cross seeded. With so much intellectual and practical resources we will surprise the world about our capability.

The Sniper 5^th generation is a good starting concept. Refined, it will give us an useful warplane and also an export Industry.

  

  Table 1. A comparison of parameters of 5^th and Frugal 5^th generation Fighters.

Dimensions (unless otherwise mentioned) in MKS units.

Figures are under constant refinement and may be treated as provisional as of date.

Sl.No.	Parameter	Sniper YF 32	Gnat Sniper	AMCA
1	Span	8.34	9.31	11.13
2	Length	12.6	13,0	17.6
3	Height	3.5	3.15	4.5
4	Wing area	33	27.7	55
5	Empty weight	5000	4800	12,000
6	Clean (Stealth) weight	9,200	8900	18,000* (21,700)
7	Maximum weight1	n. a. in Block 1	n. a. block 1	25,000
8	Fuel weight	2800	2700	6500
9	Weapons load	1000	1000	2500
10	Specific fuel availability	56	55	40
11	Wing loading	273	321	394
12	Power Loading	5.76/8.69**	5.61/8.98**	7.37/10.5
13	Engine thrust ( kN)	53*	53*	2x80/115
14	Aspect ratio	2.1	3,2	2.25
15	Max Speed	M 1.2-1.3*	1.2-1.3	M1.6

·        ¹ Sl. no 7 max wt. is not applicable because it is presumed that initially all 5^th.gen a/c available will be used in “clean” i.e.only in stealth mode without any external loads.

·        Official AMCA figures for Gross weight 18,000 kgs will not allow the maximum internal fuel weight of 6500 kgs to be carried. In this comparison in all cases the max, internal fuel load is considered and this give the clean Gross weight at 21,700 kgs for the AMCA.

·        The “better” thrust to weight ratio of the AMCA (sl.no 12) comes at the cost of poorer fuel availability.  40 kg/kN whereas the Snipers have about 40% more fuel as endurance is considered more important in warfare with AI enabled weapon.

·        ** Assuming availability of a Kaveri with a rating of 48/78kN (i.e. similar to F 404) by 2027,

Note 1.

Digressing, the Kaveri is within an ace of success now with Godrej being involved. I expect carefully thought-out QC, QA and assembly planning will improve the Kaveri’s cold thrust, reheat stability & reduced blade shedding. This is not a plug for Godrej but based on engineering fundas & what has happened in history.

(note2) Questioning specifications

The entire process of specifications formulation starts off realistically enough but very soon it is taken over by other forces. The result may be bewildering. I would recommend you listen to an amplification of my views at the references given below etc. but I will briefly cite just one example here.

In the 1960s the British issued a specification GOR 339 that resulted in the TSR2. It asked for a low- level supersonic bomber capable of carrying a nuclear weapon and capable of terrain following and have a Mach 2 dash performance. Various forces including “the import lobby” finally scotched that aircraft including destroying the prototypes & the production tooling so that it could not be put back into production after the next elections. but that also happened with the Avro Canada Arrow. The US tried to sell its F 111 but finally the “winner” was the F 4 Phantom. Being British the customer managed to confuse things there also and insistence on the use of the RR Spey led to cost increases due to re-design resulting in the final numbers of Phantom to be much less than initially hoped. The absurdity however is how could an operational requirement originally calling for a low- level supersonic bomber capable of taking off from a grass field be replaced by a Phantom and why was such a solution finally found acceptable? You see what I mean? There is no connection between what is being asked for and what will finally accepted. Be warned this is by no means an isolated example.

Note 3

History does indeed repeat itself. The USSR faced a similar situation in 1940. The country was under threat, it had only one Fighter Design Bureau (Polikarpov) and that was failing. Stalin held conference of the Aviation people and sanctioned the development of fighter proposals by 23 teams some of whom were new to fighter design. When asked about so many teams Stalin replied he did not expect that all 23 would succeed but the urgency needed taking of every measure. Many failed but 3 of the 23 became world famous fighter design bureaux.

Note 4. In case you wanted the sailor's salty statement about the F 35s arrester hook verbatim. The point I emphasize is that even at the bottom of the ecosystem there is knowledge and insights which one must not be too proud to stoop and learn.

"Boss," he says to me, "This fucker ain't gonna work. Look at this thing. It's short, it's too close to the wheels, and look at this dumbass hook shoe they got on it. If the wire don't hit it exactly right, it's just gonna go under the hook and you'll bolter."

General discussions on stealth fighters are at.

Part 1 - https://youtu.be/cZ6YsfLvc6A

Part 2 - https://youtu.be/ObsLita2zrc

Part 3   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cZ6YsfLvc6A

Part 4   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7N0Bzvzb-SY

Part 5   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0kp9zxGRTpU                                               Part 6   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NvyzUuOl-SM&t=1s

 

Prof. Prodyut Das 2:  Developing Stealth Technology. https://prodyut7.blogspot.com/2024/01/prof.html?spref=tw

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7N0Bzvzb-SY

 

The Graph shows that at the region where combats is most likely to take place or wind up in. BVR missile  ranges may be no more than 10-20 kms i.e. about 20 to 40 seconds to acquire, confirm and launch the missile under ideal conditions including flying over a “flat earth” terrain as in Ukraine, Effect of mountains, direction of flight etc will increase difficulties.

The Super Gnat Sniper

Figure 1 The Super Gnat Sniper 2-5th Generation. The aircraft is smaller than a Tejas Mk1. The weapons bays below the wings are 4000x 400 x variable depth.

 The Drawing shows the schematic planform. Span 9310 mm, Length 13000mm, Ht 3150 mm: 

Dimension are subject to refining.